Ruben Lorenzo Paz v. State
05-14-01127-CR
| Tex. App. | Oct 22, 2015Background
- Victim W.G. (born ~2001) made multiple outcries that her father, Ruben Paz, began sexually abusing her at about age six and continued until age twelve; she reported penetration and described several locations (home, dentist office, employer’s office, cabana).
- W.G.’s older sister A.G. initially accused Paz, then recanted; A.G. testified at trial that she fabricated allegations under influence of relatives but had earlier told investigators Paz “checked” her and she had admitted abuse to the prosecutor the morning of trial.
- Forensic testing recovered semen on carpet from a restroom at a dentist’s office; DNA testing produced sperm-cell profiles matching Paz and epithelial-cell results that did not exclude W.G. for one sample.
- W.G. gave inconsistent testimony and recanted at times, but earlier forensic interview and multiple outcries were admitted; medical exam was normal (consistent with a delay between alleged acts and exam).
- Paz was indicted, tried, and convicted by a jury of continuous sexual abuse of a child (two or more acts over a 30+ day period) as to W.G.; indecency charge as to A.G. was dismissed by instructed verdict; punishment 40 years.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Paz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for continuous sexual abuse (two or more acts over 30+ days) | Evidence of multiple outcries, W.G.’s forensic interview describing repeated penetrations at multiple locations, and DNA linking Paz to semen in restroom carpet supports conviction | W.G. recanted; testimony was inconsistent; evidence insufficient to prove two or more acts beyond reasonable doubt | Affirmed: evidence sufficient; jury credited W.G.’s outcries and DNA corroboration despite recantations |
| Jury instruction on "reasonable doubt" (court’s language described exclusion of "reasonable doubt") | Instruction correctly stated burden is proof beyond reasonable doubt, not all possible doubt | Instruction impermissibly defined reasonable doubt (invoking Paulson) | Affirmed: instruction permissible (did not improperly define reasonable doubt) |
| Trial court jurisdiction / absence of transfer order from grand-jury court | Indictment was filed in 291st District Court; local assignment rules can govern where cases are tried | Grand jury impaneled in 204th Court; no transfer order in record — so 291st lacked jurisdiction | Affirmed: absence of transfer order is procedural, not jurisdictional; no timely plea waived complaint; indictment filed in 291st sufficed |
| Reformation of judgment (trial counsel named incorrectly) | N/A | Judgment listed wrong trial counsel name | Modified judgment to correct trial counsel to Al Mendez, then affirmed judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for sufficiency review: evidence viewed in light most favorable to verdict)
- Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (applying Jackson sufficiency standard)
- Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to support conviction)
- Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (jury may disbelieve recantation and weigh witness credibility)
- Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (trial court may give instruction distinguishing reasonable doubt from all possible doubt)
- Mills v. State, 742 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987) (absence of transfer order is procedural and waivable)
- Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (appellate courts may reform judgments to correct clerical errors)