Samuel J. Stoorman & Associates, P.C. v. Dixon
394 P.3d 691
Colo.2017Background
- Wife (Kristy Casagranda) was awarded spousal maintenance in a 2009 divorce; Husband (Brian Dixon) was ordered to pay monthly maintenance for 72 months.
- Samuel J. Stoorman & Associates, P.C. (the Firm) represented Wife and obtained a judgment against her for unpaid attorney fees and a court order recognizing a charging lien.
- The Firm notified Husband in 2012 that its charging lien attached to Wife’s maintenance and sought redirection of payments to the Firm; Husband continued paying Wife.
- In 2014 the Firm moved to enter judgment against Husband to enforce its charging lien against maintenance payments; the trial court denied the motion and awarded Husband attorney fees for defending the motion.
- The court of appeals affirmed; the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a statutory attorney’s charging lien attaches to spousal maintenance and whether public policy bars such attachment.
- The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that Colorado’s attorney’s lien statute unambiguously allows attachment to spousal maintenance and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a statutory attorney’s charging lien attaches to spousal maintenance | Firm: § 12-5-119 grants a lien on “any ... judgment they may have obtained or assisted in obtaining,” so it attaches to maintenance awards | Dixon: Maintenance is exempt from certain levy/execution remedies and public policy should protect maintenance from lien attachment | Held: Yes — the statute’s plain language covers maintenance awards; attorney’s charging lien may attach to spousal maintenance |
| Whether statutory exemptions from levy/execution (§ 13-54-102) prevent lien enforcement | Firm: Exemption governs levy/execution methods, not charging-lien enforcement | Dixon: Exemption demonstrates legislative intent to protect maintenance broadly | Held: Exemption irrelevant — charging-lien enforcement is not a levy/attachment and §12-5-119 controls |
| Whether public policy prevents lien on maintenance (including analogy to child support protections) | Firm: No policy bar; maintenance benefits spouse and fees incurred by spouse may legitimately be secured by maintenance | Dixon: Public policy (and timing of statute amendments) favors protecting maintenance like child support | Held: Policy argument rejected; child support protection rests on right of child, not analogous to maintenance; court must follow clear statutory text |
| Proper remedy on remand (attorney fees awarded to Husband by trial court) | Firm: Enforcement of lien appropriate; no basis for trial court’s fee award against Firm | Dixon: Trial court’s denial and fee award were proper | Held: Trial court’s award of attorney fees to Husband vacated; case remanded for proceedings consistent with decision |
Key Cases Cited
- BP America Production Co. v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 369 P.3d 281 (Colo. 2016) (interpreting broad statutory modifier “any” to apply inclusively)
- Gee v. Crabtree, 560 P.2d 835 (Colo. 1977) (treating a dissolution decree as a judgment for lien purposes)
- In re Marriage of Etcheverry, 921 P.2d 82 (Colo. App. 1996) (charging-lien enforcement is not a levy under writ of execution/attachment)
- McQuade v. McQuade, 358 P.2d 470 (Colo. 1960) (right to child support belongs to the child, distinguishing child support from maintenance)
- Jasper v. Smith, 540 N.W.2d 399 (S.D. 1995) (recognizing attachment of attorney’s lien to alimony/maintenance under broad lien statutes)
- Carnes v. Shores, 318 So.2d 305 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975) (same: attorney’s lien may reach alimony/maintenance)