Antoinette Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Company

Further, remand, Hoopai’s request

court reconsider should attorneys’ fees under section 607-14. Conclusion

VI. 506(b) governs

Section an oversecured attorneys’ entitlement to fees in-

creditor’s prior Chapter

curred confirmation law; plan preempts and state both the BAP court therefore in analyzing Countrywide’s

erred claim to

pre-confirmation fees under Hawaii’s at-

torneys’ fee We further statute. conclude correctly the BAP determined that

Hoopai prevailing party was the under Ha- 607-14,

waii Revised Statutes section clearly

that the court erred in

determining Countrywide was the

prevailing party. We therefore reverse

the BAP opinion part, part, affirm it in

and vacate the bankruptcy court’s order. attorneys’ remand for the award of 506(b) Countrywide

fees to pursuant

up confirmation, plan the date of and for of Hoopai’s request

reconsideration

post-confirmation fees.

VACATED REMANDED.

In the Matter of Antoinette

DUMONT, Debtor, Dumont, Appellant,

Antoinette

v.

Ford Company, Appellee. Motor Credit

No. 08-60002. Appeals,

United States Court of

Ninth Circuit.

Argued May and Submitted Sept.

Filed

O’SCANNLAIN, Judge: Circuit Bankrupt- whether the must decide cy Prevention and Consumer Pro- Abuse allows consumer in Act of 2005 tection personal property bankruptcy to retain subject interest security continuing to a payments to make under his contract. I purchased a car in Antoinette Dumont Company 2003 from Ford Motor Credit (“Ford”). a agreement The loan contained stating that Dumont would be in clause bankruptcy involved in a default she was “ipso also proceeding, known facto” Chapter Dumont filed for bank clause.1 2006, subsequent ruptcy protection Doan, Firm, Law G. Doan Michael Bankruptcy the effective date of Abuse CA, Carlsbad, argued appel- cause and Protection Act Prevention Consumer and filed briefs. lant-debtor (“BAPCPA”), 109-8, Pub.L. No. of 2005 Cooksey Toolen Mrocynski, P. Randall listed on the 23. The vehicle was Stat. Mesa, CA, Duffy Woog, & Gage Costa petition having a bankruptcy value and sub- argued appellee the cause for $8,288 $5,800. time, At the she owed on a brief. mitted making payments per and was $335.78 In her Bankruptcy month. Statement of National Association of Twomey, Tara Intentions, that she Dumont stated would Attorneys, Bankruptcy San Consumer car continue to make retain the Jose, CA, behalf of submitted a brief on monthly payments. National Association Con- amicus curiae her Attorneys. With sumer Dumont’s at- attorney e-mailed Ford’s Cynthia on Feathers. the brief was asking Dumont reaffirm the torney, attorney the offer. It

debt. Her declined the record what is not clear from reaffirmation were. proposed terms of claim, a to which proof Ford filed Ford’s claim objection; there was no thus 502(a). was allowed. See 11 U.S.C. Du- GOODWIN, T. ALFRED Before discharge August a mont received O’SCANNLAIN, and F. DIARMUID discharge, she continued After the GRABER, Judges. P. Circuit SUSAN payments on the car loan. With- making O’SCANNLAIN; notice, repossessed Ford her out advance by Opinion Judge 14, 2006. ear November by Judge GRABER. Dissent default, we you “[i]f states that further contract read: "Default means The you vehicle if we do (repossess) the from [y]ou proceeding in one take a start your property.” peacefully.” so against you or It is started (and successfully reopen later, moved stay Dumont den the automatic her case and claimed that injunction) the discharge repossess- from discharge injunction Ford violated the ing buyer collateral unless the default- her by repossessing car. buyer If making ed. stopped pay- court denied the motion to find Ford in defaulted, ments or otherwise then the injunction, discharge violation creditor could reclaim its collateral but (BAP) Bankruptcy Appellate Panel pursue deficiency could not judgment unanimously affirmed. against the debtor. Unsurprisingly, system the ride-through

II proved popular debtors. Debtors usu A ally need a car3 to travel to and from work, school, medical appointments, Chapter When debtor files for 7 bank ruptcy, required important just she state other Having her inten activities. tions with regard any property2 which bankruptcy, they filed for understandably subject security to a interest. expect experience difficulty securing fi 521(a)(2). BAPCPA, Prior to our circuit nancing for another vehicle. Accordingly, law allowed among the debtor to choose they willing pay were often to continue First, options. four merely she could sur ments on loans that were “underwater” Second, render the collateral. she could (i.e., loans which the amount ex due is, such pay redeem collateral—that collateral). ceeded the value creditor fair present its market value. See ride-through, Some creditors embraced § id. 722. debtor The could also reaffirm allowing even to keep making debtor the debt on terms she and the creditor in payments circuits which did recog not agreed on. Reaffirmation allowed See, Braucher, the option. e.g., nize Jean collateral, debtor to her keep but re-ex Redux, and Ride-Through Rash 13 Am. posed personal liability her to should she 457, (2005). L. 474-81 Bankr. Inst. Rev. fail payments promised. to make as See hand, On the might other creditors believe 524(c) (setting § id. conditions for reaffir buyer unlikely was to follow mations and exempting them from dis through plan with the or that the collateral injunction). charge final option The —rec in might decrease faster pay value than ognized in only some circuits—was the so- ments coming were in. See Till v. SCS “ride-through” called or “pay and drive.” 465, 479, Corp., Credit 541 U.S. 124 S.Ct. plan, Under this the debtor continued to (2004) payments if make as 158 L.Ed.2d 787 (plurality never occurred. The opinion) creditor was forbid- (acknowledging the increased risk case, ("Code D.Conn.2008) 2. property 521(a)(6) 362(h) In this was §§ owned an personal abrogated individual option debtor was used for ride through per- However, purposes. personal rather than business property. The bank- tains to courts ruptcy differently ability laws often treat individuals concluded that the of a debtor to may though other option from entities which file choose the ride for bank- as it relates to See, 521(a)(2) ruptcy. § e.g., (ap- property abrogated by real was U.S.C. not BAPC- PA.”). plying debtor[s]"). analysis necessarily only may Our to "individual We hold note where the debtor is property dispute also that the individual or here personal property property, where real property- was involved. not real We accordingly have no to need determine proper- whether debtors retain their real Ride-through was not limited to automobile 362(h)(1) However, ty (refer- ride-through. § via See id. implies, loans. as the name ride- estate"); ring "personal property through frequently In was used most to allow Caraballo, (Bankr. re 386 B.R. debtors to hold to an automobile. redeem, reaffirm, only or surrender “‘if in the by bankrupt debtors non-payment context); is, id. at debtor —that applicable,’ 13 “cramdown” Chapter (Scalia, J., dissenting) any op to choose three plan[ned] 124 S.Ct. Parker, depreciation).4 in the statute.” the risk due to tions listed (noting (quoting at 673 then-current 11 B 521(2)(A)). § “The debtor’s other available, unambigu BAPCPA, options remain[ed] we had held Prior 521(2)(C): ously stated [then-current] was available debtors. ](A) ... v. Parker shall Credit Union subparagraph[ Fed. ‘[N]othing McClellan (9th (In Parker), rights F.3d Cir. alter the debtor’s the trustee’s Fourth, 1998). Second, Third, regard property The such under this ” (final cir Id. origin likewise.5 Other Circuits held two alterations Tenth title.’ al).8 rejected ride-through.6 cuits Parker, clear lan we relied C statute,7 holding that

guage changes in wrought several BAPCPA required to file state was bemay applicable the Code which to ride- sec under then-current ment of intention First, 521(2), 521(2)(A). through. it amended section read the statute tion 521(a)(2). is now section Most rele- declare an intent which the debtor to require decided, was 7. At the time Parker the relevant expressed some confusion about BAP statute, 521(2) given 11 U.S.C. read: repossess that Du- decision Ford's Dumont, making payments. In re was mont of an individual debtor's schedule assets [I]f 2008). 481, (9th BAP 489 17 Cir. B.R. n. 383 debts which and liabilities includes consumer speculate as to Ford’s motiva- We decline to estate!, by property of the the are secured case; that deci- we note in this tions debtor shall]— might repossess make financial sense sion (A) thirty days after date of the within assumptions. under certain sets of filing chapter petition 7 of this title of a under meeting of or on or before the date of Del. State PoliceFed. Credit Union 5. See Price v. creditors, earlier, or within such whichever ( Cir.2004); Price), (3d re 370 F.3d 362 court, cause, In time for within additional as the Credit Union v. Boodrow Capital Commc’ns Fed. fixes, period with such the debtor shall file ( Boodrow), (2d 43 Cir. re 126 F.3d respect clerk of his intention with a statement 1997); Corp. v. Funding Am. Home Owners of property to the or surrender of such retention 1992); (4th Lowry Belanger, F.2d 345 Cir. and, prop- applicable, specifying that such West, (10th v. Credit 882 F.2d 1543 Fed. Union erty exempt, that the debtor is claimed as 1989). Cir. property, to redeem such or that the intends debts debtor intends to reaffirm secured Burr), (In v. Burr re Bank Boston See property; such Cir.1998); (1st v. Fin. Johnson Sun F.3d (B) filing forty-five days after the within (5th (In Johnson), re 89 F.3d Co. section, within a notice of intent under this or 1996); Taylor Credit v. AGE Fed. Union Cir. court, cause, as the such additional time Cir.1993); (In (11th Taylor), re 3 F.3d fixes, period forty-five day within such 1990). Edwards, (7th 901 F.2d 1383 Cir. In re perform with re- debtor shall his intention rejected proposal similar The Sixth Circuit by subpar- spect property, specified as to such ride-through Acceptance in Motors General (A) agraph paragraph; and of this (In Bell), v. Corp. Bell (B) (C) (A) nothing subparagraphs in However, (6th Cir.1983). that deci 1056-58 paragraph or the this shall alter the debtor’s predated to the the 1984 amendments sion rights regard property with to such trustee’s Code, lan ”include[d] which under this title!.] guage gave dis rise to (C) as Subparagraph known pute.” v. became Fed. Credit Union Hardi Coastal man, (E.D.N.C.2008). savings clause. n. 8 398 B.R. 521(a)(6) savings purposes, vant our clause A new section was added as (C) well.10 subparagraph in now reads: “[Noth- (A) (B) in

ing subparagraphs of this 521(d) A provides new section paragraph shall alter debtor’s or timely the debtor fails to take the [i]f rights regard trustee’s with to such prop- 521(a)(6) specified in action or [§ title, erty provided except 362(h)(A) under this as in (B)], respect or 362(h).” added). (emphasis ... property to which a creditor 362(h), BAPCPA, security added holds a states interest otherwise ..., nothing voidable in this stay title shall that the automatic is terminated and prevent operation or limit provi- “property shall no be longer property sion in the underlying agree- lease or of the estate if the debtor fails” ment that has the of placing effect (A) timely any to file statement of inten debtor in default such under lease or tion ... or required indicate such agreement by occurrence, reason of the statement the debtor will either pendency, or existence a proceeding such personal property surrender re under this insolvency title or the and, tain it if retaining personal such Nothing debtor. this subsection shall [,reaffirm,] property, either redeem justify deemed to limiting such a unexpired assume such pursuant lease provision any other circumstance. 365(p)9 to section if the trustee does so, applicable; do D (B) timely specified to take action BAPCPA been has criticized for its statement, such such unless state- clarity.11 lack agree BAPCPA specifies ment the debtor’s intention to hardly very model of a well-drafted reaffirm such original debt con- However, statute. it is our task to inter tract terms and the creditor refuses pret passed by Congress the laws as with agree.... attempting out to force them to cohere 9. Section 365(p) assumption addresses the self-contradictory. They and sometimes in- BAPCPA, unexpired by ap- leases. Added it troduce new and undefined terms that resem- pears to have no relevance to this case. ble, from, but are different established terms Furthermore, that are well understood. read, part: It "[The in shall] provisions new address some situations that possession personal retain property of as to unlikely are Deciphering to puzzle arise. this which a creditor has allowed claim for the trying is like to solve a Rubik's Cube that purchase price part by secured in or whole in defect.”); arrived awith In manufacturer's re in personal property an interest such unless Steinhaus, 694, (Bankr.D.Idaho 349 B.R. 706 [timely] the debtor either [reaffirms] ... or ” 2006) ("[I]t appears unmistakable that Con- Later, property ... redeems such .... drafted, gress or allowed be drafted ..., continues: "If the debtor fails so act enacted, provisions others then with 362(a) stay under section is terminated imprecise language.”); loose' and Lun- respect with Keith [property], to the ... affected din, BAPCPA, property Principles longer such Ten property shall no be Am. Bankr. of of estate, L, 2005, 1, ("The Sept. and the creditor take Inst. whatever at 1 list of property permitted by action as to such as is drafting incomprehensible provi- errors and applicable nonbankruptcy law.” Id. at grows day every sions profes- as 521(a). digest Especially sionals BAPCPA. the con- parts, legislation sumer this was not written See, Donald, 524, e.g., In re B.R. 343 529 practitioners or vetted and scholars (Bankr.E.D.N.C.2006) (stating respect usually legislative involved in ef- ride-through: "Unfortunately, the BAPCPA forts.”). provide amendments do not clear answer. confusing, The amendments overlapping, are

1111 that, in general, legisla further note Miller We their words allow. See more than See, Ams., able here. history guide tive is not an Servs. LLC Daimlerchrysler Fin. v. (5th Parker, 633, that, (In Miller), (noting at e.g., F.3d 673 Cir.2009) (“[PJerceived drafting context, poor legisla in [in “[t]he assistance”); regarded history be as tive is of little Don should not BAPCPA] readings ald, plain-text (noting sparse invalidate B.R. at 532-33 license to that some a statute fixing legislative history the name of available for BAPCPA broken.”). 305). purposes believe is do Nor much aid. Bank provide code so, guided by we doing are two but often ruptcy law serves central statutory interpreta traditional canons of As conflicting rightly interests. Dumont “that a principle first tion. note notes, protect bankruptcy law aims whole, upon so ought, statute “honest but unfortunate debtor.” Local that, if no prevented, it can be construed Hunt, 234, 244, v. 292 U.S. Loan Co sentence, clause, superflu word shall be (1934). 695, 78 L.Ed. 1230 On the S.Ct. ous, void, Inc. v. insignificant.” TRW hand, times, bankrupt other since ancient 31, 441, Andrews, 122 S.Ct. 534 U.S. cy promoting also seen credi has been (internal (2001) quotation 151 L.Ed.2d See v. tor interests as well. United States omitted). decline to marks Courts should 434, 447, Kras, 409 U.S. 93 S.Ct. insignif any “express exception render (1973) discharge (noting L.Ed.2d (in icant, Id. superfluous.” wholly if not provisions developed England a re omitted). Howev marks quotation ternal debtors); H. cooperating Thomas ward for rule, er, plain meaning according Jackson, Policy in The Fresh-Start Bank language of an enactment “where the Law, 1393, 1395 98 Harv. L. Rev. n. ruptcy [or, plain], and parlance, in modern clear (1985) comparative (recognizing “[t]he according to its terms does construction policy fresh-start bank newness impracticable conse to absurd or lead law”). importance of the ruptcy Because employed are to be quences, the words economy, lending to the nation’s secured the mean expression taken as the final subject secured creditors have been v. Mo. Pac. ing United States intended.” This solicitude. 133, particular congressional Co., 278, 49 S.Ct. R.R. 278 U.S. provisions (1929). policy can be seen other scope appli 73 L.Ed. 322 BAPCPA, change including one which cability absurdity exception congressional concern subject vigorous clearly reflects meaning is a plain rule auto lenders.13 debate.12 See, Manning, Absurdity value of the automobile and unsecured e.g., John F. The ent 12. 2387, (2003) Doctrine, remaining 2486 portion containing 116 Harv. L. "It debt. Rev. absurdity as "en- (criticizing the doctrine Congress undisputed viewed seems to be judicial authority to tailing] the exercise of and unfair of 'cramdown' abusive this use legislative pro- displace of the the outcomes lienholders, it and other so car lenders Sunstein, cess”); Interpreting Statutes Cass R. protection give to these se- sought to” extra 405, State, Regulatoiy 103 L. Rev. in the 1315, Harv. Dean, In re 537 F.3d cured lenders. (1989) (defending the use "more 440-41 Cir.2008). (11th did alter BAPCPA not 1318 aggressive” "when conventional inter- means ability surrender the Chapter 13 debtors' absurdity gross or pretation produce would renegotiate with the credi- deal collateral injustice”). tor, payments required make them to but the creditor's amount of based on full BAPCPA, Chapter 13 debtors Prior pur- had been loans, where the automobile claim bifurcating car could "cramdown” days bankruptcy pres- within 910 portion equal to the chased a secured them into 1112

Finally, congres plainly we observe that construction is con- [the alternate] trary Congress.” to the intent of Edward power bankruptcy sional over affairs is v. Corp. J. DeBartolo Fla. Coast requirement limited the constitutional Gulf Council, Bldg. & Constr. Trades 485 U.S. bankruptcy laws “uniform.” 575, 568, 1392, S.Ct. 108 99 L.Ed.2d 645 I, 8,§ art. principle U.S. Const. cl. This (1988). Given amendment explained in was Hanover National Bank 521(a)(2) and the enactment of section 181, Moyses, v. 186 U.S. 22 46 S.Ct. 362(h), unlikely it is that Congress failed to (1902), L.Ed. 1113 which found constitu major foresee that BAPCPA have a would of the provision tional Code impact on ride-through. Accordingly, we exemptions by looking which set state Congress assume that intended to make There, [was], system law. it that “the held circuits, ride-through available all sense, in the constitutional uniform none. The direction and tenor States, throughout the United when the place which changes, new duties on debt- trustee takes each state whatever would ors and create new sanctions failure to have been available to the creditor comply, suggest Congress did in- bankrupt passed. law been The tend to increase to ride-through access general operation the law uniform [was] passing BAPCPA.

although [might] it result in partic certain Ill

ulars differently in different states.” Id. 190, 22 at S.Ct. 857. exam This but an A ple principle federal We must therefore decide whether generally determination law “the leaves our decision in Parker survived BAPCPA. property rights in the assets of a bank not, The court held that did rupt’s estate to state law.” Butner v. accordingly and that right Dumont had no States, 48, 54, United 440 U.S. 99 S.Ct. ride-through. The Ninth Circuit Bank (1979). 59 L.Ed.2d 136 It would raise ruptcy Appellate unanimously Panel questions serious constitutional for us to agreed, following every the lead of bank Congress conclude that affirmatively in ruptcy court to have considered whether tended to promote system the non-uniform debtors, ride-through is still available to at caused by the circuit split over ride- least those who did not seek reaffirmation. through. Supreme Court has coun (9th Dumont, In re 383 B.R. 481 Cir. BAP 2008).14 us seled to avoid such conclusions “unless requirements. 2006); Steinhaus, met certain other See In re In re 349 B.R. 694 Jones, (10th (Bankr.D.Idaho Cir.2008). Anderson, 2006); In re Norton, (Bankr.D.Del.2006); B.R. 652 re In following 14. The BAP (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2006); cited 347 B.R. 291 In re Donald, supporting court (Bankr.E.D.N.C.2006); decisions as its conclusion: B.R. Bower, 07-60126-FRA7, (Bankr.N.D.W.Va. No. Boring, 2007 WL In re 346 B.R. (Bankr.D.Or. 26, 2007); Rowe, 2006); (Bankr. July In re In re 342 B.R. 341 D.Kan.2006); Craker, Moustafi, (Bankr.D.Ariz.2007); B.R. In re 337 B.R. 549 06C-24120, (Bankr.M.D.N.C.2006). Openshaw, re In No. 2007 WL Several cases after (Bankr.D.Utah Mar.12, 2007); 2916294 the BAP's decision have In re also concluded that Rice, 06-10975, ride-through Ertha No. has been where 2007 WL eliminated there 781893 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.Mar.12, 2007); Husain, attempt was no at In reaffirmation. Fees v. Ford re Co., CV07-389-S-EFL, (Bankr.E.D.Va.2007); Credit No. 364 B.R. 211 Motor 2008 In re (D. 17, 2008); (Bankr.D.Utah Blakeley, 2007); WL 4630668 Oct Idaho In re 363 B.R. 225 Baine, McFall, (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2008); (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 393 B.R. re 561 In B.R. 356 674 Jones, (S.D.W.Va.2008). 2006); Ruona, (Bankr. In re 775 B.R. In re 353 B.R. 688 D.N.M.2006); 06-60346, Riggs, In re No. Dumont notes that some have al- courts (Bankr.W.D.Mo. Oct.12, However, 2006 WL ride-through lowed after BAPCPA. 362(h). § pillar

B tent. 11 U.S.C. Another the holding savings its was that clause of 521(a)(2). Du with section start We “unambiguously” that section indicated “if appli the retention of mont asserts that 521(a)(2) rights did not alter debtor’s in that section demonstrates cable” regard with collateral. F.3d at ride-through. Be of continuing existence exception of an 673. With the addition for have known that Congress would cause 362(h), only this is section conclusion not Circuit) (and court the Fourth relied this actively but obsolete contradicted. ride-through, phrase establish on this exception strongly implies of the inclusion it would have eliminated argues, Dumont 362(h) can, fact, in that section alter the it to eliminate phrase had intended rights regard the collater- debtor’s with argument is not with ride-through. This al. Yet, accept were we to out some force. view, the amendments Dumont’s turn to that section to We now see its reference to section savings clause and rights As earli Dumont’s were altered. 362(h)15 have no effect. We cannot simply noted, only duty in this circuit the im er the 2005 rely solely on Parker and write by pre-BAPCPA law was to file posed out Code. amendments specification intention. A notice of in only tent to redeem or reaffirm need of Parker —“that underpinning A core “if applicable” communicated filing act is the of the been only mandatory —that intention,” is, if options. at the debtor chose one of those 139 F.3d 673— statement of Parker, amendments, at 673. Section is inconsistent with 362(h)(1)(A) makes clear the debtor clearly provide that debtor shall which respect now has two duties with to the only a statement of intention but file before, his in- of intention. As through expressed with statement also follow cases, unclear, creating ride-through each these there was "substantial law un- 521(a)(2), 521(a)(6), many Chapter § compliance certainty § with debtors and Jones, Bankr.Inst., 362(h).” (citing at In See § 397 B.R. creditors alike. Am. Annual (Bankr.D.Del.2008); Baker, (2007-08), Filings by Chapter re 390 B.R. 524 Non-Business Chim, (Bankr.D.Md.2008); http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template 381 B.R. 191 Husain, 434; Moustafi, template at 364 B.R. 371 B.R. Redirect.cfm? =/CM/ContentDis- 211; 225); (last Blakeley, at play.cfm 363 B.R. see also & visited at ContentID=56830 96,678 Hardiman, 25, 2009) (indicating Aug. Chap- at In each of these 398 B.R. cases, alone). the debtor submitted reaffirmation ter 7 cases were filed in California court, However, long standing agreement to the which it a rule of compliance agreement may advisory opin- rejected the as not in not issue federal courts States, 524(c) beyond § with 11 U.S.C. reasons ions. See Muskrat v. United 219 U.S. 524(c)(6)(A)(ii) 352-60, § control. See id. 31 S.Ct. 55 L.Ed. 246 debtor's rule, (1911) (requiring (recounting origins the court declare the reaffirma- of the that, 1792). agreement in the best interests of the date We note tion which back issue, approving appropriate dealing it if the debtor is case with this debtor before 524(c)(3)(B) unrepresented); (requiring scheduling priority appropriate id. be- certify attorney represented significant impact cause practice. agreement impose Chapter "does an un- See 9th 27-12; dependent hardship 3.3(g). or a on the debtor 9th Cir. Gen. Order due Cir. R. approved). it can be the debtor” before (A) (B) Here, “[Njothing subparagraphs rejected undisputed that Dumont 521(a)(2)] this shall alter the debtor's or [§ ad- reaffirmation. need not an offer of regard rights prop- to such the trustee's might at- have been had Dumont dress what title, erty except provided this under tempted to be rebuffed to reaffirm 521(a)(2)(C) 362(h) [.]" are court. We either Ford added). (emphasis addressing this leaves aware that not scenario timely any must to quo bankruptcy implies “file statement of the status ante — 521(a)(2).” required under attempt ride-through intention section who debtors to now, 362(h). Id. But he must “indicate such subject to are section If ride- that” he will do existed, statement one four through any lawyer who advised surrender, redeem, reaffirm, things: or as his client to make a reaffirmation offer Id. be unexpired spe sume lease. To original guilty contract terms would be cific, he must indicate “either” surrender malpractice, any bankruptcy judge retention; latter, “or” if he chooses he approved who such a reaffirmation from redemption, must indicate “either” reaffir pro litigant seriously se be would derelict mation, assumption. “or” Id. “Either” why in his duties. For one ever would means one or the “[t]he other.” American choose reaffirmation on such terms and Heritage Dictionary English of the Lan incur the of personal liability thus risk (4th ed.2000). guage Although tradi safely when one could achieve same tionally items, it has referred to two by ride-through? Congress ends Yet English the standards of the language clearly contemplated that offers reaffir degenerated have such that is either now original mation on the terms would be acceptable with more than two clauses. If qualifies made. the debtor ex note). However, (usage id. at 572-73 See ception, then seems result disjunction ... or” always “either has pre-BAPCPA would be the same as ride- meant that one listed alternatives through. Congress presumably would not must be satisfied.16 “exception” provide created an to ac

Thus, while Dumont filed state cess to an all option debtors had in the intention, ment of and properly stated that all place. first If debtors the right property, she intended to retain the she instance, elect in the first failed to indicate permissi one three exception wholly would devoid of con doing Accordingly, ble means of so. tent. The of statutory traditional rules stay automatic was terminated with re against construction counsel that result. spect Furthermore, to her automobile. supports This a conclusion that ride- longer automobile was no the property through not available to all. of the estate. C pause an exception note The mere termination of the automatic 362(h). A debtor who files an however, stay, enough was not to authorize intent original to reaffirm contract teaches, repossession. Ford’s As Butner complete terms but is unable to such a disposition of the debtor’s assets is reaffirmation due to the creditor’s refusal generally law. left state 440 U.S. at 54- subject to the section.17 Ride- 914. Nothing 99 S.Ct. through is the Code functionally indistinguishable from itself authorized repossess reaffirmation on Ford to Du- original terms except personal liability lack of in mont’s automobile. The removal of the the former. The careful automatic stay merely carve-out reaf lifted one obstacle firmation on the contract terms —a return doing its so. instance, person 362(h)(B)

16. For if a (requiring states he will do 17. See 11 U.S.C. B, timely specified debtor “to take complied either A he has with his action statement, A, such (even B, unless such statement statement if he instead C does specifies the debtor's intention actions). such and C are in the same class reaffinn original debt on the contract terms and added)). agree.” (emphasis creditor refuses contract, the conjunc at 710. Rather it removes last remain The in parties’ law, ing impediment bankruptcy under federal when a determines tion with state ipso law to enforcement an facto clause an automobile has debtor defaulted already that caveat, exists.18 how important There is an loan. 365(e)(i)(B) generally § ever: U.S.C. 521(d) Dumont asserts while section any contractual unenforceable

renders default, may it place the debtor in “does to create a default purports term which any or provide not recourse other action the commencement a solely based on or against property.” the Debtor Debtor’s Dumont’s loan con bankruptcy case. placing It “has the effect of the debtor in clause, ipso an facto but unless sec tained default, nothing simply more. A debtor is 365(e) rely trumped Ford cannot tion Unfortunately to in default.” deemed justify Dumont, the to its actions. clause consequences of default by are contract and state determined bankruptcy court and the give law.19 Dumont’s default did not Ford 521(d) provided BAP found that section itself, a to right repossess her vehicle Du just Ford needed. Because trump 521(d) rights did give but section Ford the required by take failed to action mont in possessed it under the contract 362(h), pre in “nothing [the Code] section filing event of default of Dumont’s because operation of a or limited] vented] right bankruptcy. Ford reserved agree underlying in lease or provision in to take the collateral back case a placing the effect of ment that has take default. Once Dumont failed to such lease or under debtor default 362(h), required action section federal occurrence, agreement by reason of prevented longer law no Ford proceeding or un pendency, existence her repossessing from car. insolvency title of the debt- der this 521(d). § or.” Id. D 521(d) no sub gives Ford Section that sec Dumont next claims 521(d) right against to take action stantive she inapplicable tion because was ispo facto there is no engaged “proceedi collateral. Where in a never contract, it a “case.”21 ng”20 does allow but clause Steinhaus, argument presented was not in. 349 B.R. This pencil one Ford might any and it authorize the Although party it in meant what actions neither discusses detail, 541(c)(i)(B) (depending on the contract also restricts creditor to take clauses, Furthermore, law). Congress ipso declaring at the time facto terms state prop- filing property becomes understanding the debtor’s indicated its of what also notwithstanding a contract erty happen of the estate in Dumont’s shoes would debtors gives option provision 362(h) an "that effects or passed provision it of section when forfeiture, modification, or termi- a effect property from the estate. which divests property.” interest in nation of the debtor's alternative, Dumont mentions the As 362(h) already divested Du- But section possibility the Debtor or of "recourse outside previous status as automobile its mont’s example property.” As an of such "re- her property of the estate. course,” may lead a default she asserts that Congress changes in creditor's financial statements argues that had intend- 19. Dumont swap anything, might agreement. it trigger to mean would a default ed for default 521(a)(6)) (as provided purpose did the BAPCPAamend- But the clear compel "the take whatever action creditor action from the ments is certain 521(d) nonbankruptcy debtor, 362(h) permitted by applicable as is are sections reject argument. this When Con- spurs compliance. law.” gress something clearly once in a has said 521(d) (providing statute, Congress again. 20. See 11 U.S.C. so it need do pre- "nothing shall Code] placing [the in default what well knew Code). agree court. The BAP did not con the We special- also the it, ized the although meaning “proceeding” sider she did address it in the of term supports However, the BAP. con opening brief before We Dumont’s assertion. clude, however, general that Dumont’s has a argument “proceeding” also more defi- easily falls within one the the nition which exceptions encompasses filing of to the a bankruptcy waiver doctrine. “When the con of issue case. See American Heri- tage Dictionary English Language ceded or the trial court is neglected the of (4th ed.2000) of and purely (defining proceeding one law either does not (in rely upon affect or factual record de a “course of or “a or procedure” action” context) veloped by parties legal “legal of a “litiga- court action” or tion”). may appeals Dictionary to it.” consent consider While Black’s Law ac- Patrin, knowledges bankruptcy-specific United States v. mean- (9th Cir.1978) (internal omitted). ing, citations the lead regular definition is “[t]he opposing party prejudiced orderly lawsuit, must not be progression and in- may before the court cluding consent. Id. Satis all acts events between the question purely fied that the is one of law entry time of commencement of Dictionary prejudiced and that Ford by was its judgment.” Black’s Law below, (8th ed.1999). absence we exercise our discretion question.22 years to consider Accordingly, “pro the reference to a force, since BAPCPA came into no court of ceeding” is ambiguous. We turn to the appeals opportunity has pass clarify traditional ambiguous sources of viability ride-through, and because legislative text. The familiar canon con money of the low amounts at stake it sociis, struction, noscitwr a counsels us to may be some time before the issue here meaning determine the “pro of the term presents again itself to this court. Be ceeding” by reference to the alternate con cause a parties strong interest default, “insolvency.” dition for Insolven question resolution of this and because (i.e., cy inability in the pay sense sides, adequately was briefed both we due,”) “debts as such debts gen become is decide it now. erally required for the initiation of a bank 303(h)(1). agree ruptcy

We with the case. See Donald court 521(d) that “the And language generally is likewise debtors do not broad file enough encompass filing they of a bank unless are insolvent. Donald, hand, ruptcy case.” B.R. filing at 538. On other of a bank acknowledge Congress ruptcy has re proceeding (say, seeking discharge debt) ferred to proceeding^]” or else “case[s] of student loan nothing has to do See, where the Code. e.g., insolvency. merely U.S.C. with It marks a 101(4)(A) (defining “bankruptcy changed procedural posture assis in case subject regulation tance” volving elsewhere in already insolvent debtor.23 decline, however, operation provision vent or limit the aof 22. We Dumont's invitation [creating interpret a default under the "proceeding” contract] ... the term in her occurrence, pendency, reason of the exis- interpretation or contract with Ford. The of am- proceeding biguous tence of a questions under this title contracts involve added)). insolvency (emphasis of the Fact-finding debtor” fact well as law. not a is proper task Dumont to ask us. bankruptcy terminology, 21. "In basic a bank- ruptcy proceeding report not the same as a bank- 23. The relevant committee also mili- ruptcy proceeding something against case. A position. tates Dumont’s It states: "If already existing bankruptcy occurs timely within an the debtor fails to undertake certain Donald, specified case.” 343 B.R. at nothing actions ... then in the mortgage security you deed. Even encompassing “proceeding” as Reading if your personal do not lia- case makes sense filing reaffirm discharged, right bility the debt is because be bizarre It would statute. lien still your car the creditor have in default on her loan declare someone of pro right security property a the to take the of happenstance on the depended if sense) or (in you pay do not the debt on it. being initi the technical ceeding default personal on item If the lien is of in her case. Be reason ated for whatever your exempt that is under meaning, property we need plain there is no cause exception or that the trustee has aban- absurdity State’s law whether decide doned, you may be able to redeem the apply here.24 would than the debt. To item rather reaffirm 521(d) how section Finally, we consider redeem, you single make payment a of sections together with other works equal the creditor to the current value of by is invoked the debt- The section Code. by security property, agreed is things certain he re- or’s failure to do parties by or determined the court. 521(a)(6) do, section quired to either under 524(k)(3)(J)(i) (emphasis add- U.S.C. 362(h). section Neither those or under ed). pur- apparent of the Code nor the sections 521(d) any section bear relation- pose of certainly The language is more litigation of in a ship organization to the than a opaque hope one would Accordingly, we hold bankruptcy case. simply vague sup disclosure. It is too a filing Chapter of that the debtor’s port weight Dumont would us a for the “proceeding” initiates petition place upon literally, it. Taken the itali 521(d). purposes section merely cized sentence states obvious: filing bankruptcy does not affect the

E collateral, rights and the creditor’s a disclosure re- argues Dumont that power reposses can exercise its creditor who quired to be made consumers are sion under the contract case of non contemplating reaffirmation demonstrates payment Allowing or the creditor default. on. The relevant that lives clause the debtor in placing exercise a reads: paragraph the disclosure is with this default not inconsistent truism. Furthermore, language “pay if has debt” your security creditor What could, ambiguous. It as Dumont as or dis- is interest lien? Your serts, monthly any lien mean “continue to make charge does not eliminate But it your payments A is often referred under the contract.”25 property. ‘lien’ (i.e., interest, trust, “pay could also mean off the debt” security to as a deed prevent ipso prevent limit the action of facto clauses which shall Code agree- “proceeding” operation hinge on the institution of provision of a in a lease or problems places rather than a "case.” Similar oc- that the debtor in default ment 365(e), which the source of insolven- cur with section debtor's reason 109-31(1), ipso cy.” H.R.Rep. pt. at 71 the restriction on facto clauses execu- No. (2005), Cong. tory Although contracts. that section disables & Admin.News U.S.Code added). filing ipso predicated on the pp. (emphasis facto clauses "case,” it the activation of does not bar claus- preferred read- 24. We do note that Dumont's "proceedings.” es based ing results for other would have mischievous instance, reading cites 25. This is uncontroversial where parts For she Code. 541(c) ipso no facto clause in the contract. proposition that there is for the Con- Accordingly, meaning is correct about gress even Dumont knows the technical disclosure, interpretation Congress could “case.” Yet if intended for word only "proceeding” refer to the default rule and "case” to have their 541(c) repossession. meanings, lead to would not cannot technical it). 521(a)(6) reading sup- provides This latter fence of section redeem further sentence, ported by very next which Congress’s evidence of to elimi intent redemption as the alternative to offers nate —or at least restrict —ride- is exempt reaffirmation if the collateral through.27 under state law or has been abandoned IV

the trustee. remaining Dumont makes one ar Tellingly, nowhere the disclosure is ride-through presented option. gument. as an Giv- She claim asserts her redemp- en disclosure describes repossession was unlawful under state reaffirmation, tion an alternative to the law matter is a to be determined the of description absence similar ride- stated, court. As bankruptcy the BAP “In suggests that it is through not authorized the Ninth Circuit the test to determine presence ipso the of an facto clause. a civil proceeding whether is related to a the Because intent the disclosure is to bankruptcy case whether the outcome of “[cjonsider force debtors to the decision to proceeding the conceivably any could carefully,” reaffirm U.S.C. effect the being on estate administered in 524(k)(3)(J)(i), we decline to read one Dumont, bankruptcy.” 383 B.R. at 490 ambiguous sentence as endorsement of (internal omitted). quotation marks By ride-through Congress provided where ex- of the repossession, time estate did plicit statutorily information about the au- exist, and there could have been no reaffirmation, thorized alternative re- effects on estate. demption. argues

Dumont also there F supplemental jurisdiction was over the However, only claim. state-law she assert Having 521(a)(2)(C), decided that section §§ ed 28 1331 and 1334 as bases for 362(h), in conjunction with section disal jurisdiction before the bankruptcy court. ride-through, lows we need consider Her assertion of a may jurisdictional different ride-through whether also have been theory here is provisions terminated under the section barred the doctrine of 521(a)(6).26 merely We note that the exis- waiver.28 26. We meaning, particu- have chosen resolve this case with- the final arbiter of the text’s 521(a)(6) out resort to section because of the larly legislative history where the for same construing difficulties of "for term clearly subsection is incorrect another purchase price.” express opinion no point). 521(a)(6) BAP's conclusion independently ride-through eliminates in this legislative history This is clearer in the Dumont, Compare case. 383 B.R. at 488 itself; than in the text the former states that (construing "purchase price” "pur- to mean language "provide[s] the new that an individ- money security chase interest” because chapter ual who is a not retain probably "[o]therwise section would possession personal property securing, meaningless virtually application and have no part, purchase money whole security few because automobile lenders finance cars debtor, days interest unless the within 45 af- payment, some any without form of down and creditors, meeting ter the first enters into a payment amount of down would reduce the creditor, agreement reaffirmation with the creditor’s claim to an amount less than the property.” H.R.Rep. redeems No. 109- Steinhaus, purchase price”); B.R. at 706- 31(1), (2005), pt. at Cong. 70-71 U.S.Code (same result), Donald, 343 B.R. at 2005, atpp. & Admin.News 138-139. ("A plain meaning construction of the purchase price’ term 'claim for the indicates a purchase price.")) claim the 28. We hasten id. at n. to note Dumont debt- full (observing legislative history position necessarily that the is not ors in her are not bereft

V congres to discern struggled decades simple intent on answer to that sional at- debtor has not least At where Indeed, the enactment of question. before reaffirm, in Par- our decision tempted Abuse Prevention by BAPCPA. superseded has been ker (“BAPC Act of Protection Consumer not violate the dis- Accordingly, Ford did PA”), were five to split the circuit courts Du- injunction repossessing charge including Five ours —had four. circuits — court vehicle. The mont’s option was held Ford’s propriety held that rightly debtors, while four circuits had available was it. under state law not before actions Maj. that it at 1109 op. held was not. See AFFIRMED. cases). disagree (collecting & nn. 5-6 level represented ment at circuit court GRABER, Judge, dissenting: Circuit iceberg. tip In scores I respectfully dissent. courts, cases, district appellate courts panels, through” debtor May bankruptcy “ride debate,1 in on as had comment weighed her possession of retaining — ators.2 vehicle, long as continues motor so she on 11 dispute must the The centered the text of regular payments; loan make 521(2) (2004), § three which BAPCPA re- invoke one of the debtor instead 521(a)(2). designated many § Like 11 U.S.C. options described commentators, 521(a)(2)(A)? and and we that the confusing of courts held § Because 521(2) § text, contradictory statutory plainly courts have text of authorized criticizing opposing and read- remedy. and Ford's view view’s "Both Dumont’s rights Ehrlich, under statute); the[ir][c]ontract and remedies ing B. The of the Scott brought by existence are defined and into Option 521(2)(A) Section Fourth of —Reaffir- [cjontract governed are now their and Chapter Agreements mation and 7 Consum- Dumont, While law.” 383 B.R. at 490. state 613, Debtor, (2002) er 53 Mercer L.Rev. 700 sharp we tend to Ford's actions here as view ride-through (asserting that "affects issue opinion practice, express we no as to whether great of assets has billions dollars in any non-bankruptcy they also state or violated creditors”); importance debtors and for both federal laws. White, Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. Sears, See, (In e.g., Mayton v. Roebuck & Co. Thoughts Keep Can She the Car? Some But 61, (B.A.P. Mayton), 64 9th Cir. re 208 B.R. Chapter 7 Retention in Consumer Collateral 1997) (resolving ride-through while issue 471, Cases, Corp. 7 & L. 498 Fordham J. Fin. disagreement among noting the "marked (2002) (arguing and cred- ”[b]oth debtors courts”); Sears courts and district by recognizing itors would better served 221, Lamirande, & v. 199 B.R. Roebuck Co. right ride-through collat- debtor’s on some (Bankr.D.Mass.1996) (noting 223 Ponoroff, eral”); Up, Dude: Lawrence Surfs country split” on the across the have ”[c]ourts Riding Through Bankruptcy, 7 Bankr.L. & J. and, ride-through issue the absence 101, (1997) (noting Prac. 101-02 the “decided binding precedent, adopting persua- the more among 302, disturbing lack of consensus” Kennedy, position); In re 137 B.R. sive (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1992) Bankrupt- (noting discussing the National courts 303-04 courts ... "[n]umerous review the ride- cy Review Commission’s consistency in with little issue[ ] ruled this issue); Waxman, through Redemption Ned W. "[tjhere and, control- results” because is no Exclusive The Debtor’s Reaffirmation: district,” adopting the ling authority in this Retaining Means Possession Collateral persuasive” position). “more 7, 187, (1994) Chapter L.Rev. 56 U. Pitt. 187 ride-through (stating is ”[t]he that the issue ¶ See, e.g., Bankruptcy 521.10 4 Collier on aris- eds., consumer credit issue most controversial (Alan Henry N. Resnick & J. Sommer cases”). rev.) (advancing ing [bankruptcy] Circuit’s 15th ed. Ninth 1120 ](A) ing in option. McClellan Fed. al- subparagraph[ shall (In Parker),

Credit Union v. Parker re ter the debtor’s or the rights trustee’s (9th 668, Cir.1998); F.3d see also regard property to such under Funding Home Am. v. Corp. Owners this title.” no We see reason to reach (In Belanger Belanger), re F.2d 345 beyond plain language. this (4th Cir.1992) (reaching conclu the same (alterations 139 F.3d at 673 in original) ¶ sion); 4 on Bankruptcy Collier 521.10 omitted). (paragraph break (Alan Henry N. & Resnick J. Sommer explained by re Belanger, As “[t]he rev.) (same). eds., 15th ed. courts Other phrase ‘if applicable’ is redundant if ... 521(2) held that the plainly text di options given are consid- rected the opposite conclusion: Debtors ered to be exclusive.” F.2d at 348. must choose one of the options three listed And, course, give effect, if courts should 521(2)(A).3 See, §in e.g., Taylor v. AGE possible, every in a (In word statute. Reit- Fed. Credit Taylor), Union F.3d (11th Cir.1993). 330, er Corp., v. Sonotone 442 U.S. (1979). S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d 931 Parker, analysis Our in In re like the Fourth Circuit suggested simple alterna- analysis provided by other courts and com- tive that Congress text could have used mentators, two aspects concerned exclusive, options were In re Belanger, 521(2): §of phrase text applicable” “if 962 F.2d at suggestion 348—a that was 521(2)(A) 521(2)(C). §in and the text of repeated years later the Third Cir- We reasoned in In re Parker: Price, cuit Inin re F.3d at The statute that states the debtor shall file with the clerk a statement his Against this backdrop, Congress enacted respect intention with to the or retention in BAPCPA majority The begins and, surrender property appli- of such if with the “assum[ption] Congress that in- cable, specifying that property is to tended make available exempt, claimed as that the in- debtor circuits, Maj. all or op. none.” at 1112. I tends to redeem such or that property, am not legislative history convinced. The the debtor intends to reaffirm debts se- issue, completely is silent on nary cured such property. public reference to the vigorous debate 521(2)(A). § interpre- Our by the courts and my commentators. tation of language that that view, changes to the text indicate an mandatory act is the filing perpetuate intent to the extant split, circuit intention, statement of which the it. resolve Then, debtor “shall” file. applica- “if 521(a)(2)(A) § importantly, Most re- ble,” is, if the plans debtor to —that entirely unchanged. mains The all-impor- any choose the three options listed “if applicable” phrase tant very

later in the statute (claiming prop- —the of disagreement source among circuit erty as exempt, redeeming prop- courts, courts, courts, district debt) erty, or reaffirming the —the debtor commentators —remains intact. specify must so Con- the state- gress not only ment of declined to adopt intention. The other debtor’s options available, text, unambig- remain Fourth Circuit’s suggested it declined 521(2)(C): “[Njoth- uously §in stated any change make whatsoever. text, 362, beyond (3d poli- Cir.2004) 3. Other courts looked (summarizing 367-68 cy considerations. See Price v. Del. Po- cases). State (In Price), lice Fed. Credit Union course, guid- Congress presumptions and equally that acknowledge, I relevant — 521(a)(2)(C) statutory ing interpretation. include § modify did 362(h). my § But ex- exception for new “ matter, First, general ‘Congress as a that, if suggests of that section amination to be of an presumed aware administrative change no Congress intended anything, judicial interpretation of a or statute and The new section existing split. circuit it interpretation that when re adopt that the debtor part, in relevant requires, ” change.’ a statute without Forest enacts must —T.A., U.S.-, Dist. Grove v. Sch. intention] in such statement [of indicate (2009) 2484, 2492, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 S.Ct. surrender the debtor will either Pons, 575, (quoting Lorillard v. 434 U.S. and, it or retain property personal such (1978)). S.Ct. 55 L.Ed.2d retaining personal property, such ei- above, differing judicial As noted inter personal property redeem such ther pretations were well known and were en into an pursuant to section enter capsulated split. in the five-four circuit kind agreement specified sec- 521(a)(2)(A) § Congress Yet did not amend 524(c) debt applicable tion se- “if phrase critical applicable,” even property, such as- personal cured though courts commentators across unexpired pursuant lease sume such provided interpre nation different 365(p) if the trustee does not do Additionally, al tations of section. so, applicable [.] 521(a)(2)(C) Congress § though amended 362(h), § it to include new carried added). 362(h)(1) (emphasis § 11 U.S.C. important qualifier “applica forward 362(h) parallels § thus the text text a clear else expression “[A]bsent ble.” 521(a)(2)(A) requires Congress’ in the where Amendments of options “if to follow one of three portion provi repeal intent to some 521(a)(2)(A), applica or “as applicable,” abrogate circuit split],” sion or to For [the 362(h)(1).4 ble,” § Grove, (emphasis 129 at 2492 est S.Ct. confusing and contra When faced with added), to read the we should continue already confusing to dictory amendments I pre-BAPCPA. as we did As read statute text,5 statutory contradictory and what amendments, the BAPCPA no such “clear majority reasonably do? The should we expression” emerges. presumption Congress a that from starts disagree to that I pause to the circuit I note do must have intended resolve general “di- majority that with the split general principle and the more changes sug- in the rection and tenor of the uniformity intended bank Congress above, to Congress did not intend in- explained though, gest that ruptcy laws. As by passing presump crease access to I am not convinced those But Maj. op. at 1112. In the context of this BAPCPA.” apply tions here. case, tenor” of a statuto- general different— “direction and I would fall back two phrase weight potential to agree much distinction be- I with Ford that tend applicable” applicable.” and “as tween "if applicable” read in isolation —more "as —if rigid phrase applicable” "as so is not options strongly suggests three that one options that one of the listed command Given the context of the must be selected. be followed. must amendments, long-standing ju- BAPCPA commentary risprudence on the ride- and readily acknowledges majority the con- 5. The interplay fusing Maj. op. through option, between amendments. at nature however, 362, assign n. 11. I 1110 & decline

ry inquiry. is not the amendment correct her means of transportation, without inquiry congressional The correct intent whatsoever, any notice her great caused specific with to the Fur- respect issue. difficulties.6 It impossi is hard —if not thermore, readily agree “Congress I reconcile ble—to Ford’s actions with the did not intend increase access ride- purpose principal Bankruptcy Code: passing my In through by BAPCPA.” Dumont a give “fresh start.” In the view, Congress do though, decided to noth- of a clear congressional ap absence intent increasing ing decreasing nor ac- —neither actions, proving Ford’s I would not read Rather, ride-through. Congress cess to such intent into the statute. simply side-stepped the contentious ride- conclusion, text, I equally ap- borrow issue, through perpetuating thus the cir- here, plicable colleagues from my in a re- split. cuit cent appeal concerning a dif- Second, Code, to the specific perplexing provision: ferent overarching guiding of statu- principle The “correct” question answer tory interpretation, “again again em- us, before which the courts have been courts,” phasized by the Local Loan Co. v. struggling years Hunt, unnec- 234, 244, 695, 292 U.S. S.Ct. —at essary (1934), cost of thousands of strongly my L.Ed. 1230 hours of supports judicial view: “The pi’incipal purpose depends of the Bank- valuable ulti- time— ruptcy grant is to mately Code fresh to the upon interpretation start our debtor,” honest but unfortunate statute, Marrama but what upon Congress Mass., v. 365, Bank Citizens U.S. wants answer to be. would (2007) S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 956 hope, regard, this we judicia- (internal omitted). quotation Here, marks ry would be Sisyphean relieved of this Dumont for bankruptcy, filed stated her by legislation clearly adventure answer- intent to retain the car a ride-through, ing straightforward question: policy and declined Ford’s request to reaffirm [May debtors invoke “ride-through” the debt. Ford filed a claim with the option?] but, so far court as the record MBNA, Bank, (In v. Ransom Am. N.A. reveals, objected never to Dumont’s state- Ransom), (9th Cir. rejection ment of intent her offer 2009). In contrast to the situation In re of reaffirmation. The bankruptcy case Ransom, we have already answered the proceeded course, in the normal and the Price, question at hand. In re 370 F.3d at bankruptcy court issued an order dis- 371. Because the BAPCPA amendments charge. At all during times—both only confusion, add I would overrule bankruptcy proceedings and after dis- In re Price. charge order —Dumont continued make regularly her scheduled loan payments to

Ford. discharge Months after Dumont,

without any notice to repos- Ford

sessed Dumont’s car. imagined, As can be

Dumont claims that the repossession of noted, personal As courts financing during— debtor's for a vehicle access new (and or, here, automobile often ''vital” to the debtor immediately following bankrupt- — because, estate) limited, example, cy generally ‘‘auto- recently she because mobile [is] used commute bankruptcy. Capital to one’s work- has filed Commc’ns Price, place.” (In Boodrow), In re 370 F.3d at 378 n. 10. Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (2d Additionally, 1997). a debtor’s financial situation F.3d Cir.

Case Details

Case Name: Antoinette Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Company

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Date Published: Sep 15, 2009

Citation: 581 F.3d 1104

Docket Number: 08-60002

Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.