Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.
678 F.3d 590
| 7th Cir. | 2012Background
- 800 current/former hourly workers at U.S. Steel Gary works; dispute over compensability of clothes-changing time and travel time under FLSA 203(o) and Portal-to-Portal Act §254; district court held clothes-changing not compensable, travel time potentially compensable; court granted interlocutory appeal on travel time; plaintiffs cross-appealed regarding clothes-changing time but the cross-appeal was dismissed; majority resolves in favor of employer on clothes-changing issue, with travel-time ruling dependent on that decision.
- Clothes-changing time and travel time are governed by 203(o) exclusion and 254(a) exemption, respectively, under a prevailing collective bargaining agreement; the agreement excludes clothes-changing from compensation.
- The district judge properly treated clothes-changing time as noncompensable under §203(o) given the CBA, and the travel-time exemption follows if clothes-changing is noncompensable.
- Courts historically emphasize negotiation between labor and management under Portal-to-Portal Act to avoid broad liability for employer practices.
- The Department of Labor’s amicus briefing varied by administration, but the Seventh Circuit defers to statutory interpretation and agency practice, ultimately resolving the interlocutory issue in favor of U.S. Steel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is clothes-changing time compensable under 203(o)? | Sandifer argues clothes-changing is compensable. | U.S. Steel argues 203(o) excludes clothes-changing under a bona fide CBA. | Noncompensable under 203(o). |
| Does travel time qualify for the Portal-to-Portal exemption given the clothes-changing ruling? | Travel time should be compensable if not part of principal activity. | Travel time is exempt when clothes-changing is nonworking time under 254(a). | Exempt travel time under 254(a) due to 203(o) exclusion. |
| Was the cross-appeal properly entertained under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b)? | Plaintiffs could appeal clothes-changing issue. | Cross-appeal failed procedural requirement. | Cross-appeal dismissed; merits unaffected. |
| What is the correct interpretation of 203(o) as exclusion vs. exemption and its effect on “principal activity”? | Clothes-changing constitutes compensable work under principal activity. | Clothes-changing is excluded if agreed in CBA; not principal activity for travel. | 203(o) is an exclusion; clothes-changing can be noncompensable when agreed in CBA. |
Key Cases Cited
- Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (U.S. 1956) (integral and indispensable part of principal activity; donning/doffing can be principal activity under certain conditions)
- IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 514 (U.S. 2006) (donning/doffing may be integrated into principal activity; walk between activities may be noncompensable)
- Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (U.S. 1946) (broad definition of work; basis for Portal-to-Portal exemptions/considerations)
- Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010) (addressed §203(o); treated changing time as principal activity (rejecting reasoning))
- Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejected treating §203(o) as exemption; distinguished 203(o) as exclusion)
- Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 2010) (adopted Sepulveda’s reasoning; recognized §203(o) exclusion)
- Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2009) (held 203(o) exclusion applies; considered donning/doffing as part of principal activity)