Opinion by
Cindi L. Etcheverry (wife) appeals from the order foreclosing the attorney lien of her former attorney, Catherine Burkey (attorney), and requiring all child suppоrt payments made by Leslie J. Pratt (husband) to be forwarded to the attorney until the lien is satisfied. Because we conclude that public policy prohibits an аttorney’s charging lien from attaching to child support payments, we reverse.
The attorney represented "wife in a dissolution of marriage procеeding, and husband was ordered to pay wife, through the court registry, $268 per month for child support and $300 per month for maintenance. When wife did not pay the $3740 in attоrney fees owed at the conclusion of the proceedings, the attorney filed a notice of attorney lien claim and a motion to foreclose the lien. The trial court granted the motion and ordered that the child suрport payments were' to be redirected to the attorney until the lien claim was paid in full.
Section 12-5-119, C.RiS. (1991 Repl. Vol. 5A) provides that attorneys shall have а charging lien on any “judgments they may have obtained or assisted in obtaining,” as well аs a lien:
on any and all claims and demand in suit for any fees or balance of fees due....
It is apparent that, on its face, this statute would allow the attorney to assert a charging lien against any payments to be made to the wifе that were pursuant to a court order that the attorney assisted in obtaining, irrespective whether such payments were in the form of property division, maintenance, or child support.
However, in
Hall v. Hall-Stradley,
This decision later received legislative approval by the adoption of § 13-54-102.5(1), C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.), which provides that any child support payment to be made to a parent pursuant to a court order is exempt from “levy under writ оf attachment or writ of execution” for any debt owed by either parent. See also § 13-54-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.).
A рroceeding to enforce an attorney’s charging lien is not a levy upоn property under either a writ of execution or a writ of attachment, and it does not, therefore, fall within the literal terms of these statutes. Moreover, we need not decide whether the enforcement of such a lien is the functional equivalent of either.
We conclude, rather, that the same publiс policy referred to in Hall v. Hallr-Stradley, supra, which prevents a levy upon child support payments, also prevents the enforcement of an attorney’s charging lien upon such payments.
This conclusion is consistent with that reached by the great majority of the courts that have passed upon the issue. The lead
*84
ing opinion upon the point is
Fuqua v. Fuqua,
Therefore, irrespective whether the exemption created by § 13-54-102.5(1) and § 13-54-102(l)(a) can be construed to be applicable to an attorney’s charging lien under § 12-5-119, the public policy of this state рrevents the assertion of such a lien against funds owing to a parent as child support pursuant to a court order.
The order of the trial court is reversеd, and the cause is remanded to the court with directions to deny the attorney’s request for a lien to the extent that such request would cause such a lien to attach to funds owed as child support.