Sandra Saks, Lee Nick McFadin, III, and Margaret Landen Saks v. Broadway Coffeehouse LLC and Marcus Rogers, as Trustee for the Saks Children Trust A/K/A ATFL&L, a Texas Trust
04-14-00734-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 25, 2015Background
- Appellants (Saks family members) appealed a trial-court judgment in favor of Broadway Coffeehouse and Marcus Rogers (as trustee) resolving ownership of 5321 Broadway Partners: Coffeehouse 25%, Trustee 75%, and ordering sale of the property.
- Broadway Coffeehouse obtained partial summary judgment on claims to quiet title, partition, and winding up/termination of the partnership; the motion did not seek declaratory relief.
- The final judgment incorporated the partial summary judgment and also awarded attorney's fees to Broadway Coffeehouse and Marcus Rogers, Trustee.
- Appellants moved for rehearing en banc, arguing the fee awards were improper because: (1) no independent declaratory-judgment claim was pleaded or granted to support fees under the UDJA (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009); (2) the partial summary judgment never requested declaratory relief; and (3) fees were not segregated among claims/parties.
- Appellants rely on the “American Rule” (fees only by statute or contract) and argue that using the UDJA as a vehicle to obtain fees would improperly circumvent statutory limits on fee recovery for quiet-title/partition/partnership claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether attorney's fees awarded under the Declaratory Judgments Act (Ch. 37) are available when the relief granted was quiet title/partition/partnership winding up (no independent declaratory judgment granted) | Broadway/Trustee rely on §37.009 to recover fees tied to resolution of ownership rights | Appellants: UDJA cannot be used to obtain otherwise unavailable fees; no declaratory relief was pleaded or granted | Court affirmed fee award (appellate opinion did so; appellants argue that was error) |
| Whether summary-judgment motions and orders expressly presented or granted declaratory relief necessary to support fees | Broadway/Trustee implicitly assert declaratory theory or rely on pleading for fees | Appellants: motion and order did not request/grant declaratory relief; summary judgment limited to grounds in motion | Appellants contend the court erred because summary judgment and final judgment did not expressly grant declaratory relief |
| Whether attorney's fees must be segregated among claims/parties before award | Broadway/Trustee sought fees generally for prevailing parties | Appellants: fees were not segregated among multiple claims (quiet title, partition, UDJA, injunction, partnership claims) or among defendants; trial court abused discretion by awarding unsegregated fees | Appellants argue segregations required (citing Tony Gullo); they maintain award was improper absent segregation |
Key Cases Cited
- Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Murphy, 458 S.W.3d 912 (Tex. 2015) (party may not recover attorney's fees unless authorized by statute or contract)
- MBM Financial Corporation v. The Woodlands Operating Company, L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2009) (UDJA cannot be used to obtain otherwise impermissible attorney's fees; specific statutes prevail over general fee provisions)
- Lehmann v. Harborg Title Co., 39 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. 2001) (a summary-judgment order is final only when it disposes of all parties and claims)
- McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1993) (summary-judgment grounds must be expressly presented in the motion, not only in evidence or briefs)
- Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. 1997) (limitations on summary-judgment procedural requirements)
- Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006) (trial court abuses discretion in awarding fees when movant fails to segregate fees among claims)