991 F. Supp. 2d 678
W.D. Pa.2014Background
- Plaintiff Robert P. Rubano was a long‑time maintenance employee and foreman for Farrell Area School District; after a 2010 reorganization he was demoted to team leader, lost overtime and some certifications, and later took FMLA leave for chronic depression.
- Rubano alleged harassment beginning in 2009 (personal conflict with a board member, increased work, derogatory comments) that continued under new Director Dan Harkless (hired March 2010). He applied for FMLA in May–June 2010 and received leave June–Sept. 2010; he later took a second FMLA leave in 2011.
- Rubano filed EEOC charges (Oct. 8, 2010; Jan. 17, 2011; Sept. 19, 2011) asserting disability discrimination (regarded‑as), hostile work environment, demotion, and retaliation; he brought federal ADA and supplemental PHRA claims in 2011–2012.
- District moved for summary judgment arguing Rubano cannot show he was regarded as disabled (PHRA/ADA) or that adverse actions were caused by disability or protected activity; District relied on reorganization and financial reasons for reduced overtime and duty reassignment.
- Court applied ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) standard for the ADA (post‑2009) and the pre‑ADAAA standard for PHRA, found Rubano’s depression a non‑transitory impairment for ADAAA purposes but concluded evidence failed to show causation/pretext for ADA harassment/discrimination or retaliation; granted summary judgment for District.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rubano is "regarded as" disabled under the ADA (ADAAA) | Rubano argued his chronic depression and post‑FMLA treatment put District on notice and the District treated him differently after disclosure | District argued Rubano cannot show it regarded him as disabled and applied pre‑ADAAA standard (incorrectly) | Court: Under ADAAA Rubano’s depression is a mental impairment, non‑transitory; a genuine issue exists as to regarded‑as disability under the ADA because decisionmakers knew of his condition |
| Whether Rubano is "regarded as" disabled under the PHRA (pre‑ADAAA standard) | Rubano pointed to changed treatment after FMLA and removal of duties as evidence District perceived substantial limitation | District argued most adverse acts preceded notice of depression and were due to personal conflict and reorganization | Held: No reasonable jury could find District regarded him as substantially limited in working; PHRA disability claim fails as a matter of law |
| Whether alleged harassment/demotion were motivated by perceived disability (causation and pretext under ADA) | Rubano claimed post‑leave singling out (isolation at job site, removal from overtime, withholding mail) shows causation and pretext | District showed harassment/demotion began before notice, applied to other employees, and had legitimate non‑discriminatory reasons (reorganization, cost saving) | Held: Even assuming ADA disability, Rubano failed to show causation or that District’s reasons were pretextual; discrimination/harassment claims dismissed |
| Whether District retaliated for EEOC charges (ADA/PHRA retaliation) | Rubano alleged multiple retaliatory acts after charges (withheld mail, later written reprimand, denial of overtime/certification upkeep) | District argued most acts predated protected activity; the few post‑charge acts were not materially adverse or causally connected | Held: Most alleged acts occurred before charges; remaining acts (mail, reprimand) either not materially adverse or lacked causal nexus (timing/antagonism) — retaliation claims dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden shifting)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (framework for discrimination claims)
- Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (pretext standards for discrimination)
- Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375 (pre‑ADAAA regarded‑as analysis; working as major life activity)
- Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426 (PHRA/ADA regarded‑as intent inquiry)
- Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (but‑for causation for retaliation)