Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper
859 F.3d 865
| 10th Cir. | 2017Background
- Colorado adopted Amendment 64 to legalize and regulate recreational marijuana while federal law (the CSA) still criminalizes manufacture/distribution of marijuana.
- Reillys (landowners) and Safe Streets brought RICO claims against adjacent licensed marijuana operators alleging odorous nuisance and diminution in property value; plaintiffs also sued Colorado and Pueblo County seeking to enjoin enforcement of Amendment 64 as preempted by the CSA.
- A separate group of sheriffs and county attorneys (Smith plaintiffs) sued Colorado asserting the CSA preempts Amendment 64 and sought injunctive relief.
- Nebraska and Oklahoma sought to intervene on appeal asserting sovereign preemption claims against Colorado; they had previously filed an original action in the U.S. Supreme Court.
- District court dismissed the RICO claims (for lack of plausible property injury/proximate cause) and dismissed the preemption/equity claims; appeals followed and were consolidated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Reillys plausibly pleaded RICO (§1964(c)) claims against marijuana operators | Reillys: operators formed an association-in-fact enterprise violating the CSA; odorous nuisance and reduced market value are injury to property proximately caused by RICO predicate acts | Operators: alleged injuries speculative, plaintiffs failed to plead concrete financial loss or proximate cause | Reversed in part: Reillys plausibly alleged (1) odorous nuisance interfering with use/enjoyment, (2) present diminution in value from odors, and (3) present diminution in value from publicly operating a criminal enterprise; proximate causation adequately pleaded for those three injuries; remand for further proceedings on those claims. |
| Whether private plaintiffs may obtain equitable relief (declaratory/injunctive) to enforce CSA preemption (§903/Supremacy Clause) against state/local officials without a federal substantive right | Plaintiffs: equity is a standalone source; any citizen injured by state violation of federal law can seek injunction to enforce Supremacy/§903 | State/County: plaintiffs lack any federal substantive right under the CSA to vindicate; Supremacy Clause does not create private cause of action; enforcement rests with federal actors/Congress | Affirmed: plaintiffs cannot enforce §903 or the Supremacy Clause in equity because they possess no federal substantive rights conferred by CSA; preemption claims dismissed. |
| Whether sheriffs/county attorneys can enjoin Colorado under CSA absent a statutory federal right | Plaintiffs (Smith): equitable enforcement of CSA available for their injuries (oath conflicts; cross-border marijuana flow increases costs) | Colorado: no federal substantive rights granted to these officials; claims seek to enforce federal law without a private right | Affirmed: same reasoning as Safe Streets — no private federal right to vindicate; dismissal upheld. |
| Whether Nebraska and Oklahoma may intervene on appeal to litigate sovereign preemption claims against Colorado | States: seek to intervene to defend/advance sovereign preemption claims; argued intervention timely | Opposing parties: controversy between States must be brought in Supreme Court; 28 U.S.C. §1251(a) gives original and exclusive jurisdiction to SCOTUS for disputes between States | Intervention vacated/denied: court lacks jurisdiction over controversies between States under §1251(a); order granting intervention vacated and motions to intervene denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (RICO should be read broadly and creates civil cause of action for injury to business or property)
- RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (defining RICO private-right elements and limits on scope of recoverable injuries)
- Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009) (association-in-fact enterprise elements)
- Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (operation-or-management test for §1962(c) liability)
- Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemn. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (proximate cause in civil RICO and that plaintiffs need not be direct victims of underlying fraud to proceed if injury is direct)
- Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (limiting RICO recovery to direct injuries; proximate causation analysis)
- Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006) (discussing indirect injuries and proximate cause in RICO context)
- Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) (Supremacy Clause does not itself create a private cause of action; courts must consider statutory text and remedial scheme before granting equitable relief)
- Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (statutory text must create rights-‑‑in‑persons‑benefited terms to support private enforcement)
- Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (federal courts cannot enjoin state officials for violations of state law; federal rights required to obtain equitable relief)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (prospective injunctive relief against state officers to enjoin ongoing violations of federal law)
- Gillmor v. Thomas, 490 F.3d 791 (10th Cir. 2007) (diminution in development potential is a cognizable property injury under §1964(c))
- United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (discussing federal enforcement discretion under CSA)
