Salinas, Orlando
2017 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 284
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2017Background
- Appellant convicted of felony injury to an elderly individual and assessed a $133 consolidated court-cost fee under Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 133.102.
- § 133.102 levies a single consolidated fee and directs the Comptroller to allocate portions to multiple state accounts by percentage.
- Appellant challenged the fee facially under the Texas Constitution’s separation-of-powers clause, arguing some recipient accounts are not for legitimate criminal-justice purposes.
- On remand from this Court, appellant limited the challenge to two accounts: “abused children’s counseling” (0.0088%) and “comprehensive rehabilitation” (9.8218%).
- The Court held those two allocations facially unconstitutional because the statutory language does not direct funds to be expended for legitimate criminal-justice purposes, but severed the invalid portions and reduced the $133 fee pro rata to $119.93.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 133.102 is facially unconstitutional because some allocated accounts are not for criminal-justice purposes | The statute is facially invalid in all applications because allocations to some accounts (including the two challenged) fail the required criminal-justice nexus and turn courts into tax collectors | The allocations are constitutional: the account names and interconnected statutes (and historical use) show legitimate criminal-justice purposes or potential lawful applications | Court: § 133.102 is facially unconstitutional only to the extent it allocates to the two specified accounts; those allocations lack statutory direction to expend funds for legitimate criminal-justice purposes and are invalid |
| Validity of allocation to "comprehensive rehabilitation" account | Appellant: HHSC-managed general rehabilitation fund is not directed to criminal-justice purposes on its face | State: Interconnected statutes and programs (e.g., services to victims, specific programs) show a criminal-justice nexus | Court: Allocation invalid — statute does not on its face limit use to criminal-justice purposes; therefore unconstitutional as assessed by courts |
| Validity of allocation to "abused children’s counseling" account | Appellant: Historical program was repealed; currently no statutory recipient/mandate and funds revert to general revenue, so no criminal-justice nexus | State: The account’s name and prior statutory history, plus possible uses, relate to victim services and criminal-justice interests | Court: Allocation invalid — no current statutory direction tying the funds to a criminal-justice purpose; mere name or past use insufficient |
| Remedy, severability, and retroactivity | Appellant: Entire consolidated-fee statute should fall because no severability clause and allocations are intertwined | State: Only specific invalid uses should be excised; statute otherwise valid and severable; retroactivity implications weigh for the State | Court: Severed invalid allocations; reduced fee pro rata by combined 9.8306% ($13.07) to $119.93; limited retroactivity — apply to the parties and certain pending PDRs, otherwise prospective |
Key Cases Cited
- Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (interconnected statutes can show assessed court costs are expended for legitimate criminal-justice purposes)
- Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (courts should consider retroactivity at time of decision)
- Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (U.S. 1987) (retroactivity rule for new federal constitutional criminal procedure rules)
- Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (U.S. 1967) (balancing test applied for retroactivity of new rules)
- Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (separation-of-powers and related review principles)