Ryan v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 382 F. Supp. 3d 142

Background

ICE issued memoranda (2011 priorities; 2014 courthouse guidance; 2017 DHS enforcement memo) and Directive No. 11072.1 (Jan. 10, 2018) governing civil immigration enforcement and authorizing targeted civil arrests inside courthouses.
Plaintiffs (district attorneys, CPCS, Chelsea Collaborative) allege ICE civilly arrests noncitizens at Massachusetts courthouses, chilling victims/witnesses and disrupting prosecutions and civil filings.
Massachusetts courts adopted policies limiting DHS activity inside courthouses after Lunn v. Commonwealth (2017); state trial court rules restrict DHS arrests in courtrooms and require incident reporting.
Plaintiffs sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing the Courthouse Civil Arrest Directive exceeds ICE's statutory authority because it conflicts with the common-law privilege against civil arrests of courthouse attendees.
The government defended the Directive as lawful exercise of INA arrest powers, argued Congress and practice demonstrate courthouse arrests, and disputed causation and injury.
The court considered standing (constitutional and prudential), likelihood of success on the APA claim, irreparable harm, and balance of harms, and issued a preliminary injunction limited to civil (not criminal) arrests of court attendees in Massachusetts.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing — injury in fact	Plaintiffs suffer concrete, particularized harms: disrupted prosecutions, lost witnesses/victims, diverted resources	Injuries derive from third-party decisions (noncitizens) and are not traceable; plaintiffs lack right to assert others' removal claims	Court: Plaintiffs (DAs, CPCS, Chelsea Collaborative) have Article III injury-in-fact and traceable injuries; they have prudential standing within INA's zone of interests
Prudential standing / zone of interests	As stakeholders in state courts, plaintiffs’ interests are more than marginally related to INA enforcement	Federal immigration enforcement falls outside plaintiffs' zone	Court: Plaintiffs fall within the statute's zone of interest; suit is a permissible APA challenge
Merits — APA / common-law privilege	The common-law privilege against civil arrest of courthouse attendees survived enactment of the INA; Congress did not clearly abrogate it, so ICE exceeded statutory authority by authorizing civil courthouse arrests	INA and later statutes/practice permit courthouse arrests; Congress was aware and did not forbid the practice	Court: Strong likelihood plaintiffs will prevail on Count 1; APA requires setting aside agency action that exceeds statutory authority; common-law privilege not clearly abrogated by INA
Irreparable harm, balance, public interest	Continued civil courthouse arrests cause harms not compensable by money (chilling witnesses, disrupted prosecutions, diverted services) — injunctive relief necessary; public interest favors functioning courts	Government asserts safety and enforcement interests, and that criminal arrests remain available; enforcement delays would harm public safety	Court: Plaintiffs showed irreparable harm; balance and public interest favor injunction limited to civil arrests of attendees (criminal arrests unaffected)

Key Cases Cited

Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (describing broad discretion in removal system)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing framework)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (concreteness and particularization for injury-in-fact)
Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999) (history of civil process and service)
Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128 (1916) (privilege against arrest while attending court)
Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908) (privilege's fundamental nature)
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standards)
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (balancing harms and public interest when government is defendant)