888 F.3d 330
7th Cir.2018Background
- Sampra, an FAA electrical engineer assigned to "field" status but working largely in-office overseeing contractor work releases, took FMLA leave from Jan 6 to Mar 10, 2014.
- While she was on leave her supervisor changed; the new supervisor, Sibert, reassigned the work-release duties to himself and later assigned Sampra to a field project at O'Hare on Mar 21, 2014 (overnight runway shift lacking restroom/lactation access).
- Sibert temporarily allowed daytime hours for childcare; before the overnight work began Sampra sought reassignment and on Apr 20, 2014 was moved to a drafting coordinator role (lower pay band but she kept her engineer salary).
- Sampra sued under the FMLA on Apr 18, 2016 alleging interference with her right to restoration to an equivalent position after leave.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the Department of Transportation on the merits; the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the alternative ground that the claim was time-barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness: when did the FMLA limitations period start? | Sampra treated the actionable violation as the later, more burdensome aspects of reassignment. | Statute began when Sibert assigned Sampra to the O'Hare field project on Mar 21, 2014. | Clock began Mar 21, 2014; suit filed Apr 18, 2016 is untimely under 2-year rule. |
| Applicable limitations period: 2 years or 3 years (willfulness)? | Sampra argued the department acted wrongfully; sought tolling to 3 years for willful violation. | DOT argued no evidence of willfulness; only ordinary (at most negligent) conduct. | 3-year willfulness extension requires knowledge or reckless disregard; Sampra failed to present such evidence. |
| Availability of equitable fact issues that would beat summary judgment on statute defense | Sampra pointed to differences in duties, location, and shift to show actionable interference. | DOT pointed to unchanged title, salary, and the assignment decision date; raised SOL defense in district court. | Court resolved timeliness as a matter of law on undisputed facts and affirmed dismissal without reaching the merits. |
| Standard for "willful" under FMLA §2617(c)(2) | Sampra urged a lenient view that awareness of FMLA suffices. | DOT relied on McLaughlin standard requiring knowledge or reckless disregard. | Adopted McLaughlin: willful = employer knew or recklessly disregarded statutory prohibition; awareness alone insufficient. |
Key Cases Cited
- McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988) (defines "willful" for SOL under analogous FLSA standard: knowledge or reckless disregard required)
- Barrett v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 803 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2015) (FMLA limitations period begins at last event constituting violation)
- Bass v. Potter, 522 F.3d 1098 (10th Cir. 2008) (applies McLaughlin willfulness standard to FMLA)
- Porter v. New York Univ. Sch. of Law, 392 F.3d 530 (2d Cir. 2004) (applies McLaughlin willfulness standard to FMLA)
- Hillstrom v. Best Western TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003) (same)
- Crugher v. Prelesnik, 761 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2014) (FMLA claim SOL begins on date of adverse employment action)
- Reed v. Lear Corp., 556 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 2009) (FMLA interference SOL triggered when employer first communicated denial/assignment constituting violation)