Sambasivan v. Kadlec Medical Center
338 P.3d 860
Wash. Ct. App.2014Background
- Dr. Venkataraman Sambasivan, an interventional cardiologist, sued Kadlec Medical Center in June 2008 alleging national-origin discrimination and later added retaliation claims after Kadlec’s board (on Aug. 14, 2008) adopted a retroactive volume-based proficiency standard for interventional cardiologists.
- The new standard (150 procedures per two years) was given immediate retroactive effect; Sambasivan was the only interventional cardiologist who failed to meet it and thus became ineligible to renew interventional cardiology privileges, though he retained general cardiology privileges.
- Sambasivan claims the board’s action deprived him of (1) the opportunity to contract for paid emergency department “call” coverage at Kadlec and (2) the patient referrals/relationships that would have led to interventional procedure contracts at Kadlec; he asserted federal retaliation/contract-impairment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and state retaliation claims under RCW 49.60.210(1).
- On first summary judgment appeal this court reversed dismissal of the retaliation claims and remanded for trial, finding disputed facts about causation; on remand Kadlec moved again for summary judgment arguing Sambasivan lacked a contractual nexus and thus could not state § 1981 or WLAD retaliation claims.
- The trial court granted Kadlec’s second summary judgment motion; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding Sambasivan raised triable issues as to impairment of contractual opportunities under § 1981 and that WLAD’s retaliation provision reaches Kadlec’s conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court should refuse to consider Kadlec’s second summary- judgment motion under the law-of-the-case doctrine | Sambasivan: prior appellate remand ordered trial; second summary judgment should not have been entertained | Kadlec: did not raise certain issues earlier; CR 56 permits later summary judgment grounds | Court: law-of-the-case is discretionary; will decide the renewed motion on the merits |
| Whether § 1981 requires an existing contract or can reach impairment of future contracting opportunities (call contracts) | Sambasivan: § 1981 protects would-be contractors; loss of opportunity to obtain paid call contracts is actionable | Kadlec: loss was merely collateral to loss of privileges; bylaws don’t create a contract with hospital | Court: § 1981 protects impairment of both existing and prospective contractual opportunities; triable issue exists that Kadlec’s action impaired Sambasivan’s ability to obtain call contracts |
| Whether impairment of patient-related contracts (lost referrals/patient procedures at Kadlec) is actionable under § 1981 | Sambasivan: losing ability to treat patients at Kadlec deprived him of contract opportunities; traveling elsewhere is not a defense | Kadlec: remaining general privileges or ability to practice at other hospitals means no actionable impairment; collateral consequence | Court: Jones and Domino’s principles apply; restricting access to particular hospital privileges can deny the same contractual rights as enjoyed by others; triable issue on impairment of patient-contract opportunities |
| Whether RCW 49.60.210(1) retaliation remedy is limited to employer-employee relationships | Sambasivan: WLAD’s retaliation clause is broad (“any . . . person”) and applies to entities functionally similar to employers or to those contracting with independent contractors | Kadlec: statute limited to employer/independent-contractor personal-service relationships | Court: Washington precedent (Galbraith, Malo, Marquis) reads WLAD’s retaliation provision beyond strict employer-only limits; Kadlec’s denial of privileges affecting call-contracts and practice is sufficiently labor-related/analogous to be actionable |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (broad reading of Civil Rights Act protections for contractual opportunities)
- Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (discrimination that blocks assignment/use of membership rights actionable despite bylaw/formal authority)
- Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (pre-1991 limitation on post-formation conduct under § 1981; prompted statutory expansion)
- Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (§ 1981 protects both existing and prospective contractual relations)
- CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (§ 1981 includes retaliation claims)