Ronaldo Marques v. Loretta Lynch
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15296
| 5th Cir. | 2016Background
- Ronaldo De Lima Marques, a Brazilian national, entered the U.S. lawfully as a nonimmigrant (B‑2, later student) in 2001 and married a U.S. citizen in 2005, then applied for adjustment to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status based on that marriage; his I‑485 was approved in 2006.
- DHS investigated a marriage‑fraud ring tied to the spouse; the spouse pleaded guilty to visa‑fraud conspiracy and admitted her marriage to Marques was fraudulent; Marques divorced her in 2008.
- DHS issued a Notice to Appear charging Marques removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) as inadmissible at time of adjustment under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (no valid unexpired immigrant visa) and § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (marriage fraud); the fraud charge was later withdrawn.
- The IJ found Marques removable for lacking a valid unexpired immigrant visa at the time of adjustment; the BIA affirmed and denied a motion to reopen; Marques petitioned for review in the Fifth Circuit.
- The Fifth Circuit analyzed whether (1) § 1182(a)(7)’s documentation requirement (which applies “at the time of application for admission”) applies to post‑entry adjustments of status, and (2) whether Chevron deference to the BIA’s contrary interpretation was appropriate.
- The court concluded § 1182(a)(7) does not apply to aliens previously validly admitted who apply for adjustment of status, vacated the BIA’s removal order, and denied as moot the petition challenging denial of reopening.
Issues
| Issue | Marques' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) documentation requirement applies to post‑entry adjustment of status | § 1182(a)(7) applies only to an "application for admission" and not to an in‑country adjustment | An adjustment of status is effectively an application for admission (or a recorded admission), so § 1182(a)(7) applies; BIA’s interpretation merits Chevron deference | Held: § 1182(a)(7) does not apply to aliens who were previously validly admitted and seek adjustment of status; BIA not entitled to Chevron deference on this point |
| Whether § 1227(a)(1)(A)’s cross‑reference incorporates timing/limitations of the referenced inadmissibility provision | Implicit in above: if § 1182(a)(7) doesn’t apply to adjustments, § 1227(a)(1)(A) cannot render Marques removable on that ground | § 1227(a)(1)(A) contemplates inadmissibility at entry or adjustment; cross‑reference supports BIA view | Held: § 1227(a)(1)(A) does not override timing limits in referenced statutes; no ambiguity justifying deference |
| Whether Chevron deference applies to BIA’s interpretation equating adjustment with admission | N/A (Marques argues statute clear) | Agency interpretation reasonable and should be deferred to under Chevron | Held: No Chevron deference because statutory text and context resolve issue; prior circuit precedent disfavors equating adjustment with physical admission |
| Whether Martinez (and related caselaw re: § 1182(h)) compels treating adjustment as admission for other INA provisions | Marques relies on Martinez and other circuit decisions treating "admission" as physical entry post‑inspection, not adjustment | Government argues other INA provisions and §1255(b) support deeming adjustment a recorded admission | Held: Martinez and circuit authority show Congress and courts distinguish adjustment from physical admission; that authority supports rejecting BIA’s contrary view |
Key Cases Cited
- Majd v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 590 (5th Cir.) (discussing review of BIA decisions)
- Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588 (5th Cir.) (scope of appellate review over IJ and BIA)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for agency deference)
- Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532 (5th Cir.) (holding ‘‘admission’’ means physical entry after inspection; adjustment ≠ prior admission for § 1182(h) waiver bar)
- Nino v. Holder, 690 F.3d 691 (5th Cir.) (analysis of what cross‑referencing INA provisions adopt)
- Paz Calix v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir.) (treatment of cross‑references in the INA)
- Ortiz‑Bouchet v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 714 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir.) (holding § 1182(a)(7) applies to applicants for admission, not post‑entry adjustments)
- Pei‑Chi Tien v. INS, 638 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir.) (predecessor circuit view on documentary requirements and adjustment of status)
- Orellana‑Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511 (5th Cir.) (Chevron analysis and agency deference guidance)
