627 S.W.3d 618
Tex.2021Background
- During Hurricane Harvey (2017) the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) released water from Lake Conroe into the West Fork of the San Jacinto River; downstream owners allege that release caused or worsened flooding of their properties.
- Multiple downstream property owners filed three consolidated suits asserting (a) inverse-condemnation claims under the Texas Constitution and (b) statutory takings claims under the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act (Chapter 2007, Tex. Gov’t Code).
- SJRA moved to dismiss under Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a and raised jurisdictional defenses; the trial courts denied dismissal, and interlocutory appeals followed.
- The court of appeals held district courts lacked jurisdiction over the constitutional inverse-condemnation claims (Harris County county courts at law have exclusive eminent-domain jurisdiction) but affirmed denial of dismissal as to Chapter 2007 statutory takings claims.
- The Supreme Court addressed (1) whether Chapter 2007 covers physical takings (flooding) as well as regulatory takings and (2) whether statutory exclusions for emergency/public-safety actions barred the statutory suits on the pleadings. The Court affirmed the court of appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of Chapter 2007: Does it cover physical takings (e.g., flooding)? | Chapter 2007’s definition of “taking” and its reference to a “physical invasion” include physical takings; statute is not limited to regulatory takings. | Chapter 2007 is intended for regulatory takings; the enumerated actions and remedies fit regulatory claims, so “physical invasion” should be read as regulatory. | Chapter 2007 may include physical takings; it is not limited to regulatory takings. |
| Statutory exclusions for emergencies (§2007.003(b)(7) and (13)): Do these conclusively bar the suits? | Pleadings do not conclusively show SJRA acted in reasonable good faith or that releases imposed no greater burden than necessary; exclusions are affirmative defenses requiring fact development. | Hurricane Harvey and official disaster declarations establish as a matter of law that SJRA acted to prevent grave/immediate threats and to protect public safety. | The pleadings do not conclusively establish the exclusions; Rule 91a dismissal was improper. |
| Redress/remedy under Chapter 2007: Does the statute provide meaningful relief (standing/redressability)? | Chapter 2007 authorizes takings determinations, factfinding of monetary damages, and alternative remedies; those remedies suffice for statutorily authorized suit. | The Act’s principal remedy (invalidation/rescission) targets regulatory acts and may not redress past physical flooding; thus plaintiffs lack redress under the statute. | The Act provides more than rescission (factfinding of damages; damages payable at governmental entity’s election; attorneys’ fees); redressability is not a jurisdictional bar. |
| Jurisdiction over inverse-condemnation claims vs. Chapter 2007 claims | Plaintiffs sought to proceed in district court under Chapter 2007; inverse-condemnation claims also pleaded. | SJRA argued Harris County county civil courts at law have exclusive original jurisdiction over eminent-domain/inverse-condemnation claims. | Court of appeals (and implicitly Supreme Court for jurisdictional ruling) dismissed constitutional inverse-condemnation claims from district court for lack of jurisdiction but allowed Chapter 2007 district-court claims to proceed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2012) (sovereign/governmental immunity principles)
- Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2004) (political-subdivision flooding can be a physical taking)
- Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998) (definition of physical taking/physical occupation)
- Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. 2012) (distinction between regulatory and physical takings)
- State v. Brownlow, 319 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. 2010) (inverse condemnation when government takes/damages without formal condemnation)
- Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 71 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. 2002) (Chapter 2007 creates distinct statutory takings and TIA causes of action)
- City of Dallas v. TCI W. End, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. 2015) (statutory construction principle against rendering statutory language superfluous)
- Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 1999) (immunity-from-liability is an affirmative defense and does not destroy jurisdiction)
- Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. 2020) (Rule 91a: affirmative defenses must be conclusively established by the petition to support dismissal)