S. Baxter Jones v. City of Detroit, Mich., 20 F.4th 1117

In 2014 Baxter Jones, a wheelchair user, was arrested during a Detroit protest; a police cargo van (without a lift or restraints) transported him after he could not board the police bus, and he alleges the transport aggravated spinal injuries.
Jones sued the City of Detroit, several officers, and others under Title II of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, § 1983, and state law; his ADA/Rehab Act claims against the City were premised on respondeat superior (vicarious) liability for officers’ failure to accommodate.
The district court granted summary judgment for the City on the ADA/Rehabilitation Act failure-to-accommodate claims, reasoning vicarious liability is not available under those statutes; Jones sought interlocutory appeal on that legal question.
The Sixth Circuit majority analyzed the remedial scheme Title II borrows (via §12133 and §794a) from Title VI and followed Supreme Court and circuit precedent (notably Gebser) to conclude that vicarious liability is unavailable.
Jones argued he could instead prevail on a deliberate-indifference/direct-liability theory, but the court held he forfeited that argument because he litigated only a respondeat-superior theory below.
Holding: the Sixth Circuit affirmed—Title II of the ADA and §505 of the Rehabilitation Act do not permit vicarious liability; Jones’s City claims premised solely on respondeat superior fail.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether respondeat superior (vicarious) liability is available against a public entity under Title II of the ADA and §505 of the Rehabilitation Act	Jones: Title II/§505 permit recovery against the City for officers’ failures to accommodate	City: Title II/§505 incorporate Title VI remedies, and Title VI (per Gebser) does not allow vicarious liability	Court: No vicarious liability under Title II/§505 because they import Title VI’s remedial regime and Gebser forecloses respondeat superior
Whether Jones preserved a deliberate-indifference or direct-liability theory against the City to avoid dismissal	Jones (on appeal): record shows City was deliberately indifferent and he can pursue direct liability	City/district court: Jones sued only on respondeat superior below and did not plead or argue deliberate indifference; thus he forfeited that theory	Court: Forfeited—Jones failed to raise deliberate-indifference/direct-liability theory in complaint or summary-judgment briefing, so cannot rely on it now

Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (interprets Title IX remedial limits and holds implied damages claim requires actual notice and deliberate indifference)
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (holds ADA remedies are coextensive with those under Title VI)
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (recognizes employer vicarious liability under Title VII)
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (recognizes an implied private right of action under Title IX)
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (discusses availability of damages remedies in civil-rights statutes)
Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999) (analyzes Rehabilitation Act remedies by reference to incorporated Title VII scheme)
County of Maricopa v. United States, 889 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 2018) (holds Title VI does not permit respondeat superior and relies on Gebser)
Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2002) (earlier decision allowing vicarious liability under ADA — discussed and distinguished)
Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (earlier decision permitting vicarious-liability theories under ADA — discussed and limited)
Zeno v. Pine Plains Central School District, 702 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2012) (addresses limits on third-party conduct attribution under Title VI)