Ronald Hines v. Bud Alldredge, Jr.
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5030
5th Cir.2015Background
- Ronald Hines, a Texas-licensed veterinarian, provided paid remote veterinary advice by email/phone after retiring, without physically examining animals. He did not prescribe medication and sometimes reviewed veterinary records.
- Texas law requires a veterinarian-client-patient relationship before practicing veterinary medicine; such a relationship requires the veterinarian to have recently seen the animal or visited its premises — expressly prohibiting establishment solely by telephone or electronic means (the “physical examination requirement”).
- The Texas Board disciplined Hines in 2012 for giving veterinary advice without a physical exam; Hines accepted sanctions but later sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
- Hines alleged the physical-exam requirement violated his First Amendment free speech rights and his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. He challenged only that requirement, not pure general advice.
- The district court dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claims but allowed the First Amendment claims to proceed, reasoning the rule regulated professional speech and required more than mere rationality under Planned Parenthood v. Casey; the Board sought interlocutory review.
- The Fifth Circuit reviews de novo on a Rule 12(b)(6) record and framed the core question as whether the physical-examination rule implicates or violates the First Amendment and whether it survives rational-basis review for Fourteenth Amendment claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Texas’s physical-exam requirement violates the First Amendment | Hines: the rule regulates professional speech and thus is subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny; it unconstitutionally restricts his remote advice | Board: the rule regulates professional conduct/licensing, not speech content, and any speech impact is incidental and permissible | Reversed district court; the rule does not violate the First Amendment because it regulates professional conduct/licensing and only incidentally affects speech |
| Whether the requirement violates Equal Protection | Hines: differential treatment of remote advice lacks adequate justification | Board: classification is rationally related to legitimate public health/safety interests (quality of care, reduced misdiagnosis) | Affirmed dismissal; rational-basis review satisfied |
| Whether the requirement violates Substantive Due Process | Hines: the rule unlawfully impairs his practice without adequate process/substantive protection | Board: rule is a valid exercise of state power over professional practice and passes rational-basis review | Affirmed dismissal; due process claim fails under rational-basis review |
| Scope of permissible regulation of professional speech | Hines: professional-speech cases (per district court’s reading of Casey) require more than mere rationality | Board: longstanding precedent allows content-neutral regulation of professional practice even if speech is incidentally affected | Held that longstanding doctrine permits states to regulate professions and licensing; incidental burdens on speech are permissible |
Key Cases Cited
- Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion on standards for scrutiny in professional/regulated contexts cited by district court)
- Lowe v. Securities & Exchange Comm’n, 472 U.S. 181 (1985) (White, J., concurring in result) (professional speech may be incidental to regulable professional conduct)
- Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (explains that laws regulating commerce or conduct may impose incidental burdens on speech)
- Velazquez v. Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (struck down viewpoint-based restriction on legal advocacy; distinguished here as content/viewpoint-based)
- Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (invalidated content-based regulation of speech; distinguished from content-neutral professional regulation)
- Daly v. Sprague, 742 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1984) (state regulation of physicians’ professional conduct may incidentally restrict speech without violating the First Amendment)