San Gerónimo Caribe Project, Inc. v. Acevedo-Vilá, 687 F.3d 465

Background

SGCP alleged ARPE invoked Puerto Rico's emergency adjudicatory procedure to stay construction and suspend permits amid ownership and public-access disputes surrounding Paseo Caribe.
ARPE based its stay on Secretary of Justice opinions questioning SGCP's land ownership, and on alleged public safety and public interest concerns from protests and demonstrations.
Puerto Rico Court of Appeals upheld ARPE's stay but required a prompt full adjudicatory hearing; the Puerto Rico Supreme Court later held ARPE erred on the stay but SGCP possessed valid title, vacating the suspension.
SGCP filed a federal lawsuit alleging, among others, a violation of federal procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing predeprivation hearings were required.
The district court dismissed the federal procedural due-process claim as barred by the Parratt-Hudson doctrine (random and unauthorized conduct with available post-deprivation remedies).
On en banc review, the First Circuit reaffirmed dismissal of SGCP’s federal procedural due-process claim, applying Parratt-Hudson and ruling Zinermon does not apply here.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Parratt-Hudson bars SGCP’s procedural due process claim	SGCP argues Zinermon controls given emergency context.	Parratt-Hudson applies; predeprivation hearing not required due to random/unauthorized error and available post-deprivation relief.	Parratt-Hudson applies; predeprivation process not required.
Whether the Governor's conduct falls outside Parratt-Hudson for high office	Governor's order could implicate prerogatives beyond random acts.	Governor's actions fall within Parratt-Hudson’s scope when acting through ARPE and planning board.	Governor's conduct barred by Parratt-Hudson; claims dismissed.
Whether Zinermon forbids application of Parratt-Hudson here	Zinermon governs when state has broad, discretionary authority leading to due-process deficiencies.	Statutory framework provided narrow emergency triggers; not equivalent to Zinermon.	Zinermon does not control; Parratt-Hudson applies.
Whether the emergency adjudicatory statute § 2167 provides sufficient safeguards	Emergency procedures delegated too broadly, resembling Zinermon concerns.	§ 2167 is a narrow emergency exception with defined steps and time frames.	Statutory scheme sufficiently constrained; not a Zinermon-like failure.
Whether post-deprivation remedies were available and adequate	Arbitration by Puerto Rico courts was insufficient to remedy predeprivation error.	Puerto Rico courts provided prompt and adequate post-deprivation relief and review.	Post-deprivation remedies were available and adequate; no due process violation.

Key Cases Cited

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (U.S. 1981) (random and unauthorized conduct permits no predeprivation hearing if post-remedies exist)
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (U.S. 1984) (extends Parratt to random and unauthorized state conduct)
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (U.S. 1990) (predeprivation hearing required when state’s procedures are inherently lacking)
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (U.S. 1981) (emergency procedures can be consistent with due process if narrowly tailored)
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (U.S. 1982) (due process and state remedies context for predeprivation process)
PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991) (random/unauthorized conduct and post-deprivation remedies relevance)
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (U.S. 1961) (state actor accountability under §1983; state law not exclusive remedy)
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (U.S. 1985) (predeprivation process generally required for liberty interests)
Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1990) (high-discretion scenarios and emergency procedures; Parratt-Hudson interplay)