Rubalcado v. State
2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 391
Tex. Crim. App.2014Background
- Appellant Rubalcado entered a Midland–Ector County relationship and later faced Ector County charges for sex offenses against a child (J.S.).
- Midland police used J.S. to make pretextual calls to Rubalcado after he posted bail—aimed at eliciting incriminating statements.
- Three recorded calls occurred (Sept. 10, 23, 29, 2009) with police present; J.S. conducted the calls under police direction.
- Defense objected at trial, arguing the recordings violated Rubalcado's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that J.S. acted as a police agent.
- Court of Appeals denied relief, holding no Sixth Amendment violation and rejecting imputation of Ector County knowledge to Midland County.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached in Ector County and was violated by Massiah-type elicitation | Rubalcado argues knowledge of counsel in Ector should apply | State argues Midland calls were not for an offense with attached counsel and not Massiah setup | Yes, attachment occurred in Ector; recordings violated Massiah rights as used in Ector prosecution |
| Whether Midland law enforcement’s knowledge of counsel should be imputed from Ector to Midland | Knowledge should be imputed; Jackson-Moulton framework applies | No imputation; separate jurisdictions; no coordination shown | Yes, knowledge is imputable; Sixth Amendment applies across involved law enforcement actors |
| Whether J.S. was a government agent for Massiah purposes | J.S. acted as an agent of Midland; police supplied equipment and encouraged calls | Agent status disputed; no explicit instruction or quid pro quo shown | Yes, J.S. was a government agent under these facts |
| Whether the elicited statements were Deliberately Elicited | Calls included explicit interrogations and questions to obtain admissions | Some statements were innocuous or not designed to elicit | Yes, there was deliberate elicitation that violated Massiah |
| Whether there was a waiver of counsel or avoidable risk of bypassing counsel | Waiver not applicable in Massiah context; informant undisclosed | Defendant could have waived after initiation or by initiating contact | No waiver; Sixth Amendment violated by unaided interrogation |
Key Cases Cited
- Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (Sixth Amendment violation when government elicits incriminating statements after indictment without counsel)
- Moulton v. United States, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (Dual-use evidence; government agent eliciting statements; Massiah protections apply beyond jailhouse setting)
- Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (Imputing State knowledge to other law enforcement actors in Sixth Amendment contexts)
- Thompson v. State, 93 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (Right to counsel violation where undercover elicitation occurs for pending charges; potential overruled by Ventris later)