S. B. v. County of San Diego
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8452
9th Cir.2017Background
- Deputies Moses, Vories, and Billieux responded to a 5150 call about David Brown, an intoxicated, mentally ill man inside his home who family reported had been "acting aggressively."
- Officers entered Brown’s house; they observed knives in his pockets and ordered him to kneel; Vories had a Taser ready and Moses had a firearm drawn.
- While Brown was kneeling and had briefly complied, he grabbed a six- to eight-inch kitchen knife from his back pocket and moved as if to rise or stab; officers’ testimony diverged on exactly how and when this occurred.
- Moses fired multiple shots, killing Brown; testimony differed about whether Brown was still on his knees or standing, the distance between Brown and Vories, and whether Moses could see the other officers.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force) and state wrongful death; the district court denied Moses qualified immunity, citing triable factual disputes.
- The Ninth Circuit agreed there was a triable dispute on objective reasonableness (Fourth Amendment) but held qualified immunity applied because existing precedent did not put Moses on clear notice that his conduct was unlawful as of August 24, 2013.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Moses violated the Fourth Amendment by using deadly force | Brown’s heirs: Moses used excessive force because Brown was on his knees, about 6–8 feet from Vories, had not been warned he would be shot, and Vories had a Taser available | Moses: shooting was reasonable to prevent an imminent stabbing of Vories | Triable factual dispute exists; a reasonable jury could find a Fourth Amendment violation |
| Whether Moses is entitled to qualified immunity (clearly established law) | Plaintiffs: prior decisions put officers on notice that shooting a mentally disturbed person with a knife can be excessive force | Moses: no controlling precedent put him on clear notice that shooting under these circumstances was unlawful | Qualified immunity applies: no sufficiently analogous precedent made unlawfulness clear on the date of the shooting; immunity reversed district court denial |
| Proper level of generality for clearly-established inquiry | Plaintiffs: general excessive-force principles and some district-court decisions show unlawfulness | Moses: law must be specific; only analogous appellate or Supreme Court precedent counts | Court applied the Supreme Court’s White/Sheehan instruction: must identify similar-case precedent; general principles insufficient |
| Scope of interlocutory review | Plaintiffs: factual disputes should preclude immunity | Defendants: appellate review limited to legal questions; factual disputes not reviewable on interlocutory appeal | Court reviewed legal question of clearly established law de novo but accepted that factual disputes preclude resolving the constitutional-violation prong here |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (objective-reasonableness standard for seizure by force)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (deadly force to prevent escape; threat-based limits)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (qualified-immunity: avoid defining clearly established law at high level of generality)
- City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (clarifies clearly-established inquiry and factual specificity)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (existing precedent must place constitutional question beyond debate)
- Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir.) (considerations when subject is emotionally disturbed)
- Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir.) (excessive-force analysis in shooting of intoxicated/mentally ill person)
- C.V. by & through Villegas v. City of Anaheim, 823 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir.) (qualified immunity two-step and factual-inference rules)