San Juan County, Utah v. United States
754 F.3d 787
| 10th Cir. | 2014Background
- Salt Creek Road is a 12.3-mile unimproved route through Salt Creek Canyon in Canyonlands National Park; San Juan County and Utah seek an R.S. 2477 right-of-way to preserve vehicle access (notably to Angel Arch).
- R.S. 2477 (1866) granted rights-of-way across public lands; Congress repealed it in 1976 but preserved existing rights as of reservation dates.
- The legal question at trial was whether the public had accepted an R.S. 2477 right-of-way by continuous public use as a public thoroughfare for ten years prior to the park reservation on September 12, 1964.
- Plaintiffs presented historical evidence of varied uses (residences, cattle grazing since ~1890s, early tourism and scouting from ~1950, and mid-1950s mining/exploration); United States introduced evidence of park management actions and road closures in 1969 and the mid-1970s and ongoing maintenance.
- The district court found plaintiffs failed to prove ten years of continuous public use before reservation and entered judgment for the United States; plaintiffs appealed.
- The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding the county and state claims timely under the Quiet Title Act but concluding plaintiffs did not satisfy the R.S. 2477 acceptance standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness under Quiet Title Act for county | County: closures did not put it on notice; claim filed within 12 years of accrual (2004 complaint timely). | U.S.: earlier road closures and management put county on notice before 1992, starting limitations. | County claim is timely: closures did not sufficiently show a claim to exclude public because Salt Creek Road remained publicly accessible. |
| Timeliness under Quiet Title Act for state (Utah) | Utah: federal activities were not the kind of "substantial activities" to trigger §2409a(i); even if triggered, suit filed timely (2005). | U.S.: park reservation and subsequent planning, closures, maintenance, and management are "substantial activities" and provided notice earlier. | §2409a(i) applies because the U.S. conducted substantial activities; but Utah’s claim was still timely because notice (sufficiently adverse) occurred later (post-1995 permit restrictions). |
| Acceptance of R.S. 2477 via 10 years continuous public use | Plaintiffs: public used the route intermittently since late 1800s; frequency need only be "as often as public finds convenient or necessary." | U.S.: public use was too infrequent, often private/proprietary (grazing), and no discernible constructed road for the critical ten-year period before 1964. | Plaintiffs failed to prove acceptance: court affirmed requirement that frequency/intensity (public, varied use) and evidence of a thoroughfare are probative; judge’s factual findings not clearly erroneous. |
| Evidentiary standard and probative factors (jeep road, private use) | Plaintiffs: court erred by effectively requiring a constructed/"discernible" jeep road, discounting long-ago uses, and applying clear-and-convincing standard. | U.S.: construction is probative though not required; private/proprietary uses do not establish public thoroughfare; clear factual standard applied by district judge. | Court: no error—discernible road and construction evidence are relevant (not mandatory), proprietary-use evidence may be excluded, and district judge permissibly weighed evidence (need not decide preponderance vs. clear-and-convincing). |
Key Cases Cited
- S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005) (federal law borrows state principles to determine R.S. 2477 acceptance; construction evidence is probative)
- George v. United States, 672 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 2012) (Quiet Title Act accrual and notice standard: accrual when government assertion of adverse right puts claimant on notice)
- Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 599 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2010) (Quiet Title Act waiver and timeliness are jurisdictional; strict construction of limitation periods)
- Knapp v. United States, 636 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1980) (Quiet Title Act twelve-year limitation for non-state claimants)
- Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646 (Utah 1929) (historical common-law framework: frequency and variety of use are key to establishing public thoroughfare)
- McFarland v. Norton, 425 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2005) (management actions that regulate but do not exclude public use do not necessarily start Quiet Title Act limitations)
- FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (sovereign immunity principles: waiver defines jurisdiction)
- Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (1983) (sovereign immunity bars suit absent waiver)