Ronnie Payne v. Patricia Stansberry, 411 U.S. App. D.C. 310

Ronnie Payne was convicted after a jury trial; the trial judge’s final instruction told jurors: if the government failed to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt, “you must find that defendant guilty.” Defense counsel did not object.
Payne’s appointed appellate counsel (also his trial counsel) had the transcript but did not raise plain-error review of the burden-of-proof instruction on direct appeal. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed.
Payne filed pro se postconviction motions and a federal habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the erroneous instruction; appellate counsel admitted in letters he had “overlooked” the instruction.
The district court denied relief, finding Payne failed to show prejudice from counsel’s omission. Payne obtained a COA on ineffective-assistance claims and appealed.
The D.C. Circuit applied Strickland to appellate-counsel performance and analyzed whether the instruction was obvious plain error that affected substantial rights and trial fairness, concluding counsel’s omission was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial.
The court reversed, directing that Payne be given a new direct appeal to raise the burden-of-proof instructional error (or face issuance of a writ unless the district court provides a new appeal within a reasonable time).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek plain-error review of the jury burden-of-proof instruction	Payne: counsel overlooked an obvious constitutional instruction error; omission not strategic; reasonable probability of a different outcome on appeal	Government: reviewing court would consider instructions as a whole and not find plain error or structural defect; omission not prejudicial	Held: Counsel’s omission was objectively unreasonable; there is a reasonable probability the D.C. Court of Appeals would have found plain error; Strickland prejudice established — grant relief in form of a new appeal
Whether the erroneous instruction constituted plain error/structural error affecting substantial rights and trial fairness	Payne: instruction directed a guilty verdict/diluted Winship reasonable-doubt requirement; thus likely structural or at least plainly prejudicial	Government: instruction should be judged in context of all instructions; not necessarily structural or prejudicial under Victor analysis	Held: Instruction was obvious legal error that effectively directed a guilty verdict; under Sullivan/Winship logic and D.C. precedents, the error likely satisfies the plain-error prejudice and integrity prongs; supports Strickland prejudice finding

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance standard)
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (right to effective assistance on direct appeal)
Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain-error standard)
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (defective reasonable-doubt instruction can be structural error)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (government must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt)
Roe v. Delo, 160 F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 1998) (appellate counsel need not raise every nonfrivolous issue; winnowing issues may be reasonable)
United States v. Hayward, 420 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (instruction directing conviction operates as directed verdict)
Baker v. United States, 324 A.2d 194 (D.C. 1974) (must-convict instruction treated as directing verdict; presumption juries follow instructions)
United States v. Merlos, 8 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing Sullivan’s application to plain-error analysis)