Rutledge v. City of Kimball, 935 N.W.2d 746

Rutledge alleges David Ford, a City of Kimball employee, attacked and choked her inside the Kimball City Building; she filed an assault/battery suit against Ford and an administrative damage claim against the City.
Rutledge amended to add the City, alleging negligent hiring/supervision and failure to protect the public from Ford given his prior violent propensities.
The City moved to dismiss under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), invoking the § 13-910(7) intentional torts exception (claims "arising out of" assault or battery). The district court granted dismissal.
Rutledge later voluntarily dismissed her claim against Ford; she appealed the dismissal of the City.
The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether the PSTCA’s intentional torts exception barred the negligence claim and concluded the claim "arises out of" a battery because no duty independent of Ford’s employment was alleged.
Court affirmed: the City retains sovereign immunity under the intentional torts exception; Doe v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist. was distinguished because there the assailant was not an agent or employee.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rutledge's negligence claim against the City is barred by the PSTCA intentional torts exception	Rutledge: claim rests on the City’s independent duty to protect the public (not on vicarious liability or negligent hiring/supervision)	City: claim "arises out of" Ford’s assault/battery and thus is exempt from PSTCA waiver of immunity	Held: barred — plaintiff alleged no duty independent of Ford’s employment; claim is inextricably linked to the battery
Whether premises-liability / Doe precedent allows an independent-duty negligence claim to proceed	Rutledge: analogous to Doe — the City had an independent duty to protect persons on its premises	City: Doe is distinguishable because Ford was a City employee; here the only relationship was employment	Held: Doe distinguishable; when assailant is an employee and no separate duty is pled, the exception applies

Johnson v. State, 270 Neb. 316 (2005) (state immune where negligence claims stem from employee’s intentional assault; adopts Sheridan concurrence analysis)
Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1988) (concurrence explaining tests for whether claims "arise out of" intentional assaults or batteries)
Britton v. City of Crawford, 282 Neb. 374 (2011) (claims "inextricably linked" to a battery fall within the intentional torts exception)
Doe v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 273 Neb. 79 (2007) (permitted a negligence claim where the assailant was not an agent/employee and the duty was independent of any employment relationship)
Patterson v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 302 Neb. 442 (2019) (PSTCA governs claims based on employee acts within scope of employment)