33 F.4th 1146
9th Cir.2022Background
- Congress created the Golden Gate National Recreation Area (GGNRA) in 1972 and expressly included specified quarter-mile offshore zones of San Francisco Bay within the Recreation Area boundaries.
- The National Park Service (NPS) has a general regulation banning commercial fishing in park units (36 C.F.R. § 2.3(d)(4)); the Association challenges NPS enforcement in the GGNRA waters.
- Section 460bb-3(a) of the GGNRA Act directs the Secretary to “administer the lands, waters, and interests therein acquired for the recreation area,” and § 460bb-2 details acquisition rules for lands (including restrictions on acquiring California-owned property).
- The San Francisco Herring Association sued in 2013 arguing NPS lacks authority to regulate the navigable waters unless it first acquires a formal property interest from California; district court granted summary judgment to the government.
- The Ninth Circuit previously addressed final agency action (Herring I and Herring II); on remand the district court again granted summary judgment for the government, and this appeal presents the statutory-authority question de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NPS may administer and enforce park regulations in navigable waters within the GGNRA without first acquiring a formal property interest from California | § 460bb-3(a) conditions NPS authority on having “acquired” the waters, so NPS lacks power absent conveyance from California | Congress placed these navigable waters within park boundaries and directed their protection; waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction need not be separately conveyed and are administrable under the Organic Act and GGNRA | Held for Government: Congress’s placement of navigable waters in the GGNRA and related provisions authorize NPS to administer those waters without a separate property conveyance |
| Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Sturgeon v. Frost requires reading § 460bb-3(a) to limit NPS authority absent federal title | Sturgeon shows that specific statutory language (ANILCA) can forbid Park Service regulation absent federal title; analogous reading should apply here | Sturgeon turns on ANILCA’s unique “public lands” definition and explicit “deeming” language; GGNRA lacks analogous language and instead affirmatively includes the waters | Held for Government: Sturgeon is distinguishable and supports the conclusion that Congress did not create an Alaska‑style exception for the GGNRA |
| Whether requiring acquisition from California would be feasible or coherent given California public-trust law and GGNRA acquisition rules | If acquisition were required, state public-trust constraints and GGNRA limits on purchases from California would make NPS protection impracticable | That impracticability confirms Congress did not intend a conveyance prerequisite when it included the waters and authorized their protection | Held for Government: statutory text and structure show Congress did not intend an acquisition prerequisite |
Key Cases Cited
- Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019) (held ANILCA’s text prevents NPS regulation of non‑public waters in Alaska absent federal title; fact‑specific and distinguishable)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretation)
- United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967) (discusses congressional power over navigable waters)
- Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987) (federal control over water use can persist even if state holds submerged‑land title)
- Fed. Power Comm’n v. Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954) (observes that running waters cannot be owned in the traditional sense)
- Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988) (courts presume Congress aware of relevant legal background when drafting statutes)
- San Francisco Herring Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 946 F.3d 564 (9th Cir. 2019) (prior Ninth Circuit decision addressing final agency action on remand)
