Rudolph Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works LLC
849 F.3d 61
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Pittsburgh Glass Works (PGW) conducted a 2009 reduction-in-force (RIF) that terminated ~100 salaried employees; individual unit directors had broad, undocumented discretion in selections. Plaintiffs are older employees (mostly 50+) terminated in that RIF.
- Plaintiffs sued under the ADEA asserting disparate treatment, disparate impact (focusing on a 50-and-older subgroup), and limited retaliation claims; some opt-ins joined a putative collective action under the FLSA/ADEA framework.
- The District Court (1) initially conditionally certified a 50-and-older collective, (2) later decertified the collective as the opt-ins were found not similarly situated, (3) excluded expert testimony (statistics and implicit-bias), and (4) granted summary judgment to PGW on disparate-impact (holding subgroup claims not cognizable) and disparate-treatment claims.
- Plaintiffs appealed; the Third Circuit considered whether ADEA disparate-impact claims may be based on subgroups within the 40+ protected class and reviewed Daubert exclusion of the plaintiffs’ statistics expert.
- The Third Circuit reversed the District Court on the legal question, held subgroup disparate-impact claims cognizable under the ADEA, vacated the exclusion of the statistical expert and remanded for further Daubert proceedings, affirmed exclusion of the HR-practices and implicit-bias testimony, and affirmed decertification of the collective action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ADEA disparate-impact claims may be based on subgroups within the 40+ class (e.g., 50+) | Subgroup comparisons (or other age-focused analyses) can reveal age-based disparate impacts that a 40-and-older aggregate washes out. | ADEA protects the 40-and-older class; permitting subgroups allows manipulation (gerrymandering) and improperly treats age like a continuous variable rather than a protected class. | Held: Subgroup disparate-impact claims are cognizable; ADEA forbids discrimination "because of age," not merely "40-and-older" membership (O'Connor and Teal control). |
| Proper statistical evidence and admissibility of plaintiffs' expert (Daubert) | Dr. Campion's subgroup and z-score analyses reliably show increased termination likelihood for older subgroups; any methodological concerns go to weight not admissibility. | Expert used unreliable data, failed to apply Bonferroni adjustment (data-snooping), and his analysis lacks fit because subgroup claims are not cognizable. | Held: District Court erred to exclude the statistical testimony on these grounds; remand for further Daubert proceedings to assess reliability/fit under correct standard. |
| Admissibility of plaintiffs’ HR-practices expert testimony to rebut RFOA | Expert could show reasonable alternative practices and rebut employer's RFOA defense. | Rebuttal to RFOA must show the employer’s offered factors were unreasonable; listing alternatives is irrelevant. | Held: Exclusion affirmed — HR-practices testimony was not sufficiently relevant to rebut RFOA. |
| Admissibility of implicit-bias expert (IAT evidence) | Implicit-bias research can explain mechanisms that produce disparate impact and be probative of causation. | Such population-level evidence lacks fit to the employer’s specific decisions and disparate-impact claims do not require proof of employer state of mind. | Held: Exclusion affirmed — court did not abuse discretion excluding generalized IAT testimony for lack of fit. |
Key Cases Cited
- O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (Sup. Ct.) (ADEA prohibits discrimination "because of age," not merely membership in the 40-and-over class)
- Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (Sup. Ct.) (Title VII protects individual employees; bottom-line group advantage does not defeat a disparate-impact claim)
- Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (Sup. Ct.) (scope of ADEA disparate-impact liability is narrower than Title VII; plaintiffs must identify specific practices causing disparities)
- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (Sup. Ct.) (foundation of disparate-impact theory: neutral rules discriminatory in operation)
- Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (Sup. Ct.) (disparate-impact analysis centers on statistical disparities and factual proof)
- Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (Sup. Ct.) (plaintiff must identify specific employment practices producing disparities)
- Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (Sup. Ct.) (interpretation of "age" in different ADEA contexts; ADEA protects "relatively old" workers)
- Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (Sup. Ct.) (disparate-impact liability is limited and requires robust causation showing)