Rustad v. Baumgartner, 943 N.W.2d 786

Parties: Trevor Rustad (father) and Mary Baumgartner (mother) share two children (born 2015 and 2017); district court originally awarded primary residential responsibility to Baumgartner and restricted Rustad’s parenting time (no overnights until younger child age 3, limited weekend visits, summer time left to mother).
This Court previously remanded (Rustad v. Baumgartner) directing the district court to reconsider weekend and summer parenting time because the original schedule unduly limited the father despite no evidence of harm to the children.
On remand the district court expanded Rustad’s regular weekend time (once children are 3: Thu 6:00 p.m.–Sun 4:00 p.m.), allowed him to exercise weekends outside Glasgow, and added two 2-week summer blocks pre-school and a 6-week summer block once school begins.
Both parties sought reconsideration; Baumgartner also moved to modify parenting time, arguing the children reaching school age created a material change because Rustad’s schedule would cause missed school days.
The district court denied Baumgartner’s modification motion after a hearing, finding no material change since the prior orders and that it had considered school attendance in crafting the amended plan.
This appeal: Rustad argued the district court failed to follow the appellate mandate; Baumgartner argued the school-age issue was a material change warranting modification. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Rustad)	Defendant's Argument (Baumgartner)	Held
Did the district court comply with this Court’s remand/mandate?	Remand required broader weekend and summer time; court failed to fully implement mandate.	District court complied by materially increasing weekend and summer time and adding flexibility.	Court held district court carried out the mandate’s terms.
Is children reaching school age a material change of circumstances justifying modification?	School-age attendance was anticipated and not a new circumstance; not material.	Children starting school is a material change because alternate weekends would cause missed school.	Court held aging into school was not a material change; district had contemplated school impact in amended plan.
Did the district court clearly err in denying Baumgartner’s modification motion?	Court’s factual findings supported expanded time; no clear error.	Modification was required in children’s best interests due to school conflicts.	Court applied clearly-erroneous standard and affirmed denial—findings were not clearly erroneous.
Did the amended plan provide adequate summer and weekend parenting time as directed on remand?	District court provided additional weekend days, flexibility for travel, and defined summer blocks.	Baumgartner argued plan still problematic for schooling and logistics.	Court held the amended plan granted Rustad significantly more time and flexibility, satisfying the remand.

Rustad v. Baumgartner, 920 N.W.2d 465 (2018) (prior remand directing reconsideration of weekend and summer parenting time)
Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 821 N.W.2d 760 (2012) (explaining law-of-the-case and mandate rule)
Curtiss v. Curtiss, 886 N.W.2d 565 (2016) (standard of review for parenting-time factual findings)
Konkel v. Amb, 937 N.W.2d 540 (2020) (discussing material-change standard for modifying parenting time)
Reinecke v. Griffeth, 533 N.W.2d 695 (N.D. 1995) (example of material change where parenting schedule caused child behavior problems)
Rustad v. Rustad, 849 N.W.2d 607 (2014) (warning against applying the tender-years doctrine and urging gender-neutral parenting decisions)