Ronald Tucker v. John Doe, 330199

Plaintiff was in his parked car when a dark-colored minivan (hit-and-run) struck a white van, which was then propelled into plaintiff’s vehicle; the hit-and-run driver fled.
Plaintiff sought uninsured motorist (UM) benefits under his no-fault policy; insurer Metropolitan denied the claim, arguing the policy required the hit-and-run vehicle to have directly “struck” plaintiff or his car.
The policy’s UM provision covered bodily injury caused by an uninsured motor vehicle and defined an “uninsured motor vehicle” to include a “hit and run motor vehicle which causes bodily injury … as the result of striking that person or a motor vehicle which that person is occupying.”
Trial court granted summary disposition for the insurer, concluding the hit-and-run vehicle did not “strike” plaintiff’s vehicle as required by the policy.
On appeal, plaintiff argued the policy’s “striking” language does not require direct contact and is satisfied where an intermediate vehicle transmits the force (i.e., a substantial physical nexus exists).
Court of Appeals reversed, holding the policy did not impose a “direct” contact requirement and that a factual dispute existed whether a substantial physical nexus linked the hit-and-run vehicle to the impact on plaintiff’s car.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the policy’s term “striking” requires direct physical contact by the hit-and-run vehicle with plaintiff or plaintiff’s vehicle	"Striking" need not be direct; an intermediate vehicle can transmit the impact and satisfy the policy’s physical-contact requirement	"Striking" requires direct contact; no coverage because the hit-and-run vehicle never directly hit plaintiff or his car	The court held the policy does not require direct contact; indirect contact via an intermediate vehicle can satisfy the term if a substantial physical nexus exists
Whether a factual question exists on the substantial-physical-nexus inquiry	Evidence (plaintiff and intermediate-driver statements) supports a substantial physical nexus	Insurer argued lack of direct strike defeats claim; moved for summary disposition	Court found disputed facts sufficient to preclude summary disposition and remanded for further proceedings

Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 473 Mich. 457 (2005) (UM rights are contractual and construed without reference to the no-fault act)
DeFrain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 491 Mich. 359 (2012) (contract interpretation is a question of law; give policy language its ordinary meaning)
McJimpson v. Auto Club Group Ins. Co., 315 Mich. App. 353 (2016) (distinguishes policies requiring “direct” physical contact from those allowing indirect contact)
Berry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Mich. App. 340 (1996) (physical-contact requirement mitigates fraudulent phantom-vehicle claims; indirect contact can suffice)
Wills v. State Farm Ins. Co., 222 Mich. App. 110 (1997) (applies substantial physical nexus test for indirect contact)
Hill v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 157 Mich. App. 383 (1987) (recognizes recovery where hit-and-run strikes an intervening vehicle that then strikes the plaintiff)
Lord v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 22 Mich. App. 669 (1970) (impact of a hit-and-run vehicle may be transmitted through an intermediate car)