2023 Ohio 4575
Ohio Ct. App.2023Background
- S.D. obtained an ex parte domestic violence civil protection order (DVCPO) against S.L. in July 2021; S.L. faced pending criminal charges, and multiple ex parte DVCPOs were issued and extended over 15 months without a full hearing.
- Hearings were repeatedly continued at S.D.'s request and without S.L.'s objection initially; later, when S.L. objected, the trial court denied further continuances.
- S.D. argued her right under Marsy’s Law, as the alleged victim in the criminal case, to refuse participation in DVCPO proceedings until the criminal case concluded.
- The trial court dismissed the ex parte DVCPO and denied S.D.’s motions for further continuance, finding no mandatory right to a continuance based on Marsy’s Law.
- S.D. appealed, raising errors concerning Marsy’s Law as good cause for continuance and the trial court's alleged inconsistency with prior orders granting continuances.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, clarifying the discretionary scope of continuances under R.C. 3113.31(D).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Marsy’s Law mandates continuance of DVCPO hearing due to pending criminal charges | Marsy’s Law gives victim right to refuse participation, which constitutes good cause for required continuance | Marsy’s Law does not entitle a victim to refuse to testify at court proceedings; continuance is not mandatory | Court: No bright-line rule; Marsy’s Law does not require mandatory continuance, discretion remains with trial court |
| Whether trial court must grant continuance because it previously granted similar unopposed requests | Court was inconsistent for denying latest continuance after granting similar requests | Prior continuances were unopposed; new objections justify a different result | Court: No obligation to grant continuances merely due to prior grants, especially when circumstances change |
| Whether immediate danger of domestic violence alone provides good cause for continuance of DVCPO hearing | Immediate danger should always constitute good cause | Did not directly address this, but opposed further delay | Court: Immediate danger is good cause for ex parte DVCPO, but not automatically for continuing a full hearing |
| Whether S.D. could raise “good cause” on appeal if not argued below | S.D. raised “good cause” for the first time on appeal | Did not object to procedural default | Concurring: Arguments not raised in trial court cannot be raised on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Coles v. Granville, 116 Ohio St.3d 231 (Ohio 2007) (permissible to take judicial notice of court filings for limited purpose)
- Parrish v. Parrish, 95 Ohio St.3d 1201 (Ohio 2002) (statutory basis and process for DVCPO petitions)
- Deacon v. Landers, 68 Ohio App.3d 26 (Ohio App. 4th Dist. 1990) (due process requirements at DVCPO full hearing)
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (Ohio 1983) (abuse of discretion standard)