Ryan Remling v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 82A01-1705-CR-1063

In late 2016 Ryan A. Remling (24) lived intermittently in a family home where he babysat five-year-old A.S.; recordings on his phone and laptop showed sexual acts performed on or by A.S. and were forwarded by the victim’s sister to preserve proof.
Police seized Remling’s devices and recovered five videos consistent with the alleged molestations; other corroborating items (children’s panties) and a forensic interview with A.S. supported the allegations.
The State charged Remling with four counts of Level 1 child molesting under I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a)(1).
During trial the State moved to amend the Information twice: first to mirror statutory phrasing (“perform or submit”), then after trial began to add the statutory mental state (“knowingly or intentionally”); the court allowed both amendments.
After presentation of evidence but before closing, Remling elected to proceed pro se for closing argument; the court warned him repeatedly of the dangers, appointed standby counsel, and allowed his unsworn, prejudicial closing.
The jury convicted on all counts; the court imposed an aggregate executed sentence of 75 years. Remling appealed claiming (1) improper amendment after trial commenced and (2) invalid waiver of counsel.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Remling)	Held
Whether adding “knowingly or intentionally” to the Information after trial began was permissible	Amendment corrected form to conform to statutory language and did not change substance or prejudice defendant	Addition materially altered the charge by inserting an essential element after jeopardy attached and thus was impermissible	Amendment was one of form, not substance; court allowed it and no prejudice shown — affirmed
Whether Remling knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived counsel when he insisted on self-representation for closing	Court properly advised Remling of dangers; Remling understood risks and voluntarily chose to proceed pro se for closing; standby counsel appointed	Waiver was not made with appreciation of pitfalls; Remling’s education, Asperger’s diagnosis, and desperation undermined voluntariness; his pro se closing produced highly prejudicial admissions	Waiver was valid: trial court’s colloquy adequate under controlling factors and Remling made the choice "with eyes open"; conviction affirmed

Truax v. State, 856 N.E.2d 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (information must set forth nature and elements of offense in plain concise language)
Erkins v. State, 13 N.E.3d 400 (Ind. 2014) (statutory framework for amending charging information; form vs. substance analysis)
Blythe v. State, 14 N.E.3d 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (amendment of substance not permissible after trial commenced)
Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 2007) (test for whether amendment is form or substance)
Brown v. State, 912 N.E.2d 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (adding intent language during trial did not materially change substance and was permissible)
Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132 (Ind. 2003) (right to counsel includes right to self-representation)
Drake v. State, 895 N.E.2d 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (trial court must advise defendant of dangers of self-representation)
Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122 (Ind. 2001) (factors for assessing whether waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent)
Hopper v. State, 957 N.E.2d 613 (Ind. 2011) (defendant must choose self-representation with "eyes open")
R.T. v. State, 848 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (jurors are presumed to follow proper instructions)