904 F.3d 643
9th Cir.2017Background
- Sanchez, a Mexican national who entered without inspection in 1988, was on a short recreational fishing trip in U.S. territorial waters when his boat lost power and the U.S. Coast Guard towed him back to Channel Islands Harbor.
- Upon return, Coast Guard officers detained, frisked, and collected ID from Sanchez and his companions; Coast Guard contacted CBP reporting them as "possible" undocumented workers.
- Sanchez produced a driver’s license to the Coast Guard but was held ~2 hours until CBP arrived; CBP later interrogated and prepared Form I-213 noting inability to establish positive identity.
- Sanchez was placed in removal proceedings; the Government introduced the I-213 to prove alienage and entry without inspection.
- Sanchez moved to suppress and terminate proceedings, arguing the Coast Guard detained him based solely on his Latino appearance in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2) and the Fourth Amendment.
- The IJ and BIA denied suppression and affirmed removal; the Ninth Circuit granted review, found a prima facie regulatory violation and racial profiling, and remanded for the agency to rebut and consider termination without prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Coast Guard acted as "immigration officers" subject to 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2) | Coast Guard enforced immigration law here and thus are subject to immigration regulations | Coast Guard not formally listed in DHS regulatory definition of immigration officers | Coast Guard are agents enforcing INA and therefore subject to § 287.8(b)(2) under 14 U.S.C. § 89(b) |
| Whether detention lacked reasonable suspicion under § 287.8(b)(2) | Detention was based solely on race/Latino appearance; no specific articulable facts justified detention (Sanchez produced a license) | Government relied on Form I-213 and asserted independent bases for identity/evidence | Court found prima facie that officers lacked specific articulable facts and likely detained Sanchez based on race, violating § 287.8(b)(2) |
| Whether the regulation benefits aliens and prejudice must be shown | § 287.8(b)(2) implements Fourth Amendment protections; where regulation tracks constitutional rights, prejudice may be presumed | Government argued exclusionary rule generally does not apply and that preexisting records insensitive to suppression (e.g., prior applications) are admissible | Court held the regulation was promulgated for beneficiaries like Sanchez and, because it reflects constitutional standards, prejudice may be presumed |
| Appropriate remedy: suppression, remand, or termination without prejudice | Given egregious racial profiling, Sanchez sought suppression and termination without prejudice | Government asserted independent, untainted evidence (Family Unity and EAD applications) justified continuing proceedings | Court granted petition, remanded for agency to rebut prima facie showing; if Government fails, agency must consider terminating proceedings without prejudice (termination reserved for egregious violations) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (U.S. 1975) (race/ethnicity cannot alone justify reasonable suspicion)
- Calderon-Medina v. United States, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979) (regulatory violations can invalidate deportation actions; prejudice inquiry)
- Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2008) (pre-hearing regulatory violations may warrant termination without prejudice when egregious)
- Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 468 U.S. 1032 (U.S. 1984) (exclusionary rule’s limited application in removal proceedings and agency regulatory scheme to deter Fourth Amendment violations)
- Chuyon Yon Hong v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (exceptions where exclusionary rule applies in immigration proceedings)