Sandra Bazile v. Finance System of Green Bay, I, 983 F.3d 274

Bazile received a debt-collection letter stating a date and a $92.23 balance but not whether interest would accrue or cause the amount to increase.
She sued under the FDCPA, alleging the letter was misleading and failed to disclose the amount of the debt as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) and § 1692e.
The collector moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing (Rule 12(b)(1)) and for failure to state a claim (Rule 12(b)(6)).
The district court, relying on earlier reasoning in Larkin, concluded Bazile had standing but dismissed on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6).
The Seventh Circuit had recently held in Larkin that a statutory violation alone is not necessarily a concrete injury; a plaintiff must allege personal harm or a risk of harm.
Here the collector later asserted (factually) that interest was not accruing, casting doubt on Bazile’s standing; the Seventh Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing under Rule 12(b)(1) to resolve the factual dispute about standing before reaching the merits.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Bazile has Article III standing to sue for alleged FDCPA omission about interest accrual	Bazile: omission rendered the debt amount misleading and deprived her information needed to make debt-management choices, causing or risking concrete harm	Collector: no Article III injury because either no interest was accruing or Bazile suffered no substantive harm from any omission	Court: complaint plausibly alleges concrete injury, but factual dispute (collector says no interest accrued) requires proof; remand for evidentiary hearing on standing
Proper procedure when facts underlying standing are contested	Bazile: pleadings suffice to establish standing at the outset	Collector: challenges the truth of jurisdictional facts (a factual attack)	Court: where jurisdictional facts are contested, district court must resolve via evidentiary procedures (Rule 12(b)(1) factual attack); remand for hearing

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (standing requires a concrete and particularized injury)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (elements of standing and pleading-stage standards)
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (jurisdictional threshold must be decided before merits)
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing as jurisdictional prerequisite)
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178 (1936) (plaintiff must prove jurisdictional facts by a preponderance when contested)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard: plausible allegations and discovery expectations)
Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2018) (statutory nonreceipt of information can be concrete harm if it impairs a substantive statutory interest)
Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., Inc., 926 F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 2019) (procedural violation insufficient where plaintiff would have acted the same)
Aker v. Americollect, Inc., 854 F.3d 397 (7th Cir. 2017) (pleading need not be elaborate; context may support inference of interest accrual)
Kanzelberger v. Kanzelberger, 782 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1986) (court must conduct supplementary factual proceedings when jurisdictional allegations are doubtful)
Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1987) (resolve jurisdictional factual disputes rather than dismiss outright)