461 S.W.3d 681
Ark.2015Background
- Petitioner Roy Lee Russell filed a pro se Rule 37.1 postconviction petition in Desha County Circuit Court on September 11, 2014 challenging convictions for second-degree battery and felon in possession of a firearm.
- The circuit court initially denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction; this court reversed and remanded on December 11, 2014 because the order lacked a basis for the jurisdictional finding and the petition appeared timely and verified. (Russell v. State, 2014 Ark. 530)
- Russell then filed a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus in the Arkansas Supreme Court asking the court to direct Judge Sam Pope to rule on the Rule 37.1 petition, arguing the court had had sufficient time to summarily dispose of it and that he is entitled to a hearing and other relief.
- Judge Pope responded that the Rule 37.1 petition is under consideration, that he has not completed review of an extensive trial record (eight volumes, 787 pages), and that the delay is for the purpose of reviewing the record rather than neglect.
- The Supreme Court considered whether mandamus is appropriate to compel a judge to act (ministerial duty) versus to control discretionary rulings, and whether Russell had shown a clear and certain right to the writ.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mandamus can compel Judge Pope to issue a ruling on the Rule 37.1 petition | Russell: Judge has delayed unreasonably and must be compelled to rule now | Judge Pope: Petition is under consideration; reviewing voluminous record; delay has cause | Denied — Russell hasn’t shown entitlement to writ because judge provided a justification for delay |
| Whether mandamus can compel a hearing or particular relief on the Rule 37.1 petition | Russell: Entitled to a hearing and other relief requested in his petition | Pope/State: Granting a hearing or particular relief is discretionary | Denied — mandamus cannot control discretionary rulings |
| Whether the duty to rule on pleadings is ministerial and thus mandamus-appropriate | Russell: The court’s duty to timely act is ministerial; must be enforced | State: Duty to act is ministerial but timing must account for necessary review; here judge is acting | Denied — duty is ministerial, but petitioner failed to show failure to perform it here |
| Whether the extent of the trial record justifies delay in ruling | Russell: Delay is undue despite record size | Judge Pope: Extensive record review (eight vols, 787 pages) and priority matters justify time taken | Held for Judge Pope — substantial record review constitutes good cause for the delay shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Gibson, 423 S.W.3d 34 (Ark. 2012) (mandamus proper only for ministerial duties; courts must timely act on pleadings)
- Ladwig v. Davis, 10 S.W.3d 461 (Ark. 2000) (mandamus granted where no good cause justified delay on Rule 37 petition)
- Urquhart v. Davis, 19 S.W.3d 21 (Ark. 2000) (mandamus granted where judge provided no explanation for delay)
- Eason v. Erwin, 781 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1989) (trial courts control their dockets; judicial independence requires docket control)
