Sanchez v. Lane Bryant, Inc.
123 F. Supp. 3d 1238
C.D. Cal.2015Background
- Brenda Sanchez, a former Lane Bryant store manager over 40, sued Lane Bryant and supervisor Julie Tse in California state court alleging among other claims a defamation claim by publication of statements that she was a poor performer and incompetent, beginning on or before August 11, 2014 and continuing thereafter.
- Sanchez also pleads FEHA discrimination, wrongful termination, breach of implied-in-fact contract, and failure to prevent discrimination against Lane Bryant (not at issue here).
- Lane Bryant removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, contending Lane Bryant is a Delaware corporation with an Ohio principal place of business and that California citizen Tse was fraudulently joined and therefore her citizenship should be disregarded.
- Sanchez moved to remand; defendants opposed and also moved to dismiss Tse. The district court considered whether Tse was fraudulently joined (i.e., whether there is no possibility Sanchez could state a defamation claim against Tse).
- The court found Sanchez had alleged enough factual matter (publication, falsity, ongoing injury, reckless investigation, and a pattern of disparaging age-related comments) to create a non‑fanciful possibility of stating a defamation claim and that privileges (Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c) and managerial immunity) did not clearly preclude recovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tse was fraudulently joined so her California citizenship can be ignored for diversity removal | Sanchez argues her defamation claim against Tse is plausible: publications accusing her of poor performance were false, caused reputational harm, began before Aug 11, 2014 and continued, and followed a reckless investigation | Defendants argue Sanchez cannot state a claim against Tse (vague allegations, insufficient specifics) so Tse is a sham defendant and removal is proper | Court held Tse not fraudulently joined: allegations create a non‑fanciful possibility Sanchez can state defamation; remand granted |
| Sufficiency of defamation pleadings for fraudulent-joinder analysis | Sanchez need only show a possibility of stating a claim (not probability); her allegations are like cases where claims survived removal | Defendants emphasize lack of detail (who, where, circumstances) and claim statements are nonactionable opinion | Court applied the low fraudulent-joinder standard and found Sanchez’s allegations sufficient to raise a possibility of recovery in state court |
| Whether Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c) privilege bars the claim (malice issue) | Sanchez alleges actual malice: knowingly false statements, reckless/no investigation, and a pattern of ill will (ageist comments) | Defendants assert the statutory qualified privilege applies and Sanchez failed to plead malice | Court held privilege not conclusively dispositive at removal stage; allegations could support malice, which is a question of fact |
| Whether managerial immunity shields Tse from individual liability for defamation | Sanchez contends managerial privilege is not clearly applicable to defamation and is fact‑dependent | Defendants assert managerial immunity (absolute or qualified) bars claims against supervisors acting in employment scope | Court found application of managerial immunity uncertain and fact intensive; not a basis to hold joinder fraudulent |
Key Cases Cited
- McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1987) (standard for fraudulent joinder—failure to state a cause of action obvious under settled state rules)
- Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1992) (strong presumption against removal; burden on removing party)
- Green v. Amerada Hess Corp., 707 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1983) (heavy burden on removing defendant to prove fraudulent joinder—no possibility plaintiff can state a claim)
- Dodson v. Spiliada Mar. Corp., 951 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1992) (court looks for any possibility plaintiff may prevail; do not decide merits)
- Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal. App. 4th 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (elements of defamation under California law)
- Noel v. River Hills Wilsons, Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 1363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (actual malice defined for defeating qualified privilege)
- Huynh v. Vu, 111 Cal. App. 4th 1183 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (managerial privilege discussed in context of interference claims)
- Gallant v. City of Carson, 128 Cal. App. 4th 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (opinions implying false objective facts can be defamatory)