S.E.R.L. v. Attorney General United States, 894 F.3d 535

Background

Petitioner S.E.R.L., a Honduran national, sought asylum and withholding of removal based on membership in the proposed particular social group (PSG) "immediate family members of Honduran women unable to leave a domestic relationship." Her daughter previously received asylum; petitioner alleges threats/abuse by two men tied to those family relationships.
An IJ found petitioner credible but denied asylum and withholding, concluding petitioner failed to prove a cognizable PSG under the BIA’s test (lack of particularity and social distinction) and failed to show persecution on account of a protected ground.
The BIA affirmed the IJ: it found no past persecution by the men, held the proposed PSG lacked particularity and social distinction in Honduran society, and denied relief; petitioner timely petitioned for review to the Third Circuit.
Central legal question: whether the BIA’s modern three-part test for "particular social group" in Matter of M‑E‑V‑G‑ (immutable characteristic, particularity, social distinction) is a permissible interpretation of the INA and thus entitled to Chevron deference.
The Third Circuit previously rejected parts of the BIA’s prior formulation in Valdiviezo‑Galdamez; here the court assesses whether the BIA’s clarified framing in M‑E‑V‑G‑ resolves prior concerns and whether substantial evidence supports the BIA’s findings as applied to petitioner.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the BIA’s three‑part PSG test (M‑E‑V‑G‑) is entitled to Chevron deference	M‑E‑V‑G‑ is flawed, departs from statute and Valdiviezo‑Galdamez; court should apply Acosta instead	BIA’s clarified test is a reasoned interpretation of ambiguous statutory term and resolves prior concerns	Court: M‑E‑V‑G‑ is a reasonable interpretation entitled to Chevron deference
Whether "social distinction" duplicates nexus or is unworkable	Social distinction conflates PSG and nexus and is vague	Social distinction is societal perception evidence distinct from persecutor motive and is workable with country/expert evidence	Court: Social distinction is a reasonable, distinct requirement and workable in practice
Whether "particularity" is permissible	Particularity unduly restricts PSGs and conflicts with ejusdem generis	Particularity is textually grounded in the word "particular" and ensures definable group boundaries	Court: Particularity is reasonable and consistent with statute
Whether petitioner’s proposed PSG meets M‑E‑V‑G‑ (particularity + social distinction)	Proposed PSG is logically comprised of recognized subgroups and parallels A‑R‑C‑G‑ precedent; evidence of country conditions shows distinctness	Record lacks evidence that Honduran society perceives immediate family members of women unable to leave relationships as a distinct group	Court: Substantial evidence supports BIA; petitioner failed to show social distinction (and thus failed to establish a cognizable PSG)

Key Cases Cited

Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishes two‑step deference framework for reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes)
Valdiviezo‑Galdamez v. Attorney General, 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011) (criticized BIA’s prior social visibility/particularity approach and declined Chevron deference to that formulation)
Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993) (adopted Acosta’s immutable‑characteristic approach and framed PSG elements)
Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016) (upheld M‑E‑V‑G‑ social distinction and particularity as reasonable and distinct from nexus)
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (recognizes importance of Chevron deference to BIA in immigration context)
Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2012) (agencies’ reasonable statutory constructions deserve deference even if not the only permissible reading)
INS v. Aguirre‑Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (explains courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations in immigration adjudication)
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984) (establishes higher "clear probability" standard for withholding of removal)