Sandra Sheridan v. State of Florida, Department of Health
182 So. 3d 787
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2016Background
- Sheridan, terminated by the Florida Department of Health, dual-filed an EEOC charge that she intended to be filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR).
- EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights (right-to-sue) because the federal charge was untimely; the notice contained a 90-day federal filing deadline and warned state deadlines may differ.
- Forty-four days after filing the EEOC charge and within the EEOC 90-day window, Sheridan sued in state court under the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) before the FCHR made any reasonable-cause determination or the 180-day investigatory period elapsed.
- The Department moved for summary judgment arguing Sheridan’s suit was premature (filed before FCHR’s 180 days or cause determination), which divested FCHR of jurisdiction and barred Sheridan from relief because the one-year filing window could not be re-triggered.
- The trial court granted final summary judgment for the Department; Sheridan appealed.
- On appeal the First District held Sheridan’s suit was premature (failed to exhaust FCRA administrative prerequisites) but reversed summary judgment because the defect was cured by the passage of time and the FCHR in fact had no record or action on the charge.
Issues
| Issue | Sheridan's Argument | Department's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sheridan’s state-court suit was timely despite FCHR not having made a reasonable-cause determination or the 180 days elapsing | The EEOC right-to-sue notice (90 days) triggered a single worksharing deadline; she reasonably filed within that federal window | Suit was premature under FCRA because FCHR had to be afforded 180 days or make a cause determination before suit | Court: Suit was premature—EEOC notice did not satisfy FCRA administrative prerequisites because EEOC made no cause/no-cause determination and the notice warned state deadlines may differ |
| Whether an EEOC right-to-sue notice can substitute for an FCHR reasonable-cause determination under the worksharing agreement | Worksharing makes agencies act as one; EEOC notice should allow state suit | No provision makes EEOC notice bind FCHR; here EEOC issued the notice for untimeliness, not on the merits | Court: EEOC notice did not operate as an FCHR reasonable-cause determination; cannot be used to bypass FCHR procedures |
| Whether filing a premature FCRA lawsuit divests the FCHR of jurisdiction over the charge | Premature filing should not permanently extinguish the FCHR process; at least abate or dismiss without prejudice | Filing divests FCHR jurisdiction (per prior precedent) and can require restarting administrative charge, which may be time-barred | Court: A prematurely filed suit does not divest the FCHR of jurisdiction; only a timely suit after a cause determination divests the commission |
| Proper disposition when a suit is premature: dismissal vs. abatement/reinstatement | If premature, court should hold in abeyance or dismiss without prejudice; denying access to courts violates FCRA liberality | Premature filing that prevents FCHR from using 180 days is fatal; dismissal required | Court: Disposition depends on circumstances. Here the premature defect was cured by time and FCHR had no record of the charge, so summary judgment was erroneous and case must be reinstated |
Key Cases Cited
- Woodham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., 829 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2002) (EEOC right-to-sue does not substitute for an FCHR reasonable-cause/no-cause determination)
- Webb v. Worldwide Flight Serv., Inc., 407 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2005) (section 760.11(5) divestiture applies to timely-filed actions after an FCHR cause determination; premature suits do not divest FCHR)
- Jackson v. Worldwide Flight Servs., Inc., 960 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (rejecting rule that premature filing automatically divests FCHR; distinguishing earlier contrary precedent)
- Sweeney v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 725 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (earlier decision supporting divestiture theory; discussed and distinguished)
- McElrath v. Burley, 707 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (describing FCRA’s administrative screening purpose and 180-day backstop)