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On April 30, 2012, petitioner filed this petition for writ of mandamus, in which he seeks an order from this court directing the circuit judge in his case, respondent Robert Bynum Gibson, Jr., to issue an order disposing of the pro se pleadings. As we discuss further below, it may be, but is less clear, that petitioner simply wishes some disposition of the pleadings. It appears that petitioner more specifically requests that a written order be entered on the record addressing the merits of his arguments concerning the court’s assumption of jurisdiction in the criminal proceeding so that he can seek interlocutory review. We deny the petition because petitioner has not provided a record that demonstrates that issuance of the writ is appropriate. He has not established that the trial court did not adequately dispose of the pleadings on the record or that the trial court had a duty to enter a written order that addressed the merits of his jurisdictional challenge. He has failed to show that he had a right to the relief that he seeks.
A writ of mandamus is issued to enforce an established right or to enforce the performance of a duty. Kelley v. Norris,
The issue key to petitioner’s claim here is whether the trial court had failed to perform a ministerial duty by not providing a written order in response to petitioner’s pro se pleadings. A сourt does have a ministerial duty to timely act upon pleadings filed in that court, regardless of the merit of those pleadings, and this court may grant a request for the writ where a court fails to act upon pleadings within a timely manner. See Nelson v. Glover,
The respondent’s circuitous argument is that no ruling concerning the merit of petitioner’s claims in the pro se motiоns was necessary because the trial court already had jurisdiction over the proceedings. As we indicated in Nelson, the fact that a pleading may lack merit or be entirely frivolous does not excuse the court from performance of its duty to act on the pleading. Petitioner may or may not have had the appropriate status to require the court to address the merits of the issue, but some ruling was required, and respondent’s argument therefore fails. See Monts v. Lessenberry,
Because the focus — if not the sole рoint — -of the petition for mandamus is a written order, the parties have not addressed whether some oral disposition of the pleadings occurred or if any oral disposition was adequate. Petitioner’s reference to the apparent threat of сontempt in one of his pleadings makes it seem likely that he may have been cautioned by the court that it would not consider the pleadings, and certain that there was an attempted discussion of the pleadings at a hearing. The record petitioner provides, however, does not include a transcript [ 4that would make clear what discussion occurred, and the respondent’s response to the petition does not indicate that the court advised petitioner that the arguments in his pro se pleadings would not be considered, struck the motions, or otherwise provided any ruling on the pro se motions on the record. If the trial court advised petitioner that the pro se pleadings would not be considered, his standing before the court concerning whether he was representеd by counsel would determine whether a written order was required.
Petitioner does not assert that he had waived his right to counsel, and the record in this case does not establish that petitioner was proceeding pro se at the time that he filed the pro se motions. There are references in the record before us to counsel for the defendant. There is nothing that would tend to indicate that the attorney was acting as stand-by counsel. Without pro se status before the court, petitioner was not entitled to the court’s consideration of his pro se motions, and the content of the motions was not such that it would have been outside the trial court’s discretion to disregard both motions and defer to counsel’s judgment to
A defendant who invokes his right to counsel before trial by retaining an attornеy or accepting appointment of counsel may be found to have waived his right to self-representation at trial and also in pretrial proceedings. Id. There is no right to hybrid representation. Id. The right to self-representation does not confer a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom, and it is not a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Faretta v. California,
When a defendant does not proceed pro se, with the exception of certain fundamental decisions such as whether a plea is to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether the client will testify, it is the attorney’s duty to take professional responsibility for the conduct of the case, after cоnsulting with his client. Monts,
In Monts, this court held that, when a defendant whо is represented by counsel files a pro se pretrial motion, the trial court should exercise its discretion to strike the motion on the ground that the defendant is represented by counsel — and, thus, was not entitled to proceed pro se— or otherwise make an appropriate ruling on the motion. We acknowledged that the court had a duty to provide an appropriate order that disposed of the motions by striking or otherwise acting upon the motion, although what order was issued is clearly within the court’s discretiоn. Monts,
In Monts, there was no open question that the defendant was represented by counsel, and the respondent’s рosition was that there was no duty for the court to respond to a pro se pretrial motion in that situation. Monts established that there is a duty to respond, contrary to the | ^respondent’s position, and that the court’s response must be made a matter of recоrd. Id. It appears that petitioner would have us go further and not simply require a response on the record, but require entry of a written order addressing the merits of the issue presented.
In this case, we do not know whether petitioner was represented by counsel, but рetitioner has not demonstrated that he was not. In order to carry his burden to demonstrate that the court had a duty to provide a written order addressing the merits, petitioner must show that he was proceeding pro se before the court; otherwise he was not entitlеd to an order addressing the merits, and no written order would be required in order to provide an appropriate order.
In Monts, we did not require that the order address the merits of the pro se pleadings or that the disposition of the pleadings must be through a written, ap-рealable order. In that case, the issue was one that was subject to interlocutory review and a written order may have been
With pro se status before thе court and some basis for an interlocutory review, ^[¿petitioner may be able to demonstrate that he was entitled to a written order granting or denying the pro se motions when requested. This court has permitted interlocutory appeal of an order that challenged the trial court’s ruling on an issue of jurisdiction. See C.H. v. State,
If petitioner was represented by counsel and not proceeding bеfore the court pro se, the trial court had an obligation to provide a disposition of the pro se pleadings on the record, but the trial court has discretion to address the merits of the pro se pleadings or to strike the pleadings. While Monts requires this be dоne on the record, petitioner has not established that a written order was necessary. An oral disposition of the matter, which would not be sufficient for an interlocutory review, would nevertheless be subject to review on petitioner’s direct appeal, shоuld petitioner be convicted. With an oral disposition on the record, a petitioner without pro se status would still have a remedy through appeal. Without pro se status, the decision to seek interlocutory review of the jurisdictional issue, if the trial court reached it, would be counsel’s. Petitioner would have no right to a written order, at his pro se request, that provided a ruling on the issue.
Under the circumstances here, petitioner has failed to make a showing that he had pro se status, and we will not order the trial court to issuе a written order on the merits of his claims. To the extent that petitioner may be requesting only that the trial court dispose of the pro se pleadings on the record, he has not established that the trial court failed to do so. While the respondent does not clarify in its stated position what occurred in that regard, petitioner’s own | ^assertions tend to support the conclusion that the trial court did advise him in a hearing that argument on the pro se pleadings would not be considered. Petitioner has not brought up a sufficient recоrd concerning those discussions for this court to make a determination that the trial court failed to dispose of the pleadings appropriately. The burden is on a petitioner to bring up a record sufficient to support the petitioner’s grounds for relief. Dаvis v. State,
Petition denied.
Notes
. The partial record shows that the court had entered a not-fit-to-proceed commitment order that stayed the proceedings on November 18, 2010. The court's docket shows another forensic report was filed on June 28, 2011, and orders were entered setting a hearing and trial date shortly afterward. No order doing so was included in the record or noted on the docket, but, presumably, the stay had been lifted when the pro se pleadings were filed.