Rynders v. Williams
650 F.3d 1188
| 8th Cir. | 2011Background
- Rynders worked for the Garland County Road Department starting June 8, 2003.
- In April 2006, Rynders was involved in a workplace incident with three coworkers; he reported it to police and charges were later dropped.
- Rynders alleges Williams, as Garland County Judge, had authority over the Road Department and influenced disciplinary actions, including his termination.
- Rynders wrote a letter to the editor in December 2007 criticizing wage decisions, mentioning Williams once and alleging no retaliation by Williams was involved.
- In September 2008, Rynders received a written warning for being late; he claimed tardiness and sick leave were affected by coworkers’ actions and by a medical condition, and he sought FMLA information.
- January 13–20, 2009: Rynders was suspended and then terminated; he sued Williams in both official and individual capacities under the First Amendment and under the FMLA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Williams's termination of Rynders violate the First Amendment? | Williams had authority to fire and used it to punish the editor letter. | Termination was for poor attendance, not protected speech; Williams did not participate in the decision. | Partially yes; genuine issue whether termination was for the 2007 letter; official-capacity policy issue remanded. |
| Was Garland County liable under the First Amendment for Williams's conduct in official capacity? | Williams set Road Department policies and acted as final decisionmaker on termination. | No policy or final-decision linkage shown; no causation shown for county liability. | Remanded; need to assess whether Williams set policy to determine county liability. |
| Did Rynders provide sufficient notice under the FMLA to support interference/retaliation claims against Williams in official capacity, and did Williams personally receive notice? | Rynders told the Road Department about his condition on Sept 12, 2008 and repeatedly sought FMLA information; notice should support FMLA entitlement. | Rynders failed to provide statutorily timely and adequate notice; personal notice to Williams was not shown; claims fail. | Official-capacity FMLA notice issue creates a genuine question; personal-notice issue for Williams denied; district court correct on individual-capacity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (U.S. 2006) (public employees retain First Amendment protections)
- McGee v. Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 2 of Jefferson Cnty., Mo., 471 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2006) (speech must be a substantial or motivating factor in discharge)
- Davison v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 490 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 2007) (burden-shifting framework in First Amendment retaliation cases)
- Bonn v. City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 2010) (speech protection when speaking as a citizen on public concerns)
- Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2010) (municipal liability where policy or final policy-maker action is involved)
- City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (municipal liability requires final policy-maker action on policy)
- Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2002) (FMLA does not authorize retroactive or unscheduled leave without notice)
- Murphy v. FedEx Nat'l LTL, Inc., 618 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2010) (adequacy of notice under FMLA is typically a jury question)
- Estrada v. Cypress Semiconductor (Minn.) Inc., 616 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2010) (definition of serious health condition under FMLA includes ongoing treatment)