Samson v. Western Capital Partners, LLC (In re Blixseth)
684 F.3d 865
| 9th Cir. | 2012Background
- Debtor Edra Blixseth guaranteed a $13.65 million loan to her son and pledged extensive personal property as collateral.
- Security Agreement and a UCC Financing Statement described the Collateral as all personal property of the Debtor; no precise itemization limited to the Yellowstone club compounds.
- Debtor filed Chapter 11, converted to Chapter 7; Schedules listed Western Capital as secured with a $2 million collateral value and $69,216,315 in total personal property assets.
- Debtor did not file a statement of intention for the Collateral within required time; Trustee did not seek a determination of consequential value/benefit.
- Western Capital moved for stay relief multiple times; bankruptcy court granted relief under § 362(h) based on absence of timely statement of intention and no consequential-value determination.
- Trustee appealed the scope of § 362(h) relief, arguing it applied only to scheduled property; the court held § 362(h) applies to all personal property of the estate securing a scheduled debt.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 362(h) terminates stay on all collateral or only scheduled property. | Trustee Advocates: § 362(h) applies only to scheduled property. | Western Capital Argues: § 362(h) applies to all collateral securing the debt. | § 362(h) terminates stay on all collateral securing a scheduled debt. |
| Does property of the estate extend beyond schedules when determining § 362(h) scope? | Trustee contends limits exist due to scheduling. | Western Capital contends estate property includes unscheduled assets. | Property of the estate is broader than schedules; § 362(h) applies to all collateral. |
| Is interpretation of § 362(h) governed by plain language or legislative history? | Trustee seeks narrower reading based on schedules. | Western Capital urges plain-language approach. | Plain-language interpretation controls; no reliance on legislative history needed. |
| Does § 521(a)(2) require scheduling to trigger § 362(h)? | Debtor's non-scheduling of collateral may trigger stay termination. | Statutory text links 362(h) to property of the estate, not scheduling specifics. | Scheduling is not a prerequisite for § 362(h) to apply to the property securing a debt. |
| May a trustee object to stay relief or seek consequential-value determinations to preserve assets? | Trustee could have sought value/benefit determination to keep stay. | Trustee did not timely object or seek a § 362(h)(2) determination. | Even with timing considerations, § 362(h) operates on the statute's plain terms to release collateral. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., NA. (In re Ransom), - ( - ) (statutory interpretation framework cited for language-based analysis)
- In re Dumont, 581 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2009) (construct of § 362(h) and § 521(a)(2) interplay)
- Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (U.S. 2004) (plain, non-absurd meaning enforceable even if harsh)
- In re Joye, 578 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (legislative history not necessary when language is unambiguous)
- Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Aetna, Inc. (In re Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del.), 564 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2009) (same-language approach across statute parts)
- In re Wind N’ Wave, 509 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2007) (identical words implying same meaning in different statute sections)
- Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (U.S. 1991) (broad definition of property of the estate)
- In re Smith, 418 B.R. 359 (9th Cir. BAP 2009) (statutory interpretation standards in bankruptcy)