Salters v. Commissioner of Correction
2017 Conn. App. LEXIS 346
Conn. App. Ct.2017Background
- Gaylord Salters was convicted after a 1996 gang-related drive-by shooting of two counts of first-degree assault and one count of conspiracy; convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Salters filed a first habeas petition asserting Brady suppression (regarding witness Kendall Turner) and ineffective assistance of trial counsel; the habeas court denied relief and this Court affirmed, finding some Brady claims procedurally defaulted.
- Salters filed a second habeas petition (self‑represented initially) alleging, among other things, that his prior habeas counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) raise that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a Brady evidentiary hearing; (2) raise that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to an allegedly erroneous jury instruction that included a full statutory definition of "intentionally" (general and specific intent); and (3) allege appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise Brady and prosecutorial impropriety on direct appeal.
- At the second habeas trial, the court found Salters had not shown prejudice from the alleged Brady suppression, that the jury instruction error (reading §53a-3(11))—though improper—did not reasonably mislead the jury given numerous correct specific-intent instructions, and that appellate counsel reasonably declined to press a weak prosecutorial-impropriety claim.
- Salters appealed, arguing (inter alia) the habeas court applied the wrong (less favorable) materiality standard for Brady when false testimony was alleged; the appellate court declined to reach that claim for lack of an adequate record and affirmed the habeas court on the remaining issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether habeas court applied the stricter materiality standard for Brady claims alleging the prosecution knowingly relied on false testimony | Salters: court should have applied the stricter standard (any reasonable likelihood false testimony affected verdict) because he alleged prosecutorial knowledge/use of false testimony | State: record inadequate; habeas court did not make factual findings on false‑testimony allegation so appellate review is precluded | Court: declined to review due to inadequate record; claim not decided by habeas court |
| Whether habeas counsel was ineffective for not alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Brady evidentiary hearing | Salters: additional impeachment of Turner would have been material and likely changed outcome | State: petitioner failed to show prejudice; additional impeachment would not have materially altered cross-examination or outcome | Court: petitioner failed to prove a reasonable probability of a different result; no prejudice shown |
| Whether habeas counsel was ineffective for failing to allege trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to jury instruction that read full statutory definition of "intentionally" | Salters: reading general-intent language for specific-intent crimes could have misled jury to apply a lower mens rea | State: although reading the full definition was improper, the charge as a whole repeatedly and clearly instructed on specific intent, mitigating any harm | Court: instruction error was harmless; not reasonably possible jury was misled given repeated proper specific-intent instructions |
| Whether appellate counsel reasonably forewent a prosecutorial-impropriety claim on direct appeal (and thus whether habeas counsel was ineffective for failing to raise appellate counsel's ineffectiveness) | Salters: prosecutor misstated evidence by denying any police pressure on Turner; appellate counsel should have challenged this | State: Turner's testimony at most showed pressure to give a statement, not that police fed him identification; claim was weak and appellate counsel reasonably declined to raise it | Court: appellate counsel made a reasonable strategic choice; habeas counsel not ineffective for failing to attack appellate counsel on this ground |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (prosecutor's obligation to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Adams v. Commissioner of Correction, 309 Conn. 359 (Conn. 2013) (different materiality standard when the prosecution used known false testimony)
- State v. Montanez, 277 Conn. 735 (Conn. 2006) (jury charge must be read as a whole; repeated correct instructions can mitigate an improper general‑intent instruction)
- State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 (Conn. 1986) (use of prior inconsistent witness statements at trial)