Sanchez v. Roden, 808 F.3d 85

Background

Dagoberto Sanchez was convicted (second-degree murder; firearm) after a jury selection in which prosecutor Mark Lee used peremptory challenges to strike several young black men, including Juror 261 (19-year-old black male). Trial judge initially ruled no Batson violation; state courts affirmed.
On federal habeas, this Court (Sanchez I) held Sanchez had made a Batson prima facie showing as to Juror 261 and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on steps two and three.
On remand the district court held a live hearing; Lee testified he struck Juror 261 for a race-neutral reason (youth/maturity and jury-selection strategy about preserving strikes) and explained keeping a similarly young white juror (Juror 243, age 21, born in Russia) because Lee perceived indicia of greater maturity and because he was "running out of challenges."
The district court credited Lee’s demeanor and testimony, found the age-based explanation race-neutral (Batson step two), and concluded Sanchez failed to prove purposeful discrimination (Batson step three).
The First Circuit affirms the denial of habeas relief, applying deferential review to the district court’s credibility findings and concluding no clear error in accepting Lee’s explanation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prosecutor’s peremptory strike of Juror 261 violated Batson	Sanchez: strike was racially motivated; prosecutor struck young black men but kept similarly situated young white juror (Juror 243)	Lee: strike was race-neutral—motivated by juror youth/maturity and strategic preservation of peremptory strikes; Juror 243 had indicia of greater maturity	Court: Batson step two satisfied (age is race-neutral); step three — credited prosecutor’s testimony; no clear error in finding no discriminatory purpose; habeas denied
Whether the district court could hold an evidentiary hearing on remand given §2254 limits	Sanchez: prior state-court record insufficient; earlier misapplication warranted further fact-finding	Respondent: remand proper because earlier Batson step-one error left incomplete record; district court permitted to take testimony	Court: Remand and hearing were permissible here due to prior unreasonable Batson step-one application; parties did not contest procedure
Whether comparative juror analysis (treatment of Juror 243) showed pretext	Sanchez: retention of Juror 243 (white, 21, foreign-born) undermines age explanation and suggests race as real motive	Lee/Commonwealth: distinctions (perceived maturity, running out of strikes, selection dynamics) explained differential treatment	Court: District court reasonably credited those distinctions and strategic considerations; not clearly erroneous to find no pretext
Whether the trial judge’s earlier comments or the district judge’s questioning tainted the Batson inquiry	Sanchez: trial judge’s remark (suggesting youth as problem) and district judge’s question about ages risked supplying a post-hoc justification	Commonwealth: judge’s questions were clarifying; record supports prosecutor’s independent, consistent explanations	Court: No Dretke-type fabrication from whole cloth; judge’s questions permissible; hearing record supported prosecutor’s genuine belief in his reasons

Key Cases Cited

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (Three-step framework for assessing race-based peremptory strikes)
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (Prosecutor’s reason at step two need not be persuasive or plausible)
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (Courts may not invent post-hoc justifications; comparative juror treatment can show pretext)
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (Persuasiveness of prosecutor’s justification is central at Batson step three)
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (Trial court’s credibility/demeanor findings are pivotal in Batson review)
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (Deference to trial court on credibility/demeanor in Batson context)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (Limits on evidentiary hearings on habeas review)