821 F.3d 1270
11th Cir.2016Background
- Ronald Wayne Clark was convicted in Florida of the 1990 murder and robbery of Ronald Willis; jury found him guilty and recommended death (11–1). The trial court imposed death; Florida Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal.
- At penalty phase Clark (through counsel) declined to present mitigating evidence to the jury after a lengthy on‑the‑record colloquy in which Clark personally waived presenting mitigation or testifying; counsel later explained strategy at post‑conviction hearing that mitigation could be “double‑edged.”
- Defense submitted extensive psychiatric and social‑history reports at a Spencer hearing before sentencing; the trial judge stated he had considered these reports but the written sentencing order did not narrate them in detail and concluded no mitigators outweighed the aggravators.
- Clark raised (among other claims) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present mitigation, judicial failure to consider mitigation, and Brady claims alleging the State suppressed impeachment statements by co‑defendant Hatch; state courts denied relief and Clark filed federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
- The district court denied habeas relief; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, applying AEDPA deference and holding (1) the ineffective‑assistance claim failed under Strickland (counsel’s strategy reasonable and followed Clark’s express instruction), (2) the sentencing judge did consider mitigation as a factual matter, and (3) Clark failed to show suppression, materiality, or entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on his Brady claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ineffective assistance for failing to present mitigating evidence | Clark: counsel unreasonably declined to present mitigation; prejudiced because jury might have recommended life | State: claim procedurally barred; alternatively counsel’s choice was a reasonable strategy and followed Clark’s instruction | Denied — Florida Supreme Court’s Strickland ruling was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law; counsel’s decision reasonable and based on strategy and client instruction |
| Sentencing judge failed to consider submitted mitigating evidence | Clark: judge’s written order omitted discussion of the psychiatric reports so court may have given them no weight | State: trial judge expressly said he considered all evidence; omission in written order does not show constitutional infirmity | Denied — trial judge’s statements and proceedings show consideration; no Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment violation established |
| Brady suppression of co‑defendant statements (impeachment evidence) | Clark: prosecution suppressed Hatch statements that contradicted trial testimony and showed bias | State: discovery record and trial cross‑examination show Hatch’s statements were disclosed; no evidence of suppression or materiality; procedural issues also raised | Denied — record shows disclosure of impeachment material; Clark failed to prove suppression, materiality, or satisfy AEDPA standard for an evidentiary hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of favorable evidence violates due process)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard: performance and prejudice)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deferential standard and "double" deference with Strickland)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (federal habeas review limited to the state‑court record)
- Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009) (state procedural rules that refuse to readjudicate do not necessarily impose federal procedural default)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel’s duty to investigate mitigating evidence and evaluation under Strickland)
- Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencer must be allowed to consider any relevant mitigating evidence)
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (sentencer cannot be precluded from considering mitigating factors)
- Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991) (trial judge’s statement that he considered evidence may support presumption of consideration)
- Kormondy v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 688 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012) (mitigation can be a two‑edged sword; deference under AEDPA/Strickland)