Case Information
*1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
444444444444
N O . 13-0795 C ITY OF D ALLAS , P ETITIONER ,
v.
TCI W EST E ND , I NC ., R ESPONDENT
O N P ETITION FOR R EVIEW FROM THE C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE F IFTH D ISTRICT OF T EXAS
PER CURIAM
Section 54.012(3) of the Texas Local Government Code authorizes a municipality to pursue
a civil action against a property owner to enforce an ordinance “for zoning that provides for the use
of land or classifies a parcel of land according to the municipality’s district classification scheme.”
§ 54.012(3). Despite section 54.012(3)’s clear and unambiguous language,
the court of appeals held that a municipality cannot pursue a civil action under that statute for
violations of “general zoning ordinances regulating the use of land.”
The City of Dallas contends that TCI West End, Inc. (TCI) demolished a building located in a historic overlay district in violation of a city ordinance. See Dallas City Ordinance No. 21391, as amended by Ordinance No. 22158, § 7.1 (requiring building owner, prior to demolishing or altering *2 building located in historic overlay district, to apply for determination as to whether structure is “contributing structure” subject to strict demolition requirements); see also id. at § 4 (incorporating chapter 51A of the Dallas City Code); Dallas, Tex. City Code § 51A—4.501(a)—(p) (regulating historic overlay districts). Among other claims, the City sued TCI for civil penalties under section 54.017 of the Texas Local Government Code, as authorized by section 54.012 of the code. See T § 54.012 (listing types of ordinances municipality can enforce by civil action), .017 (authorizing civil penalties for ordinance violations). Following a jury verdict in the City’s favor, the trial court rendered judgment awarding the City $750,000 in civil penalties.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that sections 54.012 and 54.017 apply only to health
and safety ordinances, not “general zoning ordinances regulating the use of land.”
Although other issues have been raised on appeal, the threshold issues are (1) whether sections 54.012(3) and 54.017 are limited to enforcement of “health and safety” zoning ordinances; and (2) whether section 54.017 requires that actual notice be effected before violation of the *3 applicable ordinance. These matters present questions of law that we review de novo. City of [2]
Rockwall v. Hughes
,
Our primary objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent as
expressed in the statute’s plain language.
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs
,
Section 54.012, which is located in chapter 54, subchapter B of the local government code, authorizes a municipality to pursue a civil action against a property owner to enforce several categories of ordinances, including “an ordinance . . . for zoning that provides for the use of land or classifies a parcel of land according to the municipality’s district classification scheme.” § 54.012. The remaining provisions in subchapter B address the rules, procedures, [3] and relief available for a civil action authorized by section 54.012. See id. §§ 54.013–.020. Among other available remedies, section 54.017 permits a municipality to recover civil penalties, up to specified limits, upon proof that:
(1) the defendant was actually notified of the provisions of the ordinance; and (2) after the defendant received notice of the ordinance provisions, the defendant committed acts in violation of the ordinance or failed to take action necessary for *4 compliance with the ordinance.
Id. § 54.017.
The court of appeals determined that all the provisions in subchapter B, including sections
54.012(3) and 54.017, “relate only” to health and safety matters and thus do not apply to general
zoning ordinances regulating the use of land.
To support this construction of subchapter B, the court of appeals cited a Texas Attorney
General opinion limiting the statute’s application to health and safety matters because (1) it is
entitled “Municipal Health and Safety Ordinances” and (2) section 54.012 specifically refers to those
types of matters in some of its subsections.
Id.
(citing Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0267 (2004)).
The court also cited
Hollingsworth v. City of Dallas
,
We hold that the court of appeals’ interpretation of section 54.012(3) as incorporating a health-and-safety limitation is contrary to the plain and unambiguous language in the statute and would render meaningless and redundant language in that section expressly circumscribing other categories of ordinances enforceable under subchapter B.
Section 54.012(3) expressly authorizes municipalities, such as the City, to enforce ordinances “for zoning that provides for the use of land or classifies a parcel of land according to the municipality’s district classification scheme.” T EX . L . ’ T C ODE § 54.012(3). Section 54.012(3)’s language plainly encompasses the zoning ordinance at issue in this case, and neither the words “health” and “safety” nor analogous limitations are included anywhere therein. In comparison, at least three other subsections of section 54.012 expressly limit the types of ordinances that may be enforced to those involving health or safety matters or use comparable terminology. See *6 id. § 54.012(1) (pertaining to ordinances “for the preservation of public safety, relating to [building construction]”), .012(2) (referring to ordinances “relating to the preservation of public health or to the fire safety of a building or other structure or improvement”), .012(6) (applying to ordinances “relating to dangerously damaged or deteriorated structures or improvements”).
As a general principle, we eschew constructions of a statute that render any statutory
language meaningless or superfluous.
Crosstex
,
We likewise do not attribute decisive weight to subchapter B’s title because “[t]he heading
of a title, subtitle, chapter, or section does not limit or expand the meaning of a statute.”
See
§ 311.024;
see also Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams
,
Nor do we perceive a fatal conflict between chapter 54, subchapter B and chapter 211 that would render the former wholly inapplicable to a general land-use ordinance despite its plain language. Chapter 54 provides municipalities with general authority to enforce ordinances whereas chapter 211 grants municipalities specific authority to pass substantive ordinances regulating zoning. Whatever conflict may exist between the injunctive relief available under each of these statutory schemes, we cannot say that the statutes are mutually exclusive merely because they overlap in scope. Although both statutory schemes authorize recovery of civil penalties, the availability of the particular remedies hinge on distinct procedural mechanisms. Chapter 54 creates a framework for pursuing civil penalties for specific conduct while chapter 211 permits, but does not require, municipalities to adopt civil penalties for the violation of an ordinance adopted under that chapter. *7 Compare EX . L OC . G OV ’ T C § 54.017 with id. § 211.012(b). The City’s election to forego adopting specific civil penalties for violations of specific zoning ordinances does not preclude the City from pursuing the remedies already available to it under chapter 54, subchapter B, on the terms provided therein.
Applying section 54.012(3)’s plain language, we conclude that chapter 54, subchapter B authorizes a suit for civil penalties based on a violation of the land-use restrictions embodied in Dallas City Ordinance No. 21391, as amended by Ordinance No. 22158. The court of appeals’ contrary holding is erroneous.
In an alternative holding, the court of appeals determined that the City’s civil-penalty claim
would fail on the merits due to legally insufficient evidence that TCI had received actual notice of
the ordinance provision before it demolished the building in violation of the ordinance. Although
acknowledging the existence of evidence that TCI had actual notice of some of the requirements for
obtaining a demolition permit for buildings in the historic district, the court held that the City
“presented no evidence that [TCI] was ever informed of the ordinance provisions themselves
before
the building was demolished
.”
Regardless of the validity of the court’s assessment of the evidence, which we need not
consider, the court’s analysis fails because section 54.017 authorizes an award of civil penalties if
the defendant violated an ordinance after receiving notice of its provisions
or failed to take action
necessary for compliance with the ordinance after receiving such notice
. T ODE
§ 54.017(a). The statute’s use of “or,” a disjunctive, identifies two alternative bases for recovering
civil penalties.
See id.
;
see also City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings, L.P.
,
The court of appeals did not address these arguments. Instead, it concluded that there was no evidence that TCI had actual notice before it “violated an ordinance” by demolishing the building, without considering whether TCI could have “take[n] action necessary for compliance with the ordinance after receiving such notice.” Without addressing whether, in fact, TCI could have taken action to comply with the ordinance after receiving actual notice of the ordinance, we agree with the City that the court of appeals erred in failing to consider whether the civil-penalty award could be sustained under this alternative statutory ground.
Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we reverse the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment concluding that chapter 54, subchapter B does not authorize the City’s enforcement action against TCI and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See T R. A PP P. 59.1.
OPINION DELIVERED: May 8, 2015
Notes
[1] The ordinance defines a “contributing structure” as one that “retains its essential architectural integrity of design and whose architectural style is typical or integral to [the] district.”
[2] The City has not appealed adverse holdings by the trial court and court of appeals on its other claims.
[3] Although the statute has been amended since the events giving rise to this litigation, the changes are not material to the issues on appeal; accordingly, we cite the current version of the statute for convenience.
[4] Section 211.012(a) authorizes a municipality to adopt ordinances to enforce (1) the provisions of chapter 211, subchapter A, which imbues municipalities with the authority to adopt general zoning regulations, and (2) any ordinance or regulation adopted thereunder. T O C G O V O DE § 211.012. Section 211.012(c) provides that “in addition to other remedies,” a municipal authority may obtain an injunction “[i]f a building or other structure is erected, constructed, reconstructed, altered, repaired, converted, or maintained . . . in violation of this subchapter or an ordinance or regulation adopted under this subchapter.”