163 F. Supp. 3d 787
E.D. Cal.2016Background
- Decedent Johnathan Rose, age 24, diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, died after Deputy David McEntire shot him three times during a January 17, 2012 response to a 911 call placed by Johnathan’s father requesting help administering medication.
- Parties’ accounts sharply conflict: Plaintiffs say Johnathan was asleep, presented his hands, was struck with a metal flashlight, and then was shot; Defendants say Johnathan attacked McEntire, grabbed his belt/weapon, and McEntire shot in self‑defense.
- Plaintiffs sued County of Sacramento, Sheriff Scott Jones, and Deputy McEntire under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force, substantive due process loss of familial relations, Monell municipal liability, supervisory liability), wrongful death (Cal. CCP § 377.60), and an unreasonable search claim.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment limited to Plaintiffs’ Count II (Fourteenth Amendment loss of familial relations) and Count III (Monell municipal liability).
- The court denied summary judgment as to Count II, finding genuine factual disputes about whether McEntire had time to deliberate (deliberate indifference vs. purpose to harm), and granted summary judgment for Defendants on Count III (Monell claim) for failure to prove a policy, practice, or deliberate indifference by the County.
- The court ordered Plaintiffs to file any required California successor‑in‑interest affidavit within 30 days, but did not dismiss standing at this stage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether parents’ Fourteenth Amendment claim for loss of familial relations (substantive due process) survives summary judgment | Plaintiffs say McEntire’s actions (waking, striking, then shooting a sleeping or compliant mentally ill son) meet even the high "purpose to harm" standard or at least show deliberate indifference | County contends McEntire’s use of force arose from a violent, unprovoked attack by Johnathan during a lawful law‑enforcement response, so no purpose to harm and summary judgment is proper | Denied: factual disputes about the sequence and immediacy of events create a triable issue about which culpability standard applies (deliberate indifference vs. purpose to harm) |
| Whether County is liable under Monell for failure to train deputies to deal with mentally ill persons | Plaintiffs claim lack of post‑academy CIT training and specific deficits for McEntire explain the constitutional violation | County shows deputies received some training and Plaintiffs failed to show training failure rose to deliberate indifference or was the moving force of the violation | Granted: Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of deliberate indifference or specific training deficiencies creating municipal liability |
| Whether County is liable under Monell for failure to supervise based on McEntire’s alleged complaint history and lack of data analysis | Plaintiffs point to McEntire’s alleged history of excessive‑force complaints and County’s purported failure to analyze complaint data | County argues single‑officer problems or unproven data‑analysis gaps cannot establish a longstanding custom or deliberate indifference | Granted: isolated or single‑officer supervisory shortcomings do not meet Monell standard |
| Whether County had unconstitutional practice of failing to investigate officer‑involved shootings (supporting Monell liability) | Plaintiffs argue Internal Affairs did not investigate officer‑involved shootings (2007–2012), creating a culture of non‑accountability that caused Johnathan’s death | County presents evidence investigations were done (homicide unit investigations, administrative IA review); Plaintiffs offer no convincing record showing a policy of non‑investigation or causal link | Granted: Plaintiffs failed to show a municipal practice of failing to investigate that caused the violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (parents have Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in companionship of children; deprivation actionable when conduct shocks the conscience)
- Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishes deliberate indifference standard from purpose‑to‑harm in snap‑judgment situations)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires an official policy or custom; respondeat superior not sufficient)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (municipal failure to train actionable only when it evidences deliberate indifference and is the moving force behind constitutional violations)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standards; genuine dispute requires evidence permitting reasonable jury verdict for nonmoving party)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (moving party’s burden on summary judgment and shifting burden to nonmoving party)
- Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (nonmoving party must show a genuine issue of material fact)
- Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 1999) (single incident insufficient to establish municipal custom or policy)
- Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 1996) (Monell custom must be persistent, widespread, and well settled)
- Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007) (failure to supervise a single officer generally insufficient for municipal liability)
- Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2006) (successor‑in‑interest requirements for prosecuting survival actions under California law)