Runningeagle v. Schriro
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10535
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- In 1988 Runningeagle was convicted in Arizona of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death; the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed in 1993 (Runningeagle I).
- Trial counsel Iniguez presented limited mitigation (15 letters, testimony at hearings, PSRs, two court-ordered mental exams) and the court found three aggravators and only minimal mitigation (age).
- Post-conviction: Runningeagle filed Rule 32 (PCR) proceedings; appointed PCR counsel Antieau raised multiple IAC claims but the PCR court dismissed many as raiseable on direct appeal; the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.
- Years later Runningeagle pursued federal habeas; while appeals were pending the U.S. Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan (2012), creating an equitable exception to excuse procedural defaults of certain IAC claims when initial-review collateral counsel was ineffective.
- On limited remand to apply Martinez/Trevino principles, the Ninth Circuit held Arizona’s practice at the time effectively required IAC claims to be raised in initial-review collateral proceedings (so Martinez could apply), but concluded Runningeagle failed to show PCR counsel’s performance was both deficient and prejudicial as required; thus defaults remained unexcused and habeas relief was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Runningeagle) | Defendant's Argument (Ryan/State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arizona required IAC claims to be raised in initial-review collateral proceedings so Martinez applies | Valdez/Valdez-style practice and consolidation made direct appeal possible, so Martinez does not apply | Arizona’s system in practice made meaningful direct-review of IAC claims virtually impossible, so Martinez applies | Martinez/Trevino applies: Arizona’s procedure effectively required IAC claims to be raised in initial PCR proceedings |
| Whether PCR counsel (Antieau) provided constitutionally deficient assistance under Strickland in initial PCR proceedings | Antieau failed to investigate and present mitigation-level evidence and failed to pursue key expert work and funding | Record lacks contemporaneous proof of deficiency; choices may have been reasonable strategic decisions; presumption of competence applies | Antieau’s performance was not shown to be deficient under Strickland |
| Whether any PCR deficiency prejudiced the petitioner (i.e., reasonable probability of different outcome) — the recursive Martinez / Strickland prejudice requirement | Had PCR counsel developed mitigation/mental-health/cultural evidence, there is a reasonable probability the sentencer would not have imposed death | New evidence is largely cumulative or equivocal; even better experts’ opinions are tentative and would not have undermined confidence in the death sentence | No Strickland prejudice: petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability of a different penalty outcome |
| Substantive merit of other defaulted IAC claims (inculpation; failure to request second counsel) | Trial counsel should have developed inculpatory evidence against co-defendant Tilden or sought second counsel; these are substantial claims | Evidence strongly points to Runningeagle as the killer; inculpation theory lacks support and second-counsel claim is not per se deficient without special proof | Both claims are insubstantial; defaults not excused under Martinez |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (creation of deficient-performance and prejudice standards for IAC)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (state procedural default doctrine and cause-and-prejudice standard)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (equitable exception allowing cause to excuse procedural default when initial-review collateral counsel was ineffective)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (applying Martinez where state system in operation effectively required IAC claims to be raised in initial collateral review)
- Runningeagle v. State (Runningeagle I), 859 P.2d 169 (Ariz. 1993) (state-court opinion summarizing facts and affirming conviction/sentence)
- Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2015) (applying recursive Strickland prejudice analysis to Martinez claims)
- Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362 (9th Cir.) (discussing Martinez framework)
- Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir.) (procedural posture regarding evidentiary development under Martinez)
- Leavitt v. Arave, 646 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2011) (on weight of equivocal diagnostic opinions for mitigation)