Rosemond v. Al-Lahiq, 362 S.W.3d 830

Rosemond sued Dr. Al-Lahiq in a health care liability suit; Rosemond later nonsuited the hospital; Dr. Katz provided the expert report under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §74.351.
Dispute over service of the report by facsimile within 120 days and whether timely service occurred; the trial court dismissed with prejudice based on deficiencies in the report and lack of service.
On original submission, the court of appeals initially upheld dismissal; the Texas Supreme Court reversed regarding timeliness and remanded to consider the sufficiency of the expert report and the denial of a 30‑day extension.
Katz’s six‑page report largely summarized records and contained an assessment and causation sections that tied lack of range-of-motion exercises to contractures but did not specify Dr. Al-Lahiq’s specific duty or breach.
The report did not clearly articulate the standard of care applicable to Dr. Al-Lahiq or connect Katz’s conclusions to Al-Lahiq’s actions; the court found the report deficient under §74.351(r)(6).
The appellate court held that while the report was deficient, the trial court abused its discretion by denying a 30‑day extension to cure under §74.351(c); the case was reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the extension.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Katz not qualified based on training or experience as to standard of care?	Rosemond argues Katz was qualified under §74.401(a),(c).	Al-Lahiq contends Katz lacked relevant training/experience for joint contractures.	No abuse; court’s implied qualification finding was reasonable.
Did Katz's report constitute no report at all requiring no extension?	Rosemond contends the report, though deficient, met minimal criteria and merited an extension.	Al-Lahiq argues the report is deficient to the point of being no report.	Report contained opinions by an expert with expertise and implicates Al-Lahiq’s conduct; extension permissible.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying a thirty-day extension to cure under §74.351(c)?	Rosemond asserts deficiencies are curable; extension should be granted.	Al-Lahiq maintains extension was not warranted.	Abuse; extension should have been granted.
Should the court affirm denial of extension or reverse and remand for cure?	Rosemond seeks reversal and remand for cure under §74.351(c).	Al-Lahiq argues no cure period should follow a deficient report.	Texas law favors granting a cure extension when deficiencies are curable; remand with extension.

American Transitional Care Centers of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873 (Tex. 2001) (defines 'good-faith' and what constitutes a fair summary under §74.351(r)(6))
In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d 507 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2004) (limits on qualifications and bridging experience to standard of care)
Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48 (Tex. 2002) (requirement that reports show specific standard of care and breach)
Jorgensen v. Texas MedClinic, 327 S.W.3d 285 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2010) (distinguishes cases with single defendant and defined standard from multi-defendant scenarios)
Scoresby v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2011) (establishes a minimal standard for granting a 30-day extension under §74.351(c))
Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. 2011) (discusses standards for evaluating extensions under §74.351(c) amid fractured authority)
Rosemond v. Al-Lahiq, 331 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam; remanded for consideration of first two issues after review)