Sanchez v. Aberdeen School District No 5
3:21-cv-05236
W.D. Wash.Feb 6, 2023Background
- From 1982–1986 Michael Alstad taught band in Cheney School District; beginning in 1984 he allegedly groomed and sexually abused student Sara Bachman‑Rhodes while employed there.
- Several Cheney employees learned of the relationship: Alstad’s wife Yvonne Elliot (a junior‑high TA), roommate/art teacher Susan Grover, and possibly assistant band instructor Patrick Albert (factual dispute exists about Albert’s knowledge).
- Alstad left Cheney in 1986; Cheney completed an experience verification for him; he was then hired by Aberdeen School District and later allegedly groomed and sexually abused Mary (Sanchez) at Aberdeen.
- Sanchez sued both districts under Washington law for failure to report (RCW 26.44.030/related theories), negligence, agency, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress; WLAD claim was against Aberdeen only.
- Cheney moved for summary judgment arguing (1) employees who learned of abuse learned it in a personal capacity so no duty to report under James‑Buhl, (2) no duty of care to Sanchez for negligence, and (3) dismissal of the outrage (intentional infliction) claim.
- The court denied Cheney’s summary judgment motion in all respects except it granted summary judgment dismissing the outrage claim; other claims survive summary judgment due to disputed material facts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Liability under mandatory‑reporting statute (RCW 26.44.030) for Cheney based on employees’ failure to report | Cheney employees (Elliot, Grover, possibly Albert) were mandatory reporters with professional ties to the student and failed to report; that failure supports liability and causation inferences | Employees learned of abuse in a personal context (home/roommate) so per James‑Buhl they had no reporting duty tied to their professional roles | Cheney’s motion denied as to reporting claim — factual disputes about who knew and whether they were acting in professional capacity preclude summary judgment |
| Negligence / existence of duty to Sanchez | Cheney owed a duty via the mandatory reporting statute and/or a common‑law duty arising from a special relationship with Alstad (notice of dangerous propensities) | No duty because Sanchez was not a Cheney student when abuse occurred; reporting duty, defendant says, only protects currently at‑risk children | Denied — material factual disputes (knowledge by employees; foreseeability; special relationship) make summary judgment inappropriate |
| Motion to strike witness declaration (Jenkins Mount) | N/A (Plaintiff offered declaration to show a factual dispute about Albert’s knowledge) | Declaration lacks foundation under Fed. R. Evid. 602 and should be excluded | Denied — declaration provides sufficient foundation for purposes of the motion for summary judgment |
| Intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage) claim against Cheney | Failure to report a teacher sexually abusing students is extreme and outrageous conduct supporting outrage claim | The conduct (failure to report) is not sufficiently extreme to meet outrage standard as a matter of law | Granted — outrage claim dismissed because reasonable minds could not differ that non‑reporting here is insufficiently extreme for liability |
Key Cases Cited
- Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts in diversity apply state substantive law)
- Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (choice‑of‑law principles for federal courts applying state law)
- Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation Int'l Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying state law in federal diversity cases)
- State v. James‑Buhl, 190 Wn.2d 470 (2018) (interpreting when a school employee’s knowledge is connected to professional capacity for mandatory‑reporting duty)
- Beggs v. State, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 171 Wn.2d 69 (2011) (victims may bring an implied civil cause of action for mandatory reporters’ failures)
- Evans v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 195 Wn. App. 25 (2016) (school districts can have vicarious liability for employees’ failure to report)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment Rule 56 burden allocation)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (nonmoving party must present significant probative evidence)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (genuine dispute of material fact standard)
- T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment evidence rules in Ninth Circuit)
- O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting reasonable inferences against movant on summary judgment)
- Turner v. Washington State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 198 Wn.2d 273 (2021) (elements of negligence under Washington law)
- Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 176 Wn.2d 460 (2013) (summary judgment inappropriate where duty depends on disputed facts)
- Kloepfel v. Bokor, 149 Wn.2d 192 (2003) (elements and high threshold for outrage/intentional infliction claim)
- Costanich v. State, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 177 Wn. App. 1025 (2013) (court’s role in determining whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous)