Ronald Colbert v. United States
785 F.3d 1384
11th Cir.2015Background
- The Navajo Nation and BIA entered a 2006–2008 ISDEAA (‘638) self-determination contract making the Navajo Nation responsible for administering the Navajo Children & Family Services Program (NNCFS) consistent with ICWA.
- NNDOJ attorney Kandis Martine (employed by the Navajo Nation, not paid directly from ‘638 funds) attended a Florida state adoption hearing to advise/educate retained Florida counsel and to monitor ICWA compliance on behalf of NNCFS.
- While traveling to the hearing on April 2, 2007, Martine caused a car accident; the injured parties sued Martine, Budget Rent‑A‑Car, and the United States invoking ISDEAA §314 FTCA coverage.
- The BIA/DOJ declined to certify Martine as a federal employee under 28 U.S.C. §2679(d)(1); the district court under §2679(d)(3) later found Martine was "carrying out" the self-determination contract, substituted the United States, and dismissed Martine.
- After a bench trial the district court found the United States liable; on appeal the Government challenged subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing the court erred factually in finding Martine was carrying out covered ‘638 functions and that extending FTCA coverage improperly expands the waiver of sovereign immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §314 of ISDEAA ("deemed" status) applies when a tribal employee is performing functions under a self-determination contract | Martine/Navajo: §314 covers tribal employees who are performing identifiable ‘638 contract functions (regardless of pay source); Martine was performing Scope of Work functions (ICWA training/monitoring) | United States: Martine’s role as an NNDOJ attorney and not a listed ‘638 program employee precludes FTCA coverage; coverage should be limited to positions expressly contemplated by the contract/BIA | Affirmed: §314 unambiguous; Martine was "carrying out" authorized ‘638 functions (Scope of Work ¶¶9,11) and thus qualified for FTCA protection |
| Whether the phrase "carrying out" should be narrowly construed to exclude tribal attorneys or those not paid from contract funds | Martine/Navajo: "Carrying out" means performing or acting under the contract; tribal discretion to staff positions is permitted; 25 C.F.R. §900.197 allows coverage where pay source differs | United States: "Carrying out" should be limited to traditional program positions and functions actually budgeted under the AFA; attorneys not within those positions should be excluded | Affirmed: "Carrying out" means acting under the contract; funding source irrelevant to coverage if actions implement ‘638 functions; tribal attorney could perform Scope of Work tasks |
| Whether the district court’s factual finding that Martine was performing covered functions was erroneous, making substitution improper | Martine/Colberts: record shows Martine educated contract counsel on ICWA and monitored state court compliance—functions expressly in the Scope of Work | United States: district court erred as a factual matter; Martine did legal work not covered by the ‘638 contract and lacked requisite position/qualification under AFA | Affirmed: record supports factual finding that Martine was performing Scope of Work functions at time of accident; substitution under §2679(d)(3) proper |
| Whether applying §314 here improperly expands waiver of sovereign immunity | Martine/Navajo: §314 is a clear, statutory waiver; applying it furthers ISDEAA/ICWA goals and fits the statutory scheme | United States: extending FTCA to these facts is an impermissible enlargement of waiver beyond what Congress intended | Affirmed: §314 unambiguous; applying it to these facts does not impermissibly extend waiver |
Key Cases Cited
- Means v. United States, 176 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir.) (FTCA scope and employee/scope principles)
- United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (U.S. 1976) (FTCA waiver and scope guidance)
- Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007) (statutory interpretation principles)
- Shirk v. United States, 773 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussion of limits on §314 coverage; relied on but distinguished)
- FGS Constructors, Inc. v. Carlow, 64 F.3d 1230 (8th Cir. 1995) (recognizing tribal entities perform federal functions under ISDEAA; policy background)