Ruperto Hernandez Zarate v. U.S. Attorney General, 26 F.4th 1196

Ruperto Hernandez Zarate, a Mexican national, was convicted under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) for falsely representing a Social Security number.
An Immigration Judge and the BIA ruled Zarate ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT); the BIA relied on the statute’s intent-to-deceive element but did not analyze whether the offense is inherently "base, vile, or depraved."
The Eleventh Circuit reviews CIMT questions de novo and applies the categorical (or modified categorical) approach: determine whether the least culpable conduct criminalized by the statute constitutes a CIMT.
The court explains the BIA’s two‑prong definition of moral turpitude: (1) reprehensible/inherently base, vile, or depraved conduct and (2) a culpable mental state; fraud offenses, historically, are treated as CIMTs.
§ 408(a)(7)(B) criminalizes false representation of a Social Security number “with intent to deceive” “for any purpose,” so under the categorical approach the statute’s least culpable conduct may be non‑fraudulent (i.e., not an intent to obtain a benefit).
The Court concluded the BIA erred by treating intent to deceive as dispositive and remanded for the BIA to apply its full two‑prong moral‑turpitude test to § 408(a)(7)(B).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) is a CIMT	Zarate: statute can be violated for non‑fraudulent purposes, so the least culpable conduct is not necessarily morally turpitudinous	Government/BIA: statute requires intent to deceive and thus involves dishonesty—categorically a CIMT	Remanded: not categorically a CIMT on fraud grounds; BIA must analyze inherent baseness under its two‑prong test
Whether intent to deceive alone satisfies moral‑turpitude requirement	Zarate: intent to deceive ≠ intent to defraud; mens rea alone is insufficient without inherently reprehensible conduct	Government: culpable mental state demonstrates moral culpability and supports CIMT finding	Court: intent alone insufficient; mental state and reprehensibility are distinct and both must be addressed
Whether the categorical approach applies and whether §408(a)(7)(B) contains fraud as an element	Zarate: statute’s “for any other purpose” breadth shows no fraud element; categorical approach controls	Government: various circuits have treated §408(a)(7)(B) as CIDT; statute can criminalize fraudulent uses	Court: categorical approach applies (statute treated as indivisible); §408(a)(7)(B) does not necessarily include fraud as an element because of the “any other purpose” language

Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (Supreme Court: crimes involving fraud have long been regarded as involving moral turpitude)
Walker v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 783 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015) (dishonesty crimes are generally CIMTs; cited but distinguished)
Gelin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 837 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (de novo review; categorical approach for CIMT analysis)
United States v. Harris, 376 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2004) (elements of §408(a)(7)(B): false SSN representation, intent to deceive, for any purpose)
Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2002) (moral turpitude inquiry focuses on statutory nature of offense, not particular facts)
Keungne v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009) (categorical inquiry into inherent baseness for CIMT)
Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754 (2021) (Supreme Court discussion of categorical vs. modified categorical approach)