Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174

Salinas, not in custody and not given Miranda warnings, answered some police questions but remained silent when asked if ballistics would link his shotgun to scene shells.
Prosecution later used Salinas’s pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt at his murder trial in Texas.
Lower courts upheld the use of his silence; Salinas sought relief under the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether pre-custodial silence can be used as evidence and whether explicit invocation of the Fifth Amendment is required to shield silence.
The Court ultimately held Salinas’s Fifth Amendment claim fails because he did not expressly invoke the privilege during questioning.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether pre-custodial silence can be used as evidence of guilt	Salinas argues silence implicates Fifth Amendment protection and cannot be used.	Texas contends silence may be used because invocation was not asserted.	Affirmed; plurality holds no violation given no express invocation.
Whether express invocation of the Fifth Amendment is required to shield silence	Salinas should be protected even without explicit invocation.	State may use silence unless privilege is expressly invoked.	Affirmed; express invocation required to benefit from privilege.
Whether exceptions to express invocation apply in noncustodial interviews	There should be a third exception for stand-mute silence in the face of official suspicion.	Existing exceptions (Griffin, Miranda-related coercion) do not support a new exception here.	Rejected; no new exception adopted.
Whether the prosecutor’s comments about silence violated the Fifth Amendment	Salinas would be protected from comment on silence.	No blanket prohibition on commenting where privilege isn't invoked.	Not reached; majority treats invocation issue as dispositive.

Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420 (1984) (express invocation generally required; exceptions limited)
Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965) (no adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify at trial)
Murphy, 465 U. S. 420 (1984) (coercion and invocation context for privilege)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U. S. 370 (2010) (post-Miranda silence rule; explicit invocation not at issue here)
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (1976) (use of silence after warnings; no inference from silence)
Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452 (1994) (standard for asserting right to counsel; parallel invocation rule)
Roberts v. United States, 445 U. S. 552 (1980) (no implied privilege from silence without assertion)
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231 (1980) (prearrest silence not constitutionally protected)
Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155 (1955) (no ritualistic formula required to invoke privilege)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation and the protections against self-incrimination)