155 Conn.App. 305
Conn. App. Ct.2015Background
- Parties divorced after a 1987 marriage; separation agreement (incorporated into dissolution) provided that plaintiff would be employed by defendant at $1,539/week ($80,028/yr) and that employment changes could trigger modification of alimony and child support; alimony was nominal ($1/yr) while employed.
- Paragraphs in the agreement addressed: employment/alimony modification triggers, child support adjustments if plaintiff’s employment changed, and defendant’s obligation to pay first $3,000 of unreimbursed medical expenses for children.
- Plaintiff’s employment with defendant’s company ended in July 2012; plaintiff moved to modify alimony and child support under the agreement.
- At the January 29, 2013 hearing both parties presented broad financial evidence without objection; the trial court applied § 46b-82 factors and found defendant’s gross/net income substantially higher than claimed.
- Trial court ordered modified alimony ($1,600/week) and child support ($425/week), changed allocation of medical and clothing expenses, and eliminated vehicle/gas benefits; defendant’s motion to reargue was denied.
- Defendant appealed claiming wrong legal standard, erroneous factual findings (including $20,000 of personal expenses treated as income and rental/depreciation totaling $86,788), and abuse of discretion in the modified financial orders.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court applied the correct standard to modify support | Salzbrunn relied on the agreement trigger and presented broad evidence; court may consider §46b-82 factors when parties introduce such evidence | Court should have applied a limited review based solely on the separation agreement (no §46b-82 “second look”) | Issue unpreserved; parties and court proceeded under §46b-82 at hearing and no timely objection made, so appellate review refused |
| Whether court clearly erred in treating $20,000 of business-paid personal expenses as income | Plaintiff (former bookkeeper) testified and produced company credit-card report showing personal charges; court credited that evidence | Defendant said evidence was speculative, relied on 2012 report vs. 2011 returns, and challenged plaintiff’s basis for identifying personal charges | Not clearly erroneous: trial court credited plaintiff’s testimony and report; credibility/weight were for the court |
| Whether court erred in including rental income/depreciation of $86,788 in gross income | Plaintiff argued rental income reported on defendant’s financial affidavit was properly counted as income | Defendant argued intercompany rent payments and company loss should offset rental income and that accounting treatment made amount incorrect | No error: court accepted rental figures from defendant’s affidavit and treated the properties as income-generating; claim inadequately briefed on some points |
| Whether modified financial orders were an abuse of discretion / punitive or inequitable | Plaintiff sought relief after losing employment; court balanced both parties’ needs and found defendant’s net income could support orders | Defendant argued modification was punitive, inconsistent with original deal, left him worse off and ignored that one child left for college | No abuse of discretion: court’s orders were within its broad equitable discretion and not confiscatory given court’s findings of defendant’s income |
Key Cases Cited
- Ucci v. Ucci, 114 Conn. App. 256 (Conn. App. 2009) (preservation rule: objection required when party seeks modification under agreement only)
- Miller v. Guimaraes, 78 Conn. App. 760 (Conn. App. 2003) (clearly erroneous standard for trial court factual findings)
- Greco v. Greco, 275 Conn. 348 (Conn. 2005) (reversal for inequitable financial awards)
- Pellow v. Pellow, 113 Conn. App. 122 (Conn. App. 2009) (appellate reversal when orders consume disproportionate share of payer’s income)
- Kovalsick v. Kovalsick, 125 Conn. App. 265 (Conn. App. 2010) (deference to trial court on alimony/discretion, but reviewable for excess)
- Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123 (Conn. 2014) (standards for exceptional circumstances warranting sua sponte review)
- State v. Smith, 40 Conn. App. 789 (Conn. App. 1996) (findings based on speculation are clearly erroneous)
- Rozsa v. Rozsa, 117 Conn. App. 1 (Conn. App. 2009) (trial court discretion on alimony awards upheld)
- Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579 (Conn. 1975) (trial court’s broad equitable discretion in alimony awards)