[¶ 1] Rick Rustad appeals and Svetlana Rustad cross-appeals from an amended judgment awarding her primary residential responsibility for the parties’ minor child. We affirm, concluding the district court’s decision to award Svetlana Rustad primary residential responsibility is not clearly erroneous.
I
[¶ 2] Rick and Svetlana Rustad were married in February 2008 and have one minor child together, who was born in 2011. Svetlana Rustad is a permanent resident of the United States and a Russian citizen. The parties lived in Kindred during the marriage. Rick Rustad is self-employed and works as a software consultant. Svetlana Rustad has degrees in economics and law, which she obtained in Russia, and she was employed throughout the marriage until October 2012.
[¶ 3] In May 2012, Rick Rustad filed for divorce. After a trial, the district court granted the divorce, distributed the marital property, awarded Svetlana Rustad rehabilitative spousal support and primary residential responsibility of the child, and ordered Rick Rustad to pay child support.
[¶4] Rick Rustad appealed the judgment, arguing the district court’s decision on primary residential responsibility was clearly erroneous, the decision was not supported by the evidence, the court failed to make specific findings about the best interest factors as required by N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2, and the court failed to explain its rationale for awarding primary residential responsibility to Svetlana Rus-tad when its findings were in his favor. Rick Rustad also argued the court’s marital property valuation and distribution was clearly erroneous, and the court’s decision to award Svetlana Rustad rehabilitative spousal support was clearly erroneous.
[¶ 5] In
Rustad v. Rustad,
[¶ 6] On remand, the district court amended its decision and made findings under the best interest factors. The court awarded Svetlana Rustad primary residential responsibility, finding the best interest factors favor Svetlana Rustad and it would be in the child’s best interest if she had primary residential responsibility.
II
[¶ 7] Rick Rustad argues the district court erred in awarding Svetlana Rustad primary residential responsibility. He contends the court misapplied the law, ignored relevant facts, considered facts that were not in evidence, and failed to address credible evidence of alienation.
[¶ 8] A court’s award of primary residential responsibility is a finding of fact, which will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.
Rustad,
[¶ 9] A district court has discretion in deciding primary residential responsibility, but the court must consider all of the relevant best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) and determine which party will best promote the child’s best interests and welfare.
Rustad,
[¶ 10] On remand, the district court made findings about each best interest factor. The court found factor (a), the ability of each parent to provide the child with love and guidance, and factor (m), other relevant factors, favor Svetlana Rus-tad:
Factor A: It is undisputed that both parents love [the child] very much. Svetlana has been the primary caregiver of [the child] with the aid of her mother. Rick did not want to be involved with [the child]’s day to day care. Rick wanted Svetlana to care for [the child], specifically giving her baths, feeding, and changing her. Prior to the parties [sic] separation, Rick did not change [the child]’s diapers. Svetlana provided [the child] with her daily care needs, and additionally spent time playing with [the child], singing her lullabies, and teaching her. Svetlana is very protective of [the child] and is a loving, caring mother. [The child] loves Svetlana very much; she runs to her mother and hugs and kisses her, and is very happy to be near her. [The child] also loves Rick very much and is happy to spend time with him. Although both parties love [the child] very much, this factor weighs in favor of Svetlana because she was more involved with the care of [the child], and has primarily seen to providing for her needs.
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Factor M: The parents come from different backgrounds, and cultures. They have had problems communicating with each other, due to language barriers and misunderstandings. The parents believe their way of parenting is the right way, and both parents although different have good parenting common sense skills. Svetlana has been the primary caregiver, along with her mother’s assistance. Svetlana is the parent who has bathed, clothed, and fed [the child] on a daily basis. She has scheduled all of [the child]’s necessary doctor appointments for her immunizations and general check-ups. Svetlana is more aware of her daughter’s needs, and is in a better position to explain a female’s needs. Svetlana articulates well thought plans for [the ehild]’s future education and exposure to the arts. [The child] isfamiliar with Rick’s home and is very-comfortable with the farm animals and his extended family. Rick can work a flexible schedule and when [the child] visits with him they spend all their time together. When [the child] spends time with her mother, if Svetlana is working, [the child] spends that time with her maternal grandmother. On the weekends, Svetlana is able to provide [the child] with full attention. The current schedule that is in place is nearly optimal for [the child] at this point in her life. It would be in [the child]’s best interest to have regular exposure to both of her parents, and both of her parents [sic] diverse cultures. However, someone has to be able to make regular decisions that are in [the child]’s best interest. Svetlana is in a better position to make decisions regarding [the child’s] education and extracurricular activities, and also her medical needs. Svetlana is better at providing for [the child’s] personal needs. Rick is more frugal when it comes to items for [the child] (i.e. he did not see the need for a changing table), and minimizes some of these needs. Svetlana has provided for most of [the child]’s basic and extra needs since birth. This factor favors Svetlana.
The court found the rest of the factors either did not apply or did not favor either party.
[¶ 11] Rick Rustad contends the district court erred in finding Svetlana Rustad was the child’s primary caretaker and improperly presumed she should be awarded primary residential responsibility based on that finding. We have recognized “a primary caretaker enjoys no paramount or presumptive status under the best interests of the child factors, we have also stated primary caretakers ‘deserve recognition’ in custody determinations.”
Heinle v. Heinle,
[¶ 12] Rick Rustad also contends that the district court showed bias by applying the tenants of the “tender years doctrine” in its analysis of factors (a) and (m). The “tender years doctrine” is a doctrine holding that children of “tender years,” regardless of their gender, belong with their mother.
See McDowell v. McDowell,
[¶ 13] Rick Rustad argues the district court erred in its analysis of factor (b), the ability of each parent to assure the child receives adequate food and shelter. He claims the evidence does not support the court’s finding that “Rick did not give money to Svetlana for [the child’s] needs.” However, Svetlana Rustad testified that she paid all of the child’s medical bills and insurance for the family and she bought all other necessary items for the child, including food and clothing. Rick Rustad testified that he provided for the child in other ways, he paid the mortgage and utility bills, and he admitted Svetlana Rustad paid more expenses directly related to the child. The parenting investigator testified that Svetlana Rustad paid for the child’s expenses more than Rick Rustad, but he paid other expenses for the family. The court found Rick Rustad paid the mortgage on the home and the utilities, and found “ultimately the parties were equally contributing to the family expenses.” The evidence supports the court’s findings. Rick Rustad also claims the court failed to consider that Svetlana Rustad was unemployed. The court found Svetlana Rustad was terminated from her prior employment, but found she is highly educated and has the ability to find good employment to support herself and the child. The court found factor (b) did not favor either party, and we conclude the court’s finding is not clearly erroneous.
[¶ 14] Although alienation is not specifically listed as one of the best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1), it is a significant factor in determining primary residential responsibility and can be considered under factor (e), the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child.
See Dieterle v. Dieterle,
[¶ 15] When the district court fails to specifically address a particular item, we have indicated that a court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if supporting evidence is “fairly discernable by deduction or inference” in the record.
P.A. v. A.H.O.,
[¶ 16] Rick Rustad argues the district court also erred by failing to consider Svetlana Rustad’s lack of moral fitness under factor (f). He contends the court did not properly consider evidence about Svetlana Rustad’s termination from her prior employment, which he alleged was due to misconduct. Factor (f) is “[t]he moral fitness of the parents, as that fitness impacts the child.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(f). The court found both parents appear to have good moral fitness as it impacts the child. The court considered the evidence presented about Svetlana Rustad’s termination from employment and found the reason for her termination was disputed and did not reflect on her moral fitness and ability to raise the child in a morally healthy environment. The court considered the evidence and its findings are not clearly erroneous.
[¶ 17] Rick Rustad claims the district court made findings about facts that were not in evidence, including finding the parties agreed English would be the child’s first language, Svetlana Rustad would like to remain in Fargo indefinitely, she made arrangements for the child’s maternal grandmother to stay in the United States, the parties agreed the child would have her own bed and bedroom when she is old enough, and Svetlana Rustad found a stable home in Fargo and might purchase a home in the near future. The court’s findings are supported by evidence. Svetlana Rustad testified that she speaks English and Russian about equally at home. She testified that she plans to stay in North Dakota. She has applied for jobs in Minneapolis because Job Service requires her to contact potential employers every week, but she will likely stay in North Dakota because there are more job opportunities and she already knows people here. She testified about her mother staying in the United States, and she testified that she has filed the required paperwork at the immigration office. Svetlana Rustad testified that the child does not currently have her own bed, but the child will in the future when she is older. The evidence revealed that Svetlana Rustad moved into an apartment after leaving the marital home, but she moved out one month later because the apartment was too expensive and she has remained living in her current apartment since that time. Although there was no evidence about Svetlana Rus-tad’s future plans to purchase a house, the court’s finding that “Svetlana may intend to purchase a home in the near future ...” was made in addressing Rick Rustad’s concern that Svetlana Rustad would disrupt the child’s home life because she might need to move into a bigger residence in the future. The court did not find Svetlana Rustad was planning to purchase a home;
[¶ 18] The district court followed our directive on remand and made findings on all of the best interest factors. The court’s findings now give us a clear understanding of its decision. The evidence supports the court’s findings and the court did not misapply the law. We conclude the court’s decision to award Svetlana Rustad primary residential responsibility is not clearly erroneous.
Ill
[¶ 19] On cross-appeal, Svetlana Rustad argues the district court erred in setting the parenting time schedule. She requests Rick Rustad have no more than one overnight visit per week and that he not have parenting time if the child is sick.
[¶ 20] Our standard of review for parenting-time decisions is well-established:
A trial court’s determination of parenting time is a finding of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. In awarding visitation to the noncustodial parent, the best interests of the child, rather than the wishes or desires of the parents, are paramount. We have stated visitation between a non-custodial parent and a child is presumed to be in the child’s best interests and that it is not merely a privilege of the non-custodial parent, but a right of the child.
Conzemius v. Conzemius,
[¶21] The district court ordered Rick Rustad have parenting time Monday at noon through Thursday at noon every week and both parents would have extended parenting time each summer. The court also ordered parenting time for holidays with Rick Rustad receiving parenting time each Easter, Thanksgiving, and Christmas; and Svetlana Rustad receiving parenting time for Russian Orthodox holidays.
[¶ 22] Svetlana Rustad claims Rick Rustad’s parenting time should be limited because a mother of a young child provides better care for the child. However, this Court has held the “tender-years doctrine” has been repealed and there is no presumption between the mother and father in residential responsibility or parenting time decisions regardless of the age of the child.
See Klein v. Larson,
[¶ 23] Svetlana Rustad also argues Rick Rustad’s parenting time should be limited because he does not adequately communicate with her about the child and the child is often sick after she stays with him. The district court found the parties have different parenting styles, but they have almost identical daily routines set for the child. The court found the parties have considerable communication issues, they have been ordered to use a traveling parenting journal, Svetlana Rustad keeps a detailed account of the child’s condition in the journal, and Rick Rustad focuses more on unusual issues with the child and the type of activities she was involved in while in his care. The court further found both parents have substantially followed the court’s order to use the parenting journal to assist with their communication and found they are capable of working together. The court found the parenting investigator noted Svetlana Rustad seemed to be overly critical of Rick Rustad’s care of the child and she blames Rick Rustad for the
[¶ 24] The evidence supports the district court’s findings, and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. We conclude the court’s parenting time decision is not clearly erroneous.
IV
[¶ 25] Svetlana Rustad also requests this Court reconsider the property division and spousal support award. The district court’s property division and spousal support award were affirmed in the prior appeal.
Rustad,
V
[¶ 26] We conclude the court’s decision to award Svetlana Rustad primary residential responsibility of the parties’ minor child is not clearly erroneous. We affirm the amended judgment.